

Development on the Move

Measuring and Optimising Migration's Economic and Social Impacts

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About ippr

The Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr) is the UK's leading progressive think tank, producing cutting-edge research and innovative policy ideas for a just, democratic and sustainable world.

This report captures the main results from *Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimising Migration's Economic and Social Impacts*, a joint project of the Global

Contents

About the authors.....	6
Acknowledgements.....	7
Glossary.....	9
Executive summary.....	11
1. Introduction.....	22
2. Methodology.....	25
3. Patterns of migration, remittances and other interactions.....	34
4. Migration's development impacts.....	57
5. What can policymakers do?.....	93
6. What have we learnt?.....	109
References.....	111

The backbone of this project has been the country-based research, carried out by seven teams of researchers. These were led by Mauricio Cardenas (Colombia), Mili Kaitani (Fiji)¹, Robert Tchaidze and Karine Torosyan (Georgia), Francis Dodoo and Ian Yeboah (Ghana), Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (Jamaica), Zoran Nikolovski (Macedonia) and Dang

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CS	Cross-sectional
DD	Difference-in-difference
Diaspora	All people living outside the borders of a country who were born in that country or share that national identity (including not just migrants themselves but also subsequent generations)
DotM	Development on the Move
Emigration	Leaving one country to go to live in another
GMO	Global Migration Origin database
Immigration	Moving into a country – other than the country of one’s birth – to live there
IV	Instrumental Variable
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSM	Propensity Score Matching
Remittances	Money sent across international borders

This report presents the main findings from the major global research project, *Development on the Move*, carried out between 2006 and 2010. The project has examined a wide range of migration's impacts on development, including through gathering new, comparable data in Colombia, Fiji³, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam. While the already-published country studies provide details of findings in each country, this report seeks to draw out the main comparative lessons.

The project aimed to make five key contributions to the study of migration's development impacts:

1. To develop better methodologies for assessing migration's impacts. The project designed a new, holistic approach to the study of migration and development. Our aim was to examine the range of various effects that international migration – both immigration and emigration – has on economic and social development.
2. To improve the evidence base. The project commissioned a set of new country studies, each of which was conducted in the same way, combining analysis of the existing literature with new data taken from extensive, in-depth household surveys and stakeholder interviews.
3. To carry out comparative work. There is a clear need for more analysis that examines similar research questions, using similar definitions of migration and development, and gathering similar kinds of data in similar ways. This kind of analysis should give us a much greater insight into general lessons and the factors that appear to be at the root of differences in impacts.
4. To analyse policy impacts and options. An explicit focus of the project was current and potential policy frameworks for managing migration and its impacts. We wanted to explore how policymakers could enhance positive impacts and reduce negative ones.
5. To build research capacity on migration. In order to help build migration research

3. Analysis from Fiji is not included in this main report as the Fiji dataset and report were not complete at the time this report was being prepared. We anticipate its publication later in 2010.

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Our survey gives an insight into the motivations driving emigration and return

them,⁴ people returning voluntarily because their visa has expired, or people who are deported). It would seem that immigration regimes in countries of destination do drive some return migration, despite assertions by some that they have no effect. Another relatively common set of reasons revolve around the migrant either being disappointed with their life overseas, or missing the culture and lifestyle at 'home'.

New economic opportunities in the country of origin, such as a new job, or wanting to start a new business, and government or other schemes to motivate return, are mentioned rarely. This is likely to be disappointing for policymakers in both origin and destination countries who hope to tempt returnees back by highlighting new economic opportunities or providing specially tailored programmes, such as voluntary return packages.

3
 Table 2 highlights the proportion of absent migrants who remit to the household they left behind when they migrated – somewhere between one third and three quarters, depending on the country in question. Given the information we have on the proportion of households in each country that have a migrant, we are able to calculate the proportion of the population in each country that receives remittances from their own absent migrant. This ranges between 2 and 11 per cent.

Our research also shows that it is veives

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4. Bonds are arrangements whereby when a migrant goes abroad supported by the government of their country of origin (often for study), they agree to return, and if they do not return they have to pay a certain amount to the government.

Vietnamese women remitting more than men while Macedonian women remit less than their male counterparts. Other characteristics appear to have more consistent effects – for example, if the migrant leaves close family behind (such as a partner or children), they remit more. This is unsurprising, but may raise awkward trade-off questions in policymakers’ minds, especially in countries of origin, for while extended periods of separation are no doubt bad for family welfare, there may be a temptation to pursue that kind of migration to maximise remittance flows.

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than those without (the World Bank estimates average annual per capita household income in Ghana is US\$670). Return migrants appear to have no particular impact one way or the other.

In terms of school attendance, however, on the whole migration seems not to have any effects – whether household experience is through the receipt of remittances, having a migrant away or having a returned migrant in their household. Putting these two results together suggests that households with migrants are probably making improvements to the quality of children's education, investing in materials like books, or sending them to better schools, rather than making larger changes such as enrolling them for an extra year's schooling.

There is, however, an exception to this general statement, as *parental migration* does appear to have a substantial impact. Some evidence suggests that when a parent migrates, this has a considerable effect on whether or not their children, left behind in the country of origin, are in education (though results vary significantly by country). In Jamaica, parental absence is associated with younger children in particular being much less likely to be in school, whereas in Vietnam and Macedonia the result is reversed, with parental migration being associated with children having a substantially greater chance of being in school. However, the models that examine these impacts do not control for causality, and so it is difficult to know how much of this association is driven by migration, and how much by reverse causality.

Turning to the effect that migration has on *national skills stocks*, it seems likely that in some of the DotM countries (particularly Jamaica, but possibly also Ghana and Macedonia) migration's overall effect on a country's stock of skills may be negative. In other words, the positive effects that migration can have on skills stocks (through immigration, return, remittances and incentive effects) are not able to compensate for the direct impact of skilled people emigrating. In Vietnam, Georgia and Colombia, on the other hand, it seems possible that while skills are being lost through emigration, they are being compensated for through migration's other channels. Indeed, it may be that these countries now have more skilled people than they otherwise would have had, had no one been able to migrate.

Where households receive remittances, there is some strong evidence from across the studies that spending on health increases. In Vietnam, for example, regional fixed effects analysis suggests that not only does receiving remittances raise healthcare spending, but remittances also appear to raise health spending more dramatically than other forms of income. And having an absent migrant on the whole appears to increase spending on healthcare, although here the evidence is thinner and less consistent.

Having a returned migrant seems to affect healthcare spending. In Jamaica, for example, each additional returned migrant in a household increases healthcare spending by more than 50 per cent. The patterns of spending change too, so that less emphasis is placed on traditional Jamaican medicines and more on the kinds of treatments that migrants will have been exposed to in the countries they have been living in (predominantly the USA, UK and Canada). We suggest that while this analysis is based on OLS modelling and thus does not explicitly address questions of causality

The report also looks into the effect that migration has on a country's *healthcare*

transformational at the societal level, or that alone it can be relied on to act as a national strategy for development. Rather, the fact that people are migrating in

This report is the record of a unique experiment.

Between 2006 and 2010 GDN and ippr, together with partners across the world, engaged in a bold attempt to add significantly to the global pool of knowledge about migration and its impacts on development.

It may seem odd to add yet another initiative – yet another report – to the increasingly crowded field of migration studies. Countless academic papers and policy reports have been produced to describe or measure this or that aspect of migration. And, over the past decade, even the previously neglected field of migration and development has grown considerably. Major international development organisations have devoted considerable time and resources to studying the nexus between migration and development (for example see World Bank 2005, OECD 2007 and United Nations Development Programme 2009).

This research attention in part reflects the increased focus that policymakers are placing on migration and development. More developed countries are starting to recognise that their policies need to account for the effects that migration has on development (for example, the UK has published a policy paper in this area [Department for International Development 2007]), and many developing countries are beginning to reflect the topic

2. There is a serious lack of data. Many developing countries are unable to say much about even basic migration patterns, such as how many of their citizens have emigrated or how many immigrants are in the country (Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2009). Similarly, little tends to be known about the patterns of remittances beyond broad national trends, and even less about their use. In our view, there is a pressing need to add to the existing stock of data on migration.
3. Very little migration research is truly comparative. Partly because of a lack of data, researchers have proceeded in a highly incremental way in their building of an evidence base, meaning that many have been wary of drawing out general lessons about migration's development impacts. Even where they have wanted to undertake comparative analysis they have had to proceed by reading between the lines, trying to compare the results of often very different studies (which may vary in their locations, definitions, methodologies, impacts being examined and so on). This means that where results vary, it is difficult to know which of the differences is at the root of that variance.

In our view there is a clear need for more comparative work – analysis that examines similar research questions, using similar definitions of migration, and development, and gathering similar kinds of data in similar ways. This kind of analysis should give us a much greater insight into any general lessons which can be drawn about migration and development, as well as allowing us to see what factors appear to be at the root of differences in impacts.

4. Fresh, workable policy ideas are rare. Apart from relatively easy-win

Together these six aims defined our experiment. They made it ambitious in a number of ways – in the range of issues it wanted to provide insights into; in its aims to not just analyse, but also to collect data; and in its set-up, requiring collaborative work between researchers from across the world and from different disciplinary backgrounds, and moreover, on an agreed set of research questions, using similar research methods.

This report assesses our success in achieving these aims. It examines how far we did the things we intended to; discusses what we found out about migration and its development impacts, as well as why we think we found the things that we did; and presents suggestions as to what policymakers might do about them. We also review what we have learnt throughout the process of undertaking this research, about migration and development and about doing ambitious research projects such as this one.

This report draws on a number of sources. The most important is the research conducted by the in-country research teams involved in the project. In addition to this we draw on the findings of project working papers, as well as some data analysis carried out specifically for this report. We also draw on the wider migration and development literature, which enables us to both present findings on issues where we have not been able to get much insight from our own primary research, and to place our own findings in context.

This report is structured in the following way: Chapter 2, following this introduction, presents a discussion of our methodology – defining what our experiment involved and how it proceeded. In Chapter 3 we discuss our findings in relation to migration itself, as well as about remittances and the other phenomena created by migration which have the potential to affect development outcomes. Chapter 4 sets out what we have learnt about migration's development impacts. Chapter 5 provides the report's policy contribution, where we set out our analysis of how policy can contribute to improving migration's development impacts, and makes recommendations to policymakers about taking this agenda forward. Finally, in Chapter 6 we present our thoughts on the work, and where research in this area may productively focus next.

This chapter outlines the ways in which the project was designed to meet its six aims.

or restricts substantive freedoms. Where contentious impacts may have positive short-run effects that do not contribute to sustainable outcomes in the long run, as in the above example, the framework recognises the tension, while emphasising the importance of sustainability.

With a definition of development in place the next stage was to be clear about how the

- Health impacts (for example on health, health spending, healthcare provision and quality)
- Gender impacts (for example on female migrants' own opportunities, gender roles, attitudes towards gender)
- 'Wider' social impacts (for example on attachment to traditional culture, family structures, and confidence in the 'home' society)
- Governance impacts (for example on personal security, state capacity and standards of governance)
- Environmental impacts (for example on attitudes towards the environment and environmental technologies)
- Relief impacts (for example disaster relief).

In the analysis, including in this paper, environmental and relief impacts were not examined, mainly because we felt they would be harder to tackle using a methodology that draws heavily on a household survey. We have also combined 'governance and wider social impacts' to make the structure of the reports simpler.

These impacts range from individual level impacts (including impacts on the migrants themselves), as well as effects on households, on communities and on the nation or society as a whole. This means they range from impacts on a migrant's own income, for example, through to effects on the views held within a community on gender roles.

Migration does not create all these impacts in the same way, however. Six ways, or 'routes', have been identified via which migration can have these impacts (Chappell and Glennie 2009), three of them direct (ways in which migration immediately leads to a development impact; a–c below) and three indirect (migration creates a phenomenon, such as remittances, which then has an effect on development; d–f below).

1) **Emigration of skilled people**. When people leave their country of birth to move elsewhere this can have important effects on development. If the people are skilled this is often termed 'brain drain', and if it leads to an overall decrease in the numbers of skilled people in a country or sector it may cause that country or sector harm. For example, if emigration leads to fewer doctors in the country concerned this may damage healthcare (Awases *et al* 2004).

2) **Immigration**. The second way in which migration can affect development is through immigration. Although it is sometimes assumed that most migratory movements involve people moving away from the world's poorest countries and towards the richest, in fact patterns of movement are more complex than this, with the majority of migrants moving to countries in the same 'development category' as their country of origin (for example moving from a country with a low level of human development to another country with a low level of human development – though usually one which is doing somewhat better [United Nations Development Programme 2009]). This is often to neighbouring countries, but also to places further afield. In some cases immigration may substantially compensate for emigration, and some developing countries are 'net immigration' countries – that is, they have received more migrants than they have 'lost'. These countries include Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Gabon (SASI Group and Newman 2006).

3) **Circular migration**. Recent research (for example Finch *et al* 2009) has emphasised that migration is increasingly 'circular' and does not always involve a permanent, one-way move, as has sometimes been depicted. Rather, many migrants move more than once, some on to other destinations and some returning to their place of origin. Return can therefore potentially have an important impact on the numbers of people a country is calculated to have lost through migration. However, returning migrants do not just affect the numbers of people in a country; return can also alter the resources and

assets available to a country, as in many cases returning migrants bring assets back with them. This can include new skills, ideas and ways of doing things, as well as hard financial assets. For example, if a doctor leaves a poor country she may temporarily reduce the stock of healthcare professionals in that country, but if she returns several years later having studied and worked in a different environment she may bring back more skills and new ideas. As a result the overall impact of her movement may be positive rather than negative – perhaps counter to expectations.

Because migration is an attractive prospect to many, it has the potential to change behaviour. Specifically, it has been suggested that would-be migrants look at the conditions under which people migrate and change their behaviour in order to be more like the typical migrant and have a greater likelihood of successfully migrating. This effect is vital to debates on brain drain in particular because if skilled people are more likely to be able to migrate than the less skilled (which tends to be the case), or if skilled migrants gain more as a result of migrating than the unskilled do (in terms of income, opportunities and so on), this may give people an extra incentive to invest in education and skills. And given that it is very unlikely that all the people who invest in skills subsequently migrate it is possible that the country in question ends up with a more skilled workforce than it otherwise would have done. In other words it is possible that a 'brain drain' can, by inducing others within the labour market to continue in education, turn into a 'brain gain' (Docquier 2006).

Migrants are in many cases a highly valuable source of indirect

Box 2.2: Countries studied in *Development on the Move*

The countries studied in this project were selected on a number of grounds. These included their being:

- Developing or transition countries (that is, low or middle income)

Between 20 and 30 stakeholders were interviewed in each country, involving people with different perspectives on migration and development, including academics, and representatives of government, international organisations and civil society. These interviews followed the same broad structure in all cases, drawing on the same interview template, but researchers adapted each interview to ensure it was appropriate to the country and stakeholder concerned to make the most of each interviewee's knowledge.

The stakeholder interviews produced different kinds of data. This included factual information that was not yet available in the public domain (for example, details of policies that were in development, as in Colombia); expert opinion, which can be important in tackling questions where the existing information alone is insufficient (for example, which estimates of the number of emigrants abroad is likely to be most accurate, as in Macedonia); and also provided a narrative for some of the findings and the context in which they have occurred (as, for example, the Vietnamese team exploited extensively). The stakeholder interviews also generated a sense of priorities, ideas and in some cases misconceptions that need to be addressed by researchers.

The household survey was the more important and innovative aspect of the project's data-gathering phase. A major new survey was designed specifically for use in this project to provide reliable, comparable data on the prevalence of migration in each of the countries studied, as well as on its development impacts.

Developing the survey took more than 18 months, and involved many different stages. A core team of three drew up a first draft design, with inputs from tens of others (this draft was based on many previous surveys but the World Bank's Living Standard Measurement Surveys in particular – see Grosh and Glewwe 2000). This draft was then intensively discussed with the Jamaica team, who undertook the pilot stage of the work, and was then put into the field in Jamaica towards the end of 2007. This involved a smaller sample size than planned in the main stage of research (486 households answered the full survey), and the project management team were more involved in the implementation, but it otherwise closely followed the planned model for the main phase of research.

After the results and feedback from that pilot were received (which went very well overall) the draft was adapted, and then a process of several additional rounds of changes were undertaken, based on feedback from close to 50 reviewers. This included the discussions that took place in a two-day workshop in Washington DC in June 2008, with all the survey leaders in the case study countries. There the details of the survey were finalised, definitions firmed up, and training in its implementation provided. This final template (Annex 3; see ippr.org or gdnet.org) was then adapted by each of the country teams to suit their own context (this involved changing some of the response options to make them more appropriate to country circumstances, as well as removing or adding a limited number of questions).

The survey itself was, in every country except Colombia⁵, sampled to be nationally representative, meaning that the results produced are representative for the scale and impacts of migration across the countries as a whole. The expectation is that this will be valued highly by policymakers, because it means they are looking at information that reflects the situation across the country as a whole – their domain of responsibility – and not only the way migration is affecting those in the area which was sampled. (Many other surveys are limited to capital cities, or areas where migration is particularly prevalent.) Sampling strategies were drawn up by each team in collaboration with ippr staff and an external consultant, and outlines of each can be found attached as annexes to each individual country report⁶. An outline of the template used by each team to draw up their sampling strategy is provided in Annex 4 (ippr.org or gdnet.org).

Actual interactions with the households involved two rounds of questions. The first round was a listing and screening round, where information was gathered about every household in the primary sampling units (small localities where the interviews were being conducted – typically villages or small parts of cities or the countryside) regarding whether they had a migrant member, checking for immigrants, returned migrants and people currently away (see Box 2.1 above for further information on the definitions used in the survey). This approach ensured the researchers could calculate what proportion of households in the areas in question have migrants, and because the sampling strategy was nationally representative, allowed for the calculation of national migration rates. While very useful this approach was also highly ambitious, and involved speaking to large numbers of people – thousands or tens of thousands in most cases.

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as well as information on the head-of-household's opinions about migration. This process resulted in the gathering of an extraordinarily large amount of data. If all the questionnaires used were piled on top of one another, the resulting tower of paper would be taller than the Statue of Liberty!

Steps were taken in each country to ensure the quality of the data was sufficiently high. The survey leaders were trained by the project management team directly, and provided outline training documents (see Annex 5) for them to use in training their own fieldworkers, who were either contracted directly, or through highly reputable firms or the national statistical office. Each survey leader organised in-country training sessions which lasted up to a week, and interviewers were fully supervised, with checks put in place (for example re-contacting households who were said to have been interviewed) to check the accuracy of the interviewers' work. Many of the teams also checked the parameters of the data collected (such as gender and age distribution of the sample and source countries of remittances) against existing data. When differences in definitions were taken into account, the *Development on the Move* data were found to be consistent.

The research teams in each country have written country reports that bring together existing evidence plus the results of the DotM stakeholder interviews and household surveys. These reports describe the current shape of migration to and from each country, examine what impacts migration appears to have on development, and analyse policy, making suggestions of where improvements might be possible in order to enhance positive effects and minimise negative ones. This report draws heavily on those papers, as well as on additional analysis conducted using the data by other researchers.

The household dataset will also be made available to researchers worldwide on an open access basis later in 2010.

() As set out above, the project tools were developed with the aim of producing comparable results so that it would be easier and more valid to draw out overarching

- Organising regular meetings (most team leaders attended five project workshops over the life of the project) that brought together the country researchers, the project management team, expert advisers and others working in the field to discuss research methods and lessons learnt. These meetings included a dedicated survey planning workshop and one on impact analysis and report writing.
- Developing templates, which, while promoting comparability, also introduced some of the researchers to new tools and methods of analysis in a supportive fashion.

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Several mechanisms were used to promote the crossing of disciplinary boundaries.

First, the project management team ensured that the people involved in the project reflected a range of methodological perspectives. Key to this was that each research team commissioned included members from more than one methodological background. Also important was that external experts involved in the project (including external advisers, the project steering committee and experts invited to attend various workshops) came from a range of methodological approaches.

Second, a 'Q-squared approach' was taken, using a range of methodological tools to investigate migration's development impacts, both quantitative and qualitative (as has been discussed previously). The sequencing of these research methods was discussed quite extensively with the research teams to ensure that the work took place in the most sensible way possible, to get the most out of the interaction of methods (this drew on a paper commissioned by GDN on getting the most out of multidisciplinary research projects [Hulme 2007]).

Third, guidelines for the country teams urged that they produce reports that integrate the analysis from the different research methods. The outline produced for the country reports stressed, for example, that the findings arising from each approach should not be presented in separate chapters or sections, but be integrated into a single narrative. Qualitative interview analysis should be presented alongside quantitative survey findings so that when a question is addressed in the report (for example, *what is the impact of migration on household incomes?*)

only appropriate that the figures in the second column are substantially smaller than the figures in the 'total emigration' column. It is important to look at this sub-set of emigration separately though, because both recent departure (see for example Dustmann and Mestres 2009) and leaving family members behind (see for example Pollard *et al* 2008) have been identified as important indicators of a migrant's likelihood of interacting with their country of origin and thereby potentially promoting development.

The fifth column provides estimates of return migration – which are believed to be the first set of nationally representative and comparable estimates of return migration ever collected. The information presented here again refers to a total stock, meaning that it is

Three notable findings emerge from this data. First, despite increasing discussion of the importance of south–south migration (for example see Ratha and Shaw 2007), which is often interpreted as implying that southern [developing] countries are receiving large numbers of migrants, each of the countries studied appears to be more a country of emigration than of immigration, though to different degrees⁹. Ghana stands out as having the highest levels of immigration under any measure, whether in terms of absolute numbers of immigrants, immigrants as a proportion of its total population, or in terms of net migration (that is, when numbers of people who have emigrated are compared with numbers who have migrated in). In net migration terms, Ghana may even be close to parity under some estimates, though it seems likely that it has at least marginally lower levels of immigration than emigration. In each of the other DotM countries immigration is a rather negligible phenomenon. So while south–south migration may be an important phenomenon in some parts of the world, our data suggests that it is not significant – at least in terms of scale – everywhere.

Second, it is interesting to note that the kind of emigration often assumed to have the greatest development impacts – that is, recent emigration in which the migrant leaves other household members behind – forms only a relatively small proportion of all emigration from the developing countries studied: no more than 60 per cent for the countries we have data for, and in some places far less than this, just above 10 per cent for Georgia, for instance.

Third, the DotM dataset allows for the examination of the scale of return migration, an exciting prospect as nationally representative return data has been lacking to date, and yet return has been highlighted in recent years as potentially being able to make important contributions to development (for example see UK Border Agency and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2010).

The DotM data show surprisingly similar rates of return across the countries in question (see Box 3.2 for details on how these were calculated). They show that although they vary somewhat between countries, in no cases are they very high. In Georgia about 12 out of every 100 emigrants have returned, in Vietnam about 16 out of every 100, and in Jamaica about 20. Ghana and Macedonia see somewhat higher levels of return with 34 migrants returning to Macedonia for every 100 who have departed, and 37 out of 100 in Ghana. However, because the countries have quite different rates of emigration in the first place, this equates to quite different levels of return migrants in the population as a whole. Between 0.6 per cent (in Vietnam) and 8.9 per cent (in Jamaica) of the population in each country are returned migrants.

Box 3.2. Calculating the rate of return

The number of people who return out of the group who initially migrate is calculated using return migration figures and the total stock emigration figures provided in Table 3.1. (A single emigration figure was selected for each country by the report authors, based on our assessments of the reliability the various figures within the ranges presented. The GMO figures were relied upon most heavily.)

Because in some cases these ranges are quite wide, margins of error have been calculated. These margins are fairly substantial for Ghana and Macedonia, such that in Ghana, where this issue is most extreme, while the return rate presented is 37 per cent, it may actually be located anywhere between 18 and 48 per cent. As a result it is advised that these two estimates in particular should be treated with some caution.

The two figures are a good match in that they both refer to total stocks. However, as noted in Box 2.1, the DotM data define a migrant as someone who has moved for three months or more, and the GMO uses a one year or more definition. This means that the statistics may overstate the rate of return migration somewhat, depending on what proportion of returning migrants are away for between 3 and 12 months.

9. This discussion uses total immigration and emigration figures (not the DotM statistics on recent migration that leaves family behind).

The DotM research generated rich data on which countries migrants move to. This is important because there is extensive debate about the kinds of places migrants from the developing world move to, with three suggested types of destinations:

- (i) Regional destinations. Some stress the importance of south–south movements and particularly ‘cross-border’ movements to neighbouring countries, which it is assumed migrants can access most easily (because costs of travel are low, as are the costs of meeting or evading border regulations). Quantitative information on this kind of movement is particularly poor because these migrants are often undocumented (Shitundu 2006).
- (ii) Major recipient countries. Others emphasise the extent to which a few developed countries attract the vast majority of migrants – especially the skilled. While fairly good data are available on migrant stocks in OECD countries (Chappell and Mulley 2010), this data nonetheless misses short-term and irregular migrants. Also, without good information on other kinds of movement it is difficult to see how significant it is in relation to other forms of migration.
- (iii) Policy-mediated destinations. There is also an interesting, albeit under-informed, discussion about the importance of policy in determining where migrants move. Some analysts suggest that policy has very little role in determining migratory movements (Dorling 2009) and that people will migrate to ‘desirable’ places regardless of policy. Others stress that changing policies can have a major impact on movements. Such arguments are bolstered by examples of instances where policy appears to have had a major effect. One such instance is when Poland’s entry to the EU prompted very large movements to the UK and Ireland, as Polish citizens gained the right of free movement (Pollard *et al* 2008). This example makes clear that the kind of policies that are relevant are not necessarily ‘migration’ policies, and that other policy decisions, sometimes taken for other reasons entirely, may have significant impacts on migration patterns.

The challenge is, however, to go from categorising types of destinations (which few would disagree with), to examining the relative importance of different kinds of destinations. The DotM data enables a cross-country analysis of the kinds of destinations migrants from developing countries move to, for the first time as far as the report authors are aware. The data show 23 major migratory corridors (defined as such if 5 per cent or more of a country’s absent and/or returned migrants have moved through them). These corridors involve Colombians moving to the United States, Spain and Venezuela; Georgians moving to Russia, Greece, Turkey, ‘Other former Soviet Union,’ and ‘Western Europe’; Ghanaians moving to Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, ‘Other Africa’, the USA, UK, Germany and Italy; Jamaicans moving to the USA, UK and Canada; Macedonians moving to Italy, the USA, Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia and Australia; and Vietnamese moving to the USA, Malaysia, Taiwan, Russia, Korea, Japan and Germany.


Breaking this down into the three categories of destination, the data show first that migration within regions does appear common – nine of the major migration corridors DotM gathered data on are between countries in the same region. In some cases these movements are cross-border (for example Ghanaians moving to Côte d’Ivoire, Georgians moving to Russia). A substantial number of migrants also go to countries with which they do not share a border but that are in the same region (for example Vietnamese migrants moving to Malaysia, Macedonians moving to Slovenia). More striking perhaps is the finding that regional migration is less common than migration to outside the region. Fourteen of the migratory corridors, a clear majority, are between countries in two different regions.

Large, wealthy countries that are considered desirable to migrants the world over are prominent destinations for migrants from all of the DotM case study countries – 10 of the major migratory corridors used by DotM migrants lead to the 10 countries rated most attractive to migrants. (These are the USA, UK, Australia, Norway, France, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Hong Kong, according to Economist

Intelligence Unit 2008b.) Seventeen lead to the top 20 countries (the next 10 comprise Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, Spain, Israel, Finland, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy [ibid]). Moreover, every country studied by DotM has at least one corridor that leads its migrants to a 'top 10' country. These findings suggest that movements to very popular, successful developed countries are at least as substantial numerically as migration within the region.

A third point to make is that policy and history do seem to matter. A full 18 of the major migratory corridors are between countries with major historical or policy links (which we define as policies on migration, trade, regional cooperation and integration, and other forms of political integration, including colonial links, all of

Figure 3.1: Country of citizenship of immigrants to Ghana



Source: Development on the Move Ghana household survey.

Notes: Ghana features in this graph because it lists immigrants' country of citizenship, and approximately 11 per cent of Ghana's immigrants have become Ghanaian citizens. The figures for USA, UK, Germany, Italy and Other are existent but too small to see on the graph.

It is important here to address the question of whether or not it actually makes sense to talk about 'migration corridors' or a migrant's 'country of destination'. Both phrases imply that migrants move from one place to another, and then either remain in that place permanently, or eventually depart to return to their country of origin. Recent research has emphasised that some migrants actually move in more complex patterns and to multiple countries of destination (for example see International Migration Institute 2006). Two distinct patterns of movements of this kind have been distinguished – super-mobility and step-migration.

Theories of super-mobility suggest that migrants are highly mobile, moving not just once after leaving their country of origin, but repeatedly, from destination to destination depending on the relative attractions of different places at different times. This theory is usually said to apply to those with the greatest ability to move as they wish, particularly the highly skilled (Finch *et al* 2009).

'Step-wise' or 'onward' migration is another theory that emphasises that migrants may live in a number of countries (Anarfi *et al* 2003). In this case, however, the focus is on those who lack the ability to move directly from their place of origin to their desired destination. The theory is that they may instead use a series of steps, a number of episodes of migration, to enable them to build up the resources and characteristics (such as qualifications or wages) so that they can meet the migration policy requirements of their desired destination.

The DotM evidence is not supportive of these theories of multiple movements, however, at least in the countries studied. The project data suggest that the vast majority of migrants had lived in just one country while they were away; more than 90 per cent of Jamaican emigrants stayed in one place, as did a similar proportion of emigrants from Ghana. Evidence on immigration to Ghana paints a similar picture. Of this group, more than 95 per cent moved directly from their country of origin to Ghana, without living in any other migratory destinations in between. This may be their first move in a step-wise migration to other destinations, but the data fail to bear this out. 92 per cent of Ghana's immigrants reported that they had no intention of leaving Ghana. Of the 8 per cent who did, it must be presumed that some proportion intended to move back to their country of origin, leaving only a small percentage of Ghana's total immigrants who might be engaging in step-wise movements or super-mobility.

people cite as their reason for leaving (Van-Hear *et al* 2009).

It is interesting to examine if migrants who left for economic reasons tended to have work arranged before migrating. The data suggest that this is not the case – 67 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants, according to the DotM survey, did not have work arranged before departure, and even more Georgian absent migrants – 85 per cent were in that position. The same patterns can be observed for those who have now returned.

This suggests much migration for work does not take place through work-related migration channels. Work permits for instance usually require a job to be secured in advance of departure. Though their purpose is to work, these migrants must find other routes – whether via family reunification, migration as students, travel as tourists or arriving clandestinely. In a number of cases this involves violating immigration and labour laws.



The analysis turns next to the reasons that migrants return, as charted in Figure 3.3. It is immediately obvious that these are much less consistent across the DotM countries than the reasons for leaving. It is also difficult to discern trends within countries, with responses spread more evenly across the response options, and there are far more responses categorised as 'other'. All this points towards return being driven by more personal and idiosyncratic reasons than departure, as has been found in previous research (Finch *et al* 2009). However, it is still possible to draw out some common themes.

First, family reasons are the biggest driver behind return. Simply returning to be with family is the major reason for migrants across all the countries studied here to return to their country of origin. Not far behind is return for less positive reasons – because someone in the family needs them to be there. This emphasis on family is again in line with previous studies (for example Pollard *et al* 2008).

Following family reasons are three sets of reasons which have broadly the same level of influence. These issues could be termed 'completion', 'migration policy', and 'unhappiness'.

First, completion motivators involve the migrant completing a job or contract, their course of study, or making the amount of money they went there to earn. Of these, completing a particular job or contract is the most important. This links

10. Under a bond a migrant goes abroad (often for study), supported by the government of their country of origin, agreeing to return. If they do not return they have to pay a certain amount of money to their government.

11. The Jamaica statistics here are not accurate. In Jamaica voluntary return because of visa expiry and deportation were one response category, as deportation is a very sensitive issue in Jamaica and the survey team were reluctant to ask about it in case it led to the termination of interviews. We have designated all those who indicated they returned to Jamaica because of visa issues under the 'returned voluntarily' heading (this was more common than deportation in each of the other countries, and so it is a reasonable assumption that more of this group returned voluntarily than were deported).

“Compared to other policy tools specific schemes aiming to motivate return are unlikely to motivate anyone beyond very niche groups of potential returnees”

to the second set of motivators, which are issues related to migration policy. People returning because of having a bond placed upon them¹⁰ is the most important reason among this group – as well as those who return voluntarily because their visa expired (often likely to be linked to the end of a job or contract), or who are deported.¹¹ This shows that regulations around movement do have an effect on flows, though not to the same extent as other factors such as family-related issues. Third is a set of reasons around the migrant not enjoying their life in the destination country, and missing the lifestyle they left behind.

These second-tier motivations for returning are given different priority by migrants from different countries. In particular, migrants from Georgia stand out as citing completion motivations as important reasons for coming back, and Ghanaians are much more likely to have returned because of disappointment in their life abroad – a not insignificant 21 per cent gave this reason. It seems likely that some of the disappointment Ghanaians feel about their migration experiences reflects the fact that many of the countries they move to are poor, making it more difficult for the migrants to achieve their key goal of improved economic opportunities.

Turning to the remaining set of reasons for return, the ‘least significant’ category contains new economic opportunities in the country of origin – such as a new job, or wanting to start a new business. This makes opportunity in the country of origin a less important reason for return than deportation or bad experiences abroad. The numbers here are low and probably disappointing for most policymakers.

Governmental or non-governmental schemes (such as those run by the International Organization for Migration) designed explicitly to motivate return come bottom of reasons for return, with no migrants at all in either Colombia or Jamaica citing these as important in their decision to leave. Even among Ghanaians, who cited these schemes more often than others, only 1.5 per cent of returnees mentioned them. This suggests that compared to other policy tools specific schemes aiming to motivate return are unlikely to motivate anyone beyond very niche groups of potential returnees – a finding mirrored by previous studies (for example Black *et al* 2004). This must be borne in mind by the whole range of countries, both of origin (for example Korea [Lee and Saxenian 2009] and Jamaica [Thomas-Hope *et al* 2009]) and destination (for example the UK [Thiel and Gillan 2010]), which are at various stages in designing schemes to motivate return.

The DotM evidence suggests that the length of an ‘episode’ of migration varies radically depending on the migrant’s country of origin. Table 3.2 presents results from Jamaica (Lucas and Chappell 2009) and Macedonia (Nikolovski *et al* 2010) – countries that illustrate the extremes of migration duration.

In Jamaica a large proportion of migrants move for very short periods – for example just over 50 per cent of Jamaican returned migrants are away for less than a year. In contrast, in Macedonia less than 3 per cent were away for under 12 months, and almost half had been away for more than 10 years before they returned.¹²

The country to which migrants move also seems to affect the length of time they are away. For example, while most migrants from Macedonia who do return are away for relatively long periods, those who migrated to the USA stay away for much less time on average. This trend for shorter migration periods to the USA is replicated in the Jamaican data too, and in other countries (not shown in the table). In Vietnam, for example, 49 per cent of returned migrants who went to the United States returned within a year of departing, whereas only 19 per cent of returned migrants who went to Taiwan came back that quickly (and migrants going to other destinations were even less likely to return within a year). This apparent trend for migrants returning more quickly from the USA than from many other countries, if they return at all, is probably related to the USA’s status as the most popular destination for international students (O’Shaughnessy 2009) as well as its relatively strict immigration rules. It should be noted too that many migrants who move to the USA will never return, settling there permanently.

12. Note that this analysis is only for migrants that ‘complete’ an episode of migration by returning. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, most migrants do not return: only around one in five Jamaicans and one in three Macedonians do so.

Table 3.2. Average duration of migration for returned migrants

Country of origin	Country of destination	Proportion moving for specified period (%)								Total		
		< ½ year ¹	½	1 year	1	2 years	2	5 years	5		10 years	10 years plus
Jamaica	USA	24	32		17		8		6		14	100
	UK	6	12		6		9		21		47	100
	Canada	50	36		0		0		14		0	100
	Elsewhere	30	40		15		15		0		0	100
	Overall	23	28		12		8		10		19	100
Macedonia	Italy	2	4		11		28		25		30	100
	Germany	1	0		3		14		20		62	100
	Switzerland	0	0		5		17		17		61	100
	USA	4	3		23		30		21		19	100
	Elsewhere	1	3		8		18		25		47	100
	Overall	1	2		8		18		23		48	100

Source: DotM household surveys 2007 / 2008

Note: [1] From three to just under six months. Any time abroad that lasts less than three months is not counted as migration.

The DotM research enables us to profile migrants in a way that has rarely been possible before. In particular it enables exploration of whether or not migrants tend to have similar profiles across countries, and whether or not some of the stereotypical ideas about migrants are correct. The characteristics we examine encompass the demographic – gender, age, marital status and parental status, and the relationship between the familial migrant and their household, and the socio-economic – educational achievement and income.

A stereotypical picture of a migrant would suggest that they are equally likely to be male as female (UNDESA 2009), and that typically they have a young profile (perhaps being in their early twenties) (McKenzie 2007). However, relatively little is known about migrants' marital or parental status, so what can be added here is particularly important. Information about the relationship between the migrant and the head of the household they left behind is also scarce, though it often seems to be assumed that the two are married or partners. Regarding socio-economic characteristics, migrants are usually thought to be highly educated (Kaya 2008), and relatively wealthy (Development Research Centre on Migration Globalisation and Poverty 2006). It is generally accepted that the poorest of the poor rarely migrate (at least not internationally – internal migration seems to be an option more open to the poorest households [United Nations Development Programme 2009]).

This research confirms some of this received wisdom and questions other parts.

Gender

Taking gender first (see Figure 3.4), in five out of six of the countries we studied the majority of absent migrants are men; only in Vietnam do women make up the majority of absent migrants (57 per cent). Jamaica and Colombia have close to gender parity, but with marginally more male migrants, and Georgia (at 61 per cent), Ghana (68 per cent) and Macedonia (a very striking 78 per cent) have substantially more male than female migrants.

The absent migrant is only the head of household's partner in between 5 per cent (Colombia) and 19 per cent (Macedonia) of cases. It is far more common that the absent migrant is the offspring of the head of the household. Between 40 per cent (Colombia) and 69 per cent (Vietnam) of absent migrants have this relationship with the head of household. Next most common is that the absent migrant is the household head's sister or brother; this is so in between 9 per cent (Vietnam) and 21 per cent (Colombia) of households. No other relationship is mentioned anywhere near as frequently as these three.

It is worth noting that it is rare for the migrant parent to have left their offspring behind

researchers and policymakers to the significant size of these flows, which previously had been only a marginal part of the development agenda. This change in approach to remittances has been so significant that some commentators (for example Mitchell 2006) have called it a 'remittance euphoria'. Furthermore, while the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not originally focus on remittances, newer MDG documents have referred to the need to harness their potential (Usher 2005).

However, while absolutely vital in raising the prominence of the issue, and permitting fascinating analysis of some of the macroeconomic impacts of remittances (for example Bugamelli and Paterno 2005), this data has not provided all the insights necessary in order to maximise their development impact. In particular, because the data are macroeconomic, they remain at an aggregate national level, and do not indicate who receives remittances, how much they receive, or many other aspects relating to the way this money affects people's daily lives. These issues are just as important – if not more so – than the total amounts received nationally.

Other more micro forms of data do also exist. Some more specific studies provide important insight into particular groups of recipients, for example European Stability Initiative 2006, which examines remittances received in two villages in Kosovo. Others look at 'remittance corridors', for example Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007, on the UK-Nigeria corridor. However, few have gathered information that is both in-depth and nationally representative, characteristics that are very important for anyone making policy decisions.

Table 3.6 makes clear that not all migrants remit. While few people would assert that remitting is universal, sometimes discussions of the importance of remittances for development can give the idea that the vast majority of people departing are sending money home. In fact, in the countries studied the extent of remitting varies widely. Between 36 per cent (Macedonia) and 77 per cent (Vietnam) of absent migrants remitted money or goods back to the households they lived in before departing.¹⁵

One possibility offered by the DotM household survey is that it allows for the testing of the commonly made assumption that the key remitting relationship is between a migrant and their pre-migration household. Some recent research has questioned this idea (World Bank 2006) and it does not necessarily fit with widespread understandings of the social structures and obligations at work in many of the countries migrants come from. DotM investigated this assumption by asking households both about remittances they received from their own absent migrants and remittances received from others (those not living in their household before departure).

The results, set out in column 3 of Table 3.6, are quite striking. They suggest that between 4 per cent (Colombia) and 28 per cent (Jamaica) of households in each country received funds from a 'non-member remitter' (people who were not members of the household they are currently remitting to before they migrated). For Jamaica the high figure suggests that major contributions could be being made by non-member remitters to households' welfare across the country. The Colombia figure, on the other hand, may seem negligible. However, it is worth comparing it with the number of households who have their 'own' absent migrant and receive remittances from them (column 2, Table 3.6). In several of the countries studied (including Colombia) more households receive remittances from non-member remitters than from their own absent migrants, and up to as much as four times as many in Jamaica. Moreover, in none of the countries are the numbers of households receiving remittances from their 'own' absent migrants dramatically larger than the number receiving from non-member remitters.

So who are these people remitting to households they were not previously members

Georgia were US\$2244 in 2005, making remittances a very important source of income for many recipients. On the other hand, though, in Jamaica the average amount remitted by absent migrants to their households in the previous 12 months was approximately US\$640. For comparison average household incomes in

particularly in sending it only on special occasions and in emergencies. The latter was the case for around two thirds of the time for Jamaican and 40 per cent of the time for Macedonian non-member remitters.

While the frequency of sending money was broadly similar across countries, the method generally used by absent migrants to send their money varies considerably by country, as shown in Fig 2.1er

Lastly, it is interesting to examine who is the intended recipient of the remittances – the households in their entirety, or one specific individual. Across the countries the clear majority of funds sent by absent migrants to the households they left were sent to support households as a whole rather than specific members – 70 per cent of funds were sent for the household as a whole in Jamaica, and 90 per cent in Macedonia, for example. In contrast, remittances from non-member remitters were much more likely to be sent to individuals. This is not surprising given that the migrant was not previously a household member and is therefore likely to feel less responsibility for that household's overall income. For example 52 per cent of non-member remitters in Jamaica sent funds to specific individuals, as did 28 per cent in Macedonia.

There are four aspects of remittances that potentially have the ability to change the usual understanding of the size – and even the nature – of remittance flows, and yet they have tended to remain unaddressed because of a lack of evidence. These are:

- (i) In-kind remittances: the sending of goods rather than money (as highlighted by Brown and Leevs 2007 among others)
- (ii) The repayment of remittances: some remittances may be more like loans than donations (highlighted by Grosh and Glewwe 2000)
- (iii) 'Reverse' remittances: money being sent to migrants from their households at origin, rather than vice versa (see Mazzucato 2009)
- (iv) 'Other' non-household remittances: money sent either from a migrant to themselves (see Siddiqui 2004), or between an organisation and a migrant (see Economist

abroad are 'portable', or transferable back to their country of origin.

These findings all add to the sense that we need to rethink the traditional approach of viewing remittances as money sent home by migrants to the households they have left behind, and view them more broadly as all the accumulated funds that flow from a migrant's country of destination to their country of origin as a result of their migration. This includes, but is not limited to, transfers to household members, transfers to other family members and friends, money being sent to bank accounts in the country of origin to build up a 'nest egg', resources and assets being transferred back to a migrant's country of origin with them if they decide to return, and monies they continue to receive (such as pensions) from sources abroad, even when they have relocated back to their place of origin.


This section examines factors that affect the amount of remittances each migrant sends.¹⁹ This is a vital question, as if it is possible to identify general lessons about what causes more generous remitting, policymakers could try to encourage those kinds of people to migrate, or to help migrants to acquire 'positive' characteristics. The factors explored are migrants' personal characteristics, the nature of their experience of migration, the nature of their relationship with their household of origin, and the households' own characteristics.

Personal characteristics

The first two characteristics examined are attributes of the migrants themselves – the migrants' gender and educational achievement at the time of departure. Generally, women have been described as more likely to remit than men, and sometimes also likely to send more money than men (for example see Martin 2007, UNFPA and IOM 2006). Educated migrants might be expected to remit more because they can gain better jobs in the country of destination (for example see Bollard *et al*

The data also permit analysis of an aspect of migration that has been little considered previously – the relationship between a job being arranged in advance of migration taking place, and remittances. The new evidence presented by DotM researchers – though taken from only two of our case studies, Georgia and Macedonia – suggests that having a job arranged in advance has a positive effect on remitting. This suggests that when migration is more effectively planned it is likely to lead to better outcomes for the migrants' households (as well as, presumably, for the migrant themselves). This may have important policy implications.

The last aspect of the migration experience explored here is the relationship between the country that migrants move to and their remittance behaviour. Figure 3.8 sets out how remittances vary with a migrant's country of destination for migrants from Vietnam, Jamaica and Georgia. This appears to show that remittances vary dramatically depending on the country a migrant moves to, and this is confirmed by econometric analysis conducted in the individual country reports.



It is not easy, however, to say why migrants remit more from a particular country. There is no uniform pattern. For example, it does not seem to be based on the kind of destination moved to, such as whether or not it is within the same region, or a highly developed country. Moreover, no one country stands out as a place where migrants remit more from; migrants from Georgia and Jamaica who move to the USA remit relatively more, but this is not the case for migrants from Vietnam. So while destination seems important, there are no easy lessons to be drawn about which kinds of destinations policymakers might want to direct their migrants towards.

Relationship between remitter and recipient

This is the set of factors that appears to have the most consistent impacts on remitting. First, and in line with the findings of previous work (for example Dustmann and Mestres 2009), when a migrant leaves their family behind, they remit more. This finding is universal across the four country studies which looked into this issue. This may raise some difficult issues from the perspective of the migrants' country of origin. If remittances have positive effects that go beyond the household receiving them (for example multiplier effects for the local economy, or positive impacts on the balance of payments, as evidence in Chapter 4 suggests is the case), origin country governments may have mixed feelings about migrants migrating with their families, or family members joining them at a later date. This is because while it is presumably good for the families

One of the reasons why less is known about these kinds of interactions and transfers is because they are difficult to measure. It is often assumed that they are at play when migration appears to be linked to a particular trend but remittances are not thought to be the cause, meaning they tend to be picked up as a 'residual', rather than examined in themselves. Indeed, this is the method this report predominantly uses to understand their effects in Chapter 4 (see Box 4.1 for details). But some data was gathered in the household survey which at least gives a sense of the strength and frequency of some of these non-remittances interactions – data on how often households are in contact with their household members who have moved abroad.

The research shows firstly that many more households seem to be in touch with their migrants than receive remittances from them. For example, whereas only 36 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants remit back to their households of origin, more than 99 per cent of them are in regular contact with them. In Jamaica the corresponding figures are 67 per cent and 100 per cent, and in Vietnam 77 per cent and 96 per cent. This is intuitive as it seems likely that some migrants will stay in touch with their families and yet not be in a position – or want – to send money back to them. However, it also shows the potential importance of these interactions in affecting development outcomes: because personal ties are much more widespread than financial ones, their influence is potentially broader.

Second, the intensity of these ties also seems quite significant, though they do vary by country. In each of the three countries set out above, the majority of absent migrants are in touch with their households of origin more than once a month, and in Jamaica and Macedonia substantially more frequently: significantly more than 50 per cent of Jamaican absent migrants are in touch at least weekly, as are nearly 70 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants. If these personal interactions do have the potential to act as conduits for changing attitudes, then in countries like Macedonia they may very well be playing an important developmental role. We now go on to examine this issue in some depth in the next chapter.

4. Migration's development impacts

In this chapter the analysis moves from measuring migration and the phenomena it creates to estimating the developmental impacts it has. Following the framework set out in the methodology chapter, we examine:

- A broad range of migration's development impacts, both economic and social. In turn these have been broken down into five categories – economic, educational, health, gender, and 'other' social impacts.
- The effects that occur at different 'levels': effects on the migrants' own development, effects on their households, and effects on the wider community and society.
- The different channels through which the effects appear to take place, with analysis broken down to separate the effects of receiving remittances, of having a migrant absent from one's household, and the effects of having a returned migrant.

Original DotM findings are presented alongside findings from the existing literature. This should help to place the new contributions of this project in context, and provide readers with an overview of what is currently known, where gaps have been filled, and what still clearly requires further research.

Two key issues should be noted about our methodological approach (which is set out in detail in Box 4.1).

Firstly, our assessment of migration's impacts has been made using a range of econometric techniques. Some of those techniques, such as OLS, are quite simple but the use of others, such as Instrumental Variables and Propensity Score Matching techniques, actively tries to ensure that we go beyond diagnosing correlation and ascertain when migration is the cause of a set of circumstances and when it is effect.

Secondly, while the research attempts to separate out the 'channels' through which migration's effects work, we are limited by what we can observe. The best technique available to us involves splitting the sample into households that have an absent migrant, households that have a returned migrant, and households that receive remittances, and then using these sub-categories as the basis for analysis. One implication is that it has not been possible to analyse the development impacts of *immigration*. This probably does not hinder our understanding of migration's development impacts in the countries in question too greatly, however, given the finding that immigration is fairly negligible in most of our countries of study (except for Ghana).

Migration can have many types of economic impact, including effects on wages (Mishra 2007), total demand within an economy (Glytsos 1993), growth (Glytsos 2001), trade (Bacarreza and Erlich 2006), technological progress (Burns and Mohapatra 2008) and exchange rates (Lopez *et al* 2007), to name a few. As such we have had to select a subset of economic impacts at the individual, household and societal levels to focus on. These are drawn from our impact map (Annex 2).

Box 4.1: Impact identification methodology – further details

In trying to diagnose causality, it is important to try to control for two phenomena – the possibility of reverse causality (such as migration not causing increased income, but increased income increasing the possibility of migrating) and self-selection (comparisons between migrants and non-migrants not being valid, because migrants might be different to non-migrants).

The current best practice for addressing these issues where panel data is absent (as here) is using instrumental variables (IV) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM). IV is useful for

addressing reverse causality, and PSM can potentially address both concerns (though only where migrants 'select' themselves based on observable characteristics). If there are differences between the two groups that cannot be seen – for example if migrants are particularly ambitious – then PSM models still do not give an accurate picture of migration's impacts. While not perfect, both are useful tools for trying to determine causality.

We use other models, too, which cannot address these methodological problems (including fixed effects models, Ordinary Least Squares [OLS], probit and logit). While less reliable in terms of diagnosing impacts they have the advantage of being more widely understood.

Second, while ideally we would seek to separate out the channels migration's effect (in order to be better placed to shape migration's developmental effects), we are limited by what we can observe. In some cases we control for effects through one channel while analysing others. In most cases, however, the best approach available is to break our sample into households that have an absent migrant, households that have a returned migrant and households which receive remittances, and then, on the assumption that a different mix of impact channels is probably at work in each sub-group of households, infer which channels the observed effects are operating through.

Looking first at households with absent migrants, we can be sure that all the households in this group show the direct impacts that a migrant's absence creates (for example no longer being able to carry out household tasks or work in the domestic labour market). In addition to this there will be significant effects through remittances (as between around one third and three quarters will be receiving remittances, depending on the country concerned, as shown in Chapter 3). Any incentive and non-remittance interaction effects are likely to be felt in this group, as the evidence we have collected on non-remittance interactions suggest that the vast majority of households are in close touch with 'their' migrants. It may also be that households with absent migrants have a raised probability of having a returned migrant, as migration tends to take place within social networks (Amit 2007), which, once established, make it easier for subsequent family members to migrate. To the extent that these households do have returned migrants, their presence may also affect outcomes.

Turning to households with returned migrants, this group will show the direct effects of the returned migrants' own presence and the resources, attitudes and so on they have brought back with them. Observing the returned migrant may also create incentive effects in other household members (for example if the migrant has improved their circumstances it may spur others to become more like them and attempt to migrate). It also seems likely that because of the link between migration and social networks, households with one migrant are more likely to have a second migrant, meaning that households with returned migrants may have a raised likelihood of having a currently absent migrant, with all the impacts that entails, as set out above. Social networks are also likely to promote the receipt of remittances by

The most obvious economic impact that migration can have on migrants themselves is on their standard of living. While this is determined by income, simply assessing income prior to departure and then comparing it with income abroad is not necessarily the most effective way of assessing migration's effect – in fact, it could be highly misleading for two reasons.

Firstly, asking specifically about income does not take into account the costs that migrants face in the country of destination. Given that most move to richer countries, prices are also likely to be higher. One can attempt to compensate for those cost differences, however, by comparing income in the country of origin and destination in purchasing power parity (ppp) terms.²⁰ When this is done it demonstrates that even when cost differences are accounted for, migrants still gain dramatically in terms of income. According to our Colombian research, for example, a Colombian migrant more than quadruples their income by moving to the USA, where they earn on average in ppp terms US\$25,000 annually, against approximately US\$6200 in Colombia (Cardenas *et al* 2010).

This is insightful; however, the migrant's own standard of living is affected not only by costs but also by transfers. As the previous chapter showed, between a third and three quarters of migrants from every country remit, often sending thousands of US dollars annually to their own household, as well as amounts to others too. When these remittances are also deducted from their income, it may be that the economic impacts on the individual's own development are not as positive as might have been hoped. It is

by migration-affected households can have positive effects for the local community too (IOM 2004).

Finally, labour force participation, like business start-ups, is often the topic of feverish debate on the basis of a rather thin evidence base. The commonly discussed scenario (for example see Gallina 2008) is that remittance recipients withdraw from the labour market because they have no need to work, and are able to rely on outside inflows of money instead. Policymakers worry that this will lead to de-skilling, 'laziness' and ultimately dependency, with households unable to provide for themselves (leaving them vulnerable if remittances stop). It is interesting, then, to see whether or not the receipt of remittances in particular, and exposure to migration more generally, does lead to people opting not to work.

Household income

The first relationship to be examined is the relationship between migration and household income and poverty. Each research team used its own methods for assessing this, some focusing on household wealth (measured by ownership of assets such as land and consumer durables like cars and TVs), some looking at income, and some looking at expenditure. All give an insight into the impact that migration has on the household's welfare and living standards.

Table 4.1 (overleaf) sets out the details of what was found in each of the countries.

Summarising across countries, in none does migration tend to have a negative effect on households' incomes – impacts are either neutral, or more often, positive. This is very important given the emphasis migrants place on remitting to improve the lives of their families as a reason to migrate in the first place.

Only the Macedonian analysis finds that migration has no positive impacts on household welfare – that analysis suggests no impacts on living standards from either having a returned or absent migrant in the household (but does not examine remittances explicitly). This work is reliable methodologically,²² but it may be that the measure of living standards used (ownership of large assets, such as land), is a little too inflexible to pick up small and more nuanced effects. Set alongside the other cases, which all report improvements, it seems sensible to cautiously suggest that if smaller asset items were included in the analysis, positive impacts might also be found in Macedonia.

In Jamaica there is weaker evidence (based on OLS) that having a returned migrant in the household may increase household welfare, by around 6 per cent, although migrants currently being away appears to have no effect. In Ghana, this trend is reversed, with absent migrants appearing to boost their household's welfare (on an expenditure basis at least, if not in terms of income), but with returned migrants having little impact. The Ghanaian analysis is based on propensity score matching, and thus should be some of the most accurate evidence presented.

The three remaining countries show broadly positive impacts across all categories of households – those with absent migrants, those with returned migrants and those receiving remittances. Vietnam's analysis provides weaker evidence (using a fixed effects model controlling for unobserved province-level factors) that per capita income increases with migration, with the biggest effects resulting from an absent migrant being away, rather than from return. Households with absent migrants have 82 per cent higher per capita incomes, according to the model, compared with 8 per cent higher incomes for households with returned migrants. However, the absent migrant effect is so large, and so out of kilter with the impacts on expenditure for Vietnam (see below), that it must be suspected that some of this result is attributable to reverse causality.

The Vietnam researchers also analysed expenditure on the households' economic wellbeing (i.e. expenditure minus items which don't directly benefit the household, like debt repayment and gifts to others). This analysis (again using fixed effects models) also suggests that migration has positive impacts on households' economic welfare (though, as noted above, the effects are more modest than those derived from income analysis) – increases in per capita expenditure of around 8 per cent across households with both absent and returned migrants. Remittance-receiving households experience very similar trends to households with absent migrants, with 82 per cent higher incomes per capita and 9 per cent

22. It is based on an instrumental variable approach and uses a good IV – see Nikolovski *et al* 2009.

Table 4.1. The impact of migration on household incomes

Country	Households with absent migrants	Households with returned migrants	Households in receipt of remittances
Colombia	Positive effect on per capita income (US\$ 97 per month) when remittances are included. Positive effect (of US\$72) when remittances not included.	No significant impact on per capita income.	Positive impact on per capita income of around US\$62 per month.
	Positive impact on expenditure of around 41US\$ per month.	Positive impact on expenditure of around 44 US\$ per month.	Positive impact on expenditure of around US\$37 per month.
	No significant impact on US\$1 per day poverty. If a household has a member away but receives no remittances then 3% more likely to be below US\$2 per day. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. If there is migration but no remittances then 7% more likely to be below national extreme poverty line. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. Migration without remittances has no effect on national poverty. If remittances are received the household is 14% less likely to be below national poverty line.	No significant impact on US\$1 per day poverty. If a household has a member away but receives no remittances then 3% more likely to be below 2US\$ per day. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. If there is migration but no remittances then 7% more likely to be below national extreme poverty line. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. Migration without remittances has no effect on national poverty. If remittances are received the household is 9% less likely to be below national poverty line.	No significant impact on US\$1 or \$2 a day poverty, or national extreme poverty. However, households receiving remittances 12% less likely to be below national poverty line.
Georgia	Basically no effect on expenditure.	Increases expenditure on household expenses (approx 3US\$ per month).	Spend more on most items.
	Positive asset effect – increased likelihood of gaining various assets over previous 5 years, including DVD player (10% more likely) and washing machine (9%).	Positive effect on assets – increased likelihood of gaining washing machine over past 5 years (11%), a car (8%) and a mobile phone (21%).	Very positive asset effect – increased likelihood of gaining many items over the past 5 years, including a 26% increase in the likelihood of gaining a fridge.
Ghana	No significant effect on income per capita.	No significant effect on income per capita.	No significant effect on income per capita
	Higher expenditure on some items – education (US\$107) and savings (US\$267).	No significant effect on expenditure.	No significant effect on expenditure.
Jamaica	No significant effect on assets.	Experience 6% higher living standards (asset measure).	n/a
Macedonia	No significant effect on assets.	No significant effect on assets.	n/a
Vietnam	Dramatically higher per capita income – 82% on average.	Higher per capita income – 8% on average.	Dramatically higher per capita income – 82%.
	Higher expenditure per capita (8%).	Higher expenditure per capita (8%).	Higher expenditure per capita (9%).

Source: DotM household survey 2007/2008. See Tables 2–14, Annex 9 for the full results.

Table 4.2. Impact of migration on business ownership

Country	Households with absent migrants	Households with returned migrants	Households in receipt of remittances
Colombia	No significant effect (PSM model, CS)	Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 4% (PSM model, CS)	Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 4% (PSM model, CS)
	No significant effect (PSM Model, DD)	No significant effect (PSM model, DD)	Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 5% (PSM model, DD)
Georgia	No significant effect	No significant effect	No effect overall, but 3% greater chance of owning a business in urban areas outside the capital
Macedonia	Increases likelihood of ever having owned a business	Increases likelihood of ever having owned a business (IV model)	-
	No significant effect on likelihood of having owned a business	Increases likelihood of ever having owned a business (PSM model)	-
Vietnam	-	Increases the likelihood of currently running a business of two or more workers (Probit model)	-

Source: DotM household surveys 2007/2008. For full results see Tables 15–19, Annex 9.

Note: PSM = propensity score matching; CS = cross-sectional; DD = difference in difference; IV = Instrumental Variable

though the ownership of smaller and more informal businesses is probably not incorporated in this analysis). However, the difference in difference analysis suggests that only the receipt of remittances actually has an impact, raising the likelihood of having a business account by about 5 per cent.

In Macedonia the results are quite different. There it appears that having a returned migrant in one's household makes you more likely to have run a business – and the effect is strong and highly statistically significant, being found consistently across different Instrumental Variable models and using propensity score matching. In Macedonia it also appears that currently having an absent migrant makes a household more likely to have run a business, though the effects are much less strong, and are only significant in the IV models.

In Vietnam, where only the effect of returned migration was analysed (using probit analysis and so not controlling for reverse causality) the evidence suggests that having a returned migrant in the household may raise the likelihood of households currently running a business with two or more employees. The Vietnamese researchers focused only on businesses with two or more employees as this kind of business is quite distinct in Vietnam from self-employment, which many undertake because they have no other options.

It is possible, however, to go beyond simply examining if households with exposure to migration are more likely to have run businesses. Information was also collected on the characteristics of those businesses, and whether or not they were successful. Descriptive statistics suggest that households with migrants tend to be more likely to operate larger, more formal businesses. So for example, in each of the countries that examined the split between family member and non-family member employees (Macedonia, Jamaica and Vietnam), the businesses operated by households with migrants (either absent or returned) were more likely to employ non-family members. Vietnam also found that households with migrants had more businesses

(though the difference is only marginal, and the other countries did not examine this). These findings are important because they suggest that where migration does promote the establishment of businesses, those businesses appear likely to have a larger impact on the wider economy than the average business owned by a non-migrant.

It should also be noted, however, that households with migrants are, across all three countries, more likely to have failed businesses – but the rates of business failure are not dramatically high, either in absolute or relative terms: for example 5 per cent of Macedonian households with migrants have had a failed business compared with 4 per cent of non-migrant households, and the rate in Vietnam is 11 per cent for households with absent migrants and 7 per cent for non-migrant households. This suggests that while migration may have provided households with extra resources like finance and skills, those resources are not always sufficient to ensure success. It may be that they induce some households not actually suited to entrepreneurialism to start businesses.

However, it should also be noted that the time it took for these businesses to close tended to be longer for households with migrants, in some cases much longer. The difference between households with migrants and those without ranged from a year in Macedonia (where it took almost four years for non-migrants' businesses to close and almost five for migrants') to almost eight years' difference in Jamaica (with migrant businesses lasting on average about 11.5 years, compared to around three for non-migrant failed businesses). Without subjecting these statistics to more in-depth analysis it is difficult to know quite why these differences might exist, but it could be that because the migrant businesses appear to be larger, it would take longer for them to fail. It may also be that the households are more reluctant to admit failure if the resources they have put into them are greater.

Lastly, the analysis permits us to look at which aspects of migration appear most important in determining whether or not a household with a returned migrant runs a business. The Vietnamese researchers analysed this issue in some depth – see Table 4.3.

The findings from Vietnam suggest that the migrant's education prior to departure is the most important variable in determining whether or not they go on to run a business, with those with higher levels of education most likely to be in households running businesses. Some of this result may be due to the fact that there are no variables included in the model for individuals' or households' income, and so what appears to be the result of higher levels of education is actually driven by the fact that richer households are both more likely to run businesses and also have higher levels of education. However, the model also finds that particular skills – professional and technical skills, rather than college level education – have the highest impacts on the likelihood of running a business, which emphasises the importance of having both a certain level and a certain type of skills, especially practical abilities. Also important in terms of demographic and social characteristics of the migrants are gender (with men more likely to start businesses) and the area the returned migrant lives in (with urban areas associated with higher rates of start-ups).

The model does not just examine socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the returnees, however: it also examines their migration experience. Surprisingly, some aspects of migration that might be expected to have an effect do not. The length of time spent abroad does not appear to affect the likelihood of starting a business, and neither does the reason for which a migrant returns to Vietnam. The timing of return also has no effect, which may be disappointing to Vietnamese policymakers. In the early 2000s significant economic reforms took place promoting the growth of small and medium sized enterprises, which might have been expected to facilitate the return of migrants wishing to run their own businesses. However, migrants returning after these reforms (post-2002) are no more likely to be in a household with a business than those

Table 4.3. Determinants of business ownership in Vietnam (Probit analysis)

Variable	1: Including all returned migrants		2: Only returnees who stayed abroad >=1 year	
	Estimate	Std-er	Estimate	Std-er
Dependent variable	Running a business having workers >=2			
Number of obs	416		345	
<i>Returnee characteristics</i>				
Male	0.086*	0.041	0.084*	0.045
Education prior departure				
· secondary and high school	0.111*	0.058	0.141**	0.066
· professional and technical	0.283***	0.106	0.353***	0.123
· college and above	0.088	0.091	0.229**	0.127
Working before going abroad	0.005	0.050	0.008	0.056
Urban location	0.146***	0.047	0.152***	0.053
<i>Experience while abroad</i>				
Time spent abroad (in months)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
Working while abroad	-0.126**	0.064	-0.095	0.072
Achieved some educational qualification while abroad	-0.124*	0.054	-0.138**	0.058
<i>Point of return</i>				
Age at return	0.003	0.008	-0.005	0.010
Age at return squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Returning after 2002	-0.044	0.054	-0.046	0.061
<i>Migration factors</i>				
Sending home remittances while abroad	0.102**	0.049	0.121**	0.050
Bringing money back when returning	0.080*	0.041	0.103**	0.045
Reasons for return				
· Earned a certain amount of money, then came back home	0.113	0.094	0.123	0.098
· Finished study, then came back home	0.030	0.105	0.001	0.108
Number of returnees	0.093**	0.041	0.050	0.045
Pseudo R2	0.094		0.105	

Source: Dang *et al* 2010 Note: '***', '**', '*' are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

support the idea that the reforms induced the return of people who were more likely than previous returned migrants to establish businesses. This finding fits with the results set out in the first part of Chapter 3, which suggested that few migrants return specifically because of economic opportunities.

Other aspects of migration do appear to be related to business ownership, however. In particular, across both specifications gaining educational qualifications while away makes a returned migrant's household less likely to be running a business. This could be explained by a number of things including bonding (migrants' study only taking place on the condition that they return to their previous place of work); education opening up

alternative opportunities which migrants would prefer to pursue; or simply the fact that those who study abroad have different aims to those who do not (that is, those who study abroad aim to apply for jobs that need those skills and formal qualifications, whereas those who aim to open their own business see less value in formal study).

In contrast to this finding on skills are findings on finance. The researchers found that migrants who remitted to their household while they were away or brought money back with them are more likely to be running a business. This suggests that the resources that really matter for returned migrants who intend to open their own businesses, in Vietnam at least, are finances, rather than skills.

Household labour force participation

We now focus on the much discussed issue of migration and labour force participation. Theory suggests that migration might affect it in two opposing ways. On the one hand (Vogiazides 2009) migration could make household members more likely to be in work or self employment because it creates additional opportunities for them (for example through the formation of new household businesses via the processes set out above). However, on the other, if households are able to access alternative sources of income, especially remittances, as a result of migration, they may have less need to work and will therefore exit the labour market (Acosta 2007).

Exiting work or the labour market is not necessarily problematic from the household's point of view – it is something they have freely chosen to do – and not necessarily either from a national perspective (if for example it allows parents to devote more time to caring for their children, which should be good for society as a whole). There have been concerns, however, that it could also have some negative effects in the long run at the national level too, potentially leading to a loss of skills, in the

long run nationally (especially in the case of return migrants) (ILO 2008, 186) (the)

Housing

Much of the literature discusses the important relationship between housing and migration, with returning migrants and remittance recipients often said to build new homes with the money they have made (de-Haas 2006). Investment in housing is important not just because of its potential to improve the lives of those who live in it, but also because it can create multiplier effects in the local economy – boosting demand for local construction firms and so on (Cotula *et al* 2004), providing an asset base to allow f(boosting)-25+19.2871nbecause bbase

improve health by decreasing exposure to the elements and improving sanitation and availability of electricity. As well as being important in itself, this can also increase people's productivity (Fisk 1999).

So is home ownership higher in households with migrants, and do they have an improved quality of housing? The evidence suggests that remittances are the key issue here; in all the cases examined being in receipt of remittances has a positive impact on housing. In Colombia it raises the likelihood that a household owns its own home by 5 per cent (using the more accurate difference in difference estimates) and in Ghana the effect is of an 8 per cent magnitude. In Georgia the research examined the number of rooms a household had, and found that while across the country as a whole there was no relationship between migration and the number of rooms, in rural areas it seems that receiving remittances means a household does have more rooms than the average. This result may be peculiar to rural areas because it is easier in those circumstances to add rooms or floors (if a household has the finances to do so) than it is in urban areas (Tchaidze and Torosyan 2010).

Savings

It is also important to examine the relationship between migration and savings.

Previous literature has emphasised that migration may enable households to save, or

Table 4.6. Impact of migration on savings

Country	Households with absent migrants	Households with returned migrants	Households in receipt of remittances
Colombia	Households with absent migrants save more – by around US\$8 per month	Households with returned migrants save more – by around US\$25 per month	Households receiving remittances save more – by around US\$11 per month
	Households with absent migrants save more per capita – by around US\$3 per month per capita	No significant effect on per capita savings	Households receiving remittances save more per capita – by around US\$4 per month
Georgia	n/a	n/a	Households receiving remittances save more – by around US\$94 per year
Ghana	Households with absent migrants save more – US\$267 per year	No significant effect on savings	No significant effect on savings
Vietnam	Households with absent migrants save more. The result is highly statistically significant but also very small – less than US\$1 per year per capita	n/a	n/a

Source: DotM household survey 2007/2008. For details see Tables 9, 15–17, 19 and 26 in Annex 9

While in Colombia it appears that this result may be being driven by the effect of receiving remittances (as there is a similar finding for households in receipt of remittances), in Ghana remittances do not have a significant impact on savings. This suggests that increases in saving may be the result of other ‘impact channels’ such as transmitted ideas from migrants abroad, or changed incentives. Being in receipt of remittances does, however, have a positive impact in Georgia (all of these findings are derived using PSM).

Lastly, the balance of DotM evidence on return migration suggests it has little impact on savings. This evidence comes from Ghana and Colombia. Return migration in Ghana appears to have no effect, and in Colombia the more useful of the two versions of the model run (which examines savings per capita rather than household savings as a whole) also finds no impact.

The focus of the report now moves onto the wider effects that migration has on the economy. On the one hand it is important not to put too much emphasis on these impacts. Too much of a focus here and there is a temptation to discount the effects that migration has on the households directly affected and simply to look to the ‘other’ group as the proper focus of any government intervention. However, not only are both kinds of households made up of citizens, to whom government has an equal obligation, but impacts on households with migrants are particularly important because they are the ones who have taken the risk involved in migrating.

Moreover, to some extent the distinction between effects on households that are directly affected and those that are not are somewhat artificial because, as already noted, impacts on households with migrants or those that receive remittances also affect non-migrant/non-remittance-receiving households. In some cases this is because of spillover effects. For example, if rural Georgian households build more rooms in their houses after receiving remittances, it seems likely that this will have a positive impact on the local economy through the employment of local builders, purchase of materials and so on. In some cases the impact is more direct – for example when households in Jamaica step up their labour market participation as migrants depart, this will directly affect the local and national unemployment rate; and when

more (although results do vary across countries). Moreover, the much discussed negative impact on labour force participation which has been said to result from receiving remittances does appear to exist in some circumstances, but it is very small and often seems to be outweighed by other aspects of migration that encourage members of households with absent migrants into work.

Some of the positive household impacts – such as increased business ownership and savings – are likely to have positive spillover effects affecting the wider society, meaning migration is not just good for the households concerned but the country at large. This will especially be the case for countries with high levels of movement, such as Macedonia and Jamaica, where migratory movements are large enough to impact on outcomes for whole communities, regions or even the nation itself.

In addition to extrapolating about what the household level findings mean for communities and the nation as a whole, this report explicitly examines one impact at those levels – the effect that migration has on nationwide income inequality. Here the analysis provides mixed results, though decreases in inequality as a result of migration appear to be more common than increases across the countries studied.

Broadly speaking, while the findings are not identical across indicators and countries, there is a clear overarching lesson that, on economic grounds at least, migration is good for individuals, households and the wider society across the diverse range of countries studied by DotM. This raises two challenges. First – an academic challenge – to understand further what determines when impacts are positive, neutral or negative, and how sizeable those impacts are. Second – a policy challenge – is to understand how migration can be shaped, both in its extent and in its nature, to increase the positive impacts and minimise the small number of negative ones.

We now move on to focus on migration's impacts on educational development, again looking at individuals, households and wider communities and societies.

The majority of evidence which has been produced so far on educational impacts is for household level outcomes. This research suggests that migration usually promotes investment in education. This might be for one of three reasons: first, because of incentive effects (educated people who migrate successfully incentivise others to gain education [Batista *et al* 2007, Chand and Clemens 2008]); second, as a result of the extra resources remittances bring to households, some of which are put into education (Cox and Ureta 2003); or third, because of transmitted values and attitudes which place greater emphasis on education (Lindley 2006).

These findings are not universal, however. In some circumstances, migration appears to decrease investment in education, especially, it seems, where the migration options available do not require high levels of qualifications or skills (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006). This seems to result in a negative incentive effect whereby household members conclude that to migrate and earn a decent income, education is not required. There have also been studies about nationwide effects of migration on education, which usually tend to suggest that the departure of qualified teachers, university staff and so on can have knock-on negative effects on educational provision (UNESCO 2010). It is also vital to examine one of the most discussed and contentious impacts that migration can have – the effect of 'brain drain', f 'braint toent.2.2(e)-25(pwe-2c)12.2(ewe-2c)12.2d9n.2(-5.8(y25(imp

The first evidence presented here is on educational qualifications gained by migrants while abroad. Skills acquisition by migrants is beneficial for the migrants themselves, and also has the potential to boost skill stocks in their country of origin if they return (though the 'transferability' of what they have learnt is also important). The evidence presented here is only indicative (as it has not been possible to construct a counterfactual to understand the extent to which those who migrated might have gained qualifications had they stayed in their country of origin). However, observing the extent to which migrants study while they are away remains insightful.

The extent to which migrants study while living abroad varies significantly by country. At one end of the spectrum almost 50 per cent of absent migrants from Macedonia have gained an additional qualification during their time out of the country (and even more are likely to have studied without gaining any formal qualifications) whereas at the other, only around 6 per cent of Jamaican returned migrants gained qualifications abroad. These different trends are likely to be explained partially by the time these groups spend abroad; as shown in Chapter 3, Macedonian migrants rarely return for a few years, whereas the majority of Jamaican returned migrants stay away for under 12 months.

Examining specifically the kind of qualifications gained abroad, the evidence shows that it is most common for migrants to acquire work-related qualifications. For example 65 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants who gained a qualification, gained one of this kind. Vietnam stands out as the clear exception here, with tertiary level qualifications (bachelors, masters and doctorates) making up about half of the qualifications gained by migrants who return to Vietnam. This result probably reflects the fact that Vietnamese migrants are less likely, compared with migrants from other countries, to gain any kind of qualification while abroad (about 17 per cent of these returned migrants do, one of the

the group overall). Some also said that they had learnt more about a particular social issue (such as environmental issues) – 10 per cent of Macedonian returnees claiming new skills said this (4 per cent of the overall group), as did 15 per cent of the Vietnamese group with new skills (7 per cent of returnees overall).

These are quite striking findings. They suggest that migration creates an important opportunity for skills development and possibly the broadening of horizons for individual migrants. Indeed, it is close to being the norm that migrants will develop informal skills, according to this evidence. This makes migration a good way for individual migrants to expand their capabilities, and seems likely to concomitantly increase the skills base and the range of ideas in the respective 'home' societies – a point that will be picked up again at later points in the report.

This section presents evidence on the impact that migration has on educational outcomes at a household level. The findings are once again mixed but broadly positive (see Table 4.7). The picture seems clearest in terms of the effect that remittances have on education. Broadly, educational expenditure rises on the receipt of remittances (these are the findings from PSM analysis in Colombia and Georgia); only in Ghana is there a different result (again using PSM) – no increase.

Conversely, where the relationship between remittances and school attendance is analysed, the result tends to suggest no impact (in Colombia, using PSM; and in Macedonia and Vietnam, using binomial logic and probit respectively). It is logical to see an improvement in expenditure but not attendance, as expenditure on education is an easier variable in which to see incremental differences (every extra dollar spent is reflected in the data), whereas school attendance requires a larger shift in behaviour (deciding whether or not to put a child in school) in order to be observed. Moreover in some of the countries examined school attendance – at least at primary level – is already close to universal, in which context investments in quality rather than quantity of education seem much more likely.

The exception to this finding on school attendance is Jamaica. There older children – those aged 17 and above, with 17 chosen as the age at which many in Jamaica discontinue their education – in households receiving remittances are more likely to be in education than their peers in non-receiving households. The model finds that a doubling of household income through remittances increases their likelihood of being in higher education by 80 per cent. This analysis is conducted using a logit model, however, and so it is not entirely clear in what direction causality runs – does having children in higher education make a household more likely to receive remittances, or do remittances raise the likelihood of children undertaking higher education?

It is worth noting that this focus on higher education, rather than education as a whole, is reflected in the other findings on remittances – in Colombia for example most of the extra expenditure on education from remittances appears to be focused in higher – rather than basic – education.

There is less evidence on the effects of return migration, but what there is suggests that generally return migration has little influence over the household's educational outcomes. However it does appear to have a positive influence on educational expenditures in Colombia (results taken from PSM). It is interesting to note that return migration appears to impact on a different area of education than remittances. Whereas remittances seem primarily to raise expenditure on higher education, the majority of the impact of return migration appears to be on basic education, in some ways making it particularly important in developmental terms.

The area where the findings are the most interesting, nuanced and indeed divided is on the impact of absent migrants on the household. The simplest results come from Colombia and Ghana, which examine expenditure on education using PSM, both finding that having an absent migrant increases expenditure. It is interesting, though, that this effect is smaller in Colombia than the positive effect of remittances, suggesting that while remittances may increase expenditure, other aspects of having an absent migrant may not be as positive. In contrast, Ghana found remittances do not have a positive

impact on educational spending but having an absent migrant does, suggesting that other aspects of migration – such as transmitted ideas and attitudes – may account for this impact, rather than simply flows of money from the absent migrant.

Table 4.7. Impact of migration on household members' education

Country	Households with absent migrants	Households with returned migrants	Households in receipt of remittances
Colombia	No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact on expenditure – increases by about US\$8 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of the effect comes through increases on higher education.	No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact, increases expenditure on education by US\$5 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of this effect comes through increased expenditure on basic education.	No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact on expenditure – increases by about US\$11 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of the effect comes through increases on higher education.
Georgia	n/a	n/a	Increased expenditure by US\$39 per year.
Ghana	Positive impact on educational expenditure, of about US\$107 per year.	No significant impact	No significant impact.
Jamaica	No significant effect on school attendance.	n/a	Increased likelihood of household members aged 17–21 being in education, in line with any other addition to household income. A doubling of living standards through remittances (or any other income) would lead to an 80% increase in likelihood of children over 16 being in education.
	Where the absent migrant is the parent of a child aged 5 – 16, the child is less likely to be in school against comparable non-migrant households, and the effect is large. There is no significant effect on older children.	n/a	n/a
Macedonia	Negative impact on school attendance. The effect is primarily through children aged 19–22.	n/a	No significant impact on school attendance.
	Positive impact on expenditure if it is the child's parent who is absent, raising the likelihood that the child will be in school very substantially. Again the effect operates mostly through the 19–22 age group.	n/a	n/a
Vietnam	No significant impact on school attendance	No significant impact on school attendance.	No significant impact on school attendance.
	There is, however, a quite a large positive impact on school attendance if the child's parent is absent.	n/a	n/a

Sources: DotM household survey. For details see Tables 9, 15–17 and 27–30, Annex 9

Researchers for DotM in Colombia, Vietnam, Jamaica and Macedonia examined the relationship between school attendance and having an absent migrant. In the former three countries there appears to be no impact. However, in Macedonia there is

Secondly, and potentially much more importantly, migration can clearly affect a country's stock of skills – indeed 'brain drain' is one of the best known phrases associated with migration and development. Skilled people clearly do – at least in some circumstances – play a vital economic and social role in developing countries

to the sector do not compensate for the numbers of people who originally left it through emigration. Interestingly, the one sector that is an exception is health and social care – the sector about which there tends to be the greatest concern over brain drain. While this result deserves further investigation because it is based on a seriegh

Turning to the impacts of remittances on household educational outcomes, the analysis presented above indicated that remittances may have improved the quality of education that household members are getting, but they probably are not increasing attendance. As such, while remittances may probably make a small contribution to skill stocks, it seems unlikely that even when this positive effect is combined with additions to skills via return and immigration, the effect would be strong enough to counteract the original effects of departure.

The last route whereby migration can affect skill stocks is incentives. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the fact that migration is attractive, and that having a high level of skills makes it easier to migrate, means that people in developing countries may invest more in these sorts of skills than they would have done had they not been considering migrating. Moreover, as not all these people will subsequently leave the country, the nation will retain some skilled people who, without the existence of migration, would be less qualified. The key question, however, is over the strength of the effect. Is the incentive effect fairly marginal, only leading to a few people gaining skills and not enough to counteract the departure of all those who migrate? Or is it strong enough that at least some countries end up with more skilled people than they would have in a scenario where there was no emigration?

The best evidence on incentive effects suggests two key findings. First, up to a certain level brain drain has *positive* impacts on skill stocks in the country of origin (implying, somewhat counter-intuitively, that some countries can have *too little* brain drain). Second, above a certain level brain drain is damaging, and increasingly so (that is, the damage is not linear but exponential). The key is understanding where this dividing line between benefit and harm is drawn, and whether it falls in different places for different countries.

Taking the latter question first, -25(the)-25afat ation, the effigthese betwige2007)two key

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consider what actions might be appropriate to try to strengthen skills stocks. However, it should be noted that even in these three countries, the extent to which migration flows are made up of skilled people is less than expected, as the country reports make very clear. It seems that in some cases concern about brain drain has made policymakers and observers think that migration equals brain drain when in fact skilled people make up

While this result is drawn from OLS analysis and so there are issues of causality (and the size of the 'effects' shown both for returned and absent migrants suggest that there probably is some reverse causality taking place), the suggestion that some of the Jamaican result is caused by migration is supported by the finding that the nature, and

impacts on household members' health, but there are some negative results. The Jamaica result, in the view of the current report's authors, is misleading, the result of a poorly designed question in the pilot stage of the project, and can be discounted.²⁷ However, even setting this aside, negative impacts on household members' health from having an absent migrant away and receiving remittances are still found in Colombia, where the effect falls on women's health specifically. Some local stakeholders noted that women who are left behind when their male partners migrate may feel isolated and concerned for the migrant's welfare abroad, which may impact on their own health (Cardenas *et al* 2010).

In Georgia there are sub-national, if not national, effects on health as a result of migration. Remittances appear to reduce by about a third the likelihood that rural households will have a member in poor health. By contrast, in Tblisi, the capital, they increase the likelihood by similar odds. This emphasises the importance of understanding the local context, which will determine what effect introducing an outside influence like remittances has on outcomes.

Health sector brain drain is one of the most discussed aspects of migration, with many fearing it seriously damages development in places. The analysis here mirrors the analysis above on skill stocks, to provide some insight into the specific effects of medical brain drain in DotM countries. We take Jamaica as an illustrative example.

A review of literature about the Jamaican health sector found, as might be expected, that when staff migrate, shortages in the workplace are exacerbated. Increasing staff shortages ratchet up the workload and responsibilities of remaining staff, which in turn leads to high levels of staff absenteeism, lowered staff morale and a deteriorating quality of healthcare (Mortley 2009). There are substantial shortages in Jamaica: 2000 nurses were registered in the public healthcare system in 2008, while the Jamaican Nurses Association thought there should have been 4500 (Thomas-Hope *et al* 2009).

However, although shortages lead to a deterioration of care and migration appears to exacerbate them, it has also been found that migration did not create the shortages (Mortley 2009). In 2008 the budget for training health professionals in Jamaica was cut to J\$301 million from J\$322 million the previous year – a 15 per cent reduction in real terms (Thomas-Hope *et al* 2009), and significant enough to place pressure on the provision of staff for the public healthcare system without any contribution from migration.

In order to get a full sense of the effect that migration has on health sector performance, it is important to look more broadly than this, to examine departures and the context within which they take place alongside immigration and return, remittances, other diaspora contributions, and incentives.

The first aspect to be considered is the role immigration and return play in counteracting the shortages. Foreign nurses, chiefly from Cuba and Nigeria, have helped to fill alongside as frsagh , than (Thomad s(p1u12.2(es2GD+(ex

healthcare training). In other countries, notably Vietnam but possibly also Georgia, healthcare provision could potentially be improved if there were more migration of healthcare personnel.

The fourth area of focus is gender-based impacts of migration: the effects that migration might have on restrictive gender-based roles and expectations.

This section examines first whether or not migration can offer opportunities for escaping restrictive gender roles or if it might reinforce them.

The first interesting finding in this regard comes from the Jamaica analysis, where the researchers examined whether or not migration was driven by different motivations for men and women. While some of the motivations were cited by similar numbers from each gender, some responses each gender, ciC.0159Ct-#35nseach es

It is also interesting to examine how migration has changed individuals' own attitudes to gender equality in their country of origin. In every case examined on this measure (Georgia, Jamaica and Vietnam) migration had a major impact, with large numbers of male and female returned migrants reporting that their experience of living abroad had made them think that more effort was needed 'back home' to ensure gender equality. In Jamaica about 80 per cent of both male and female returnees reported feeling this, and in Vietnam the figure was around 90 per cent for both sexes. In Georgia, in contrast, women reported a similarly increased level of support for gender equality efforts (86 per cent), but men felt less strongly, with 60 per cent saying that they felt this way. However, 60 per cent of men is still a large section of the returning migrant population, and the figures across the countries as a whole suggest that these returned migrants collectively could make a strong, potentially game-changing, force for greater gender equality in their countries of origin.³⁰

The first place where it is possible to assess whether or not greater support for gender equality gained through migration translates into better outcomes is within migrants' own households. One unique way in which DotM aims to do this is by asking households about the distribution among household members of tasks that do not earn an income. It might be expected that in households with returned migrants, and potentially other kinds of exposure to migration, these tasks might be distributed in a less gender stereotypical way than in other households.

The data make very clear, however, that no substantial changes in habits have taken place. Simply examining the distribution of household tasks between households with migrants and those without shows very little difference between the households in any of the countries. The only country where there is a significant difference in the likelihoods of men doing traditionally male tasks and women doing traditionally female tasks is Macedonia, where households with migrants (absent and returned) see women more likely to spend time doing the traditionally female task of cooking. Evidence over time from Macedonia similarly shows that women in households with migrants have also become more likely than those in households without migrants to spend a large proportion of their time cooking and cleaning compared to five years previously. This is not a good result in terms of demonstrating the influence of the supposedly radically changed attitudes of returned migrants.

Under a more advanced analysis, controlling for the influence of other factors does not paint a much more positive picture. Probit analysis which looks at all the countries except Jamaica together (i.e. Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Macedonia and Vietnam)

households with returned migrants considered separately. Interestingly, this model suggests that the return of migrants to Colombia does not reduce the extent to which core families are living apart. Indeed in this model returned migrant households are marginally more likely to be separated than absent migrant households – they are 10 per cent less likely to have kept the core family together compared to non-migrant households, versus households with absent migrants which are 7 per cent less likely. This suggests that many of the separations induced by migration may not resolve themselves, but may turn into permanent splits. However the extent of families being split by migration – both temporarily and permanently – is not as great as perhaps many expected.

The last impact examined is the extent to which migration affects the importance people assign to 'tradition'. Of course it is not possible to generalise about what tradition means to each respondent, or in each country, but it is interesting to see the extent to which the very notion of tradition and its importance is supported by those with exposure to migration. This is because in most countries it is possible to draw a line between those who support 'small c' conservative values and are hesitant about cultural and social change, and those who class themselves as progressives and broadly welcome the notion of change. Moreover, migration has been suggested to affect attachment to tradition. For example it has been shown how migration (both internal and international) supports 'tradition' in Fiji, where it boosts attachment to the traditional village structure of society (Sofer 1992). It has also been suggested, however, that the effect might work in the other direction, with those exposed to a larger alternative set of ways of living becoming more critical of tradition in their own place of origin.

The evidence from the DotM studies suggests that there is no simple relationship between migration and the perceived importance of tradition. In Georgia, Jamaica and Vietnam only indicative evidence is available, which suggests that migration is likely to be associated with an increased attachment to tradition. A very large 93 per cent of Vietnamese returned migrants say that their experiences abroad made them more protective of traditional ways of life in Vietnam and more than three quarters of Jamaican returned migrants felt the same way about their country. In Georgia results broken down by gender are very interesting, as while both genders tend to cite an increased attachment to tradition, there are significant differences between them. 91 per cent of female and 76 per cent of male returned migrants suggested that as a result of their migration they increasingly felt it is important to protect traditional ways of life in Georgia, of whom 75 per cent of the women and 49 per cent of the men felt this

may simply be, however, that households with both kinds of migrants have on average a higher degree of exposure to migration and to attitudes and lifestyles from elsewhere, which means that they take different views to those whose level of experience of migration is less (see Tables 44 and 45 in Annex 9 for results).

The findings presented in this chapter are diverse, nuanced, and can be looked at in a number of different ways. This summary briefly considers some of the different views to the

As such, the effects on a community of having absent migrants appears, at least according to the evidence presented here, mixed depending on the circumstances of the country in question, but in many cases much more positive than is often depicted.

A key concern of policymakers is to know whether or not migration has classic 'externality' effects – or if, in other words, it seems like a good choice for the individuals who engage with it, but has wider impacts for others that are not taken into account by the people who make the decision to migrate. This, for example, drives concern about brain drain that the skilled people who are leaving benefit on average from that decision, but that the impacts for those left behind are problematic, particularly if the migrants were previously performing vital roles such as in healthcare.

The analysis presented here focuses most directly on household level impacts, which means it cannot give a comprehensive assessment of the scope of impacts at different 'levels' but it does nonetheless provide some interesting insights, which we summarise briefly below.

Effects at all levels – on the migrant themselves, the households they have relationships with, and their wider communities and society – appear broadly positive (though there is some variation across countries and indicators). As such, it is not clear that externality effects are of as great a concern as has been expected. While the existence of some of the expected negative externalities has been supported by this research, in other cases they are not as problematic as had been thought, and in some cases DotM has shone a light on positive externalities that had previously been either overlooked or neglected altogether. These include the extent to which migration affects many more households than expected in broadly positive ways via the sending of remittances: these spread much more widely through society than has previously been recognised, far beyond the households that migrants were previously members of. When added to the spillovers that result from household level impacts (for example on savings or business ownership), this research does not provide much support for the hypothesis that migrants benefit from migration to the detriment of others. Rather, the developmental impacts that migration has are broadly, though not uniformly, positive across different levels of society.

5. What can policymakers do?

This chapter is divided into two sections. First, we draw out the big-picture policy messages that emerge from the DotM project, presenting three principles we believe all policymakers should base policy around. Second, we take a more detailed look at specific policy tools, because while the report's findings have some big-picture implications, they also show a remarkable degree of nuance in how migration affects development. This in turn suggests a role for a broad range of policies to shape and enhance the process of migration and development, to increase its development benefits and reduce its costs.

This research has three fundamental messages that all policymakers need to take on board if migration is to reach its development potential. Were all these three planks to be accepted by all key players in the process, this would provide a solid foundation upon which specific, well-designed policy interventions could be built.

The major, overarching conclusion of this research is that migration is good for development. On average it improves migrants' lives, it improves their families' lives, and in most cases it improves the lives of the other people living in their communities and countries of origin through positive spillover effects. More specifically, the research suggests that most developing countries would benefit from high levels of migration, with large numbers of migrants remitting, strong contacts between migrants and the people and places they leave behind, and significant numbers of people returning.

Just as important as the fact that migration improves people's lives is the finding that it improves them most dramatically in the ways that matter to them. The framework developed for this project (based on the capabilities approach) makes clear that people's own development goals – the ambitions they themselves have identified and hold dear – should be at the centre of development. Answers to questions about why people migrate reveal that economic goals – improving job prospects, pay, and being able to remit – are the major hopes held by migrants across most countries. And the findings of this research suggest that it is in the economic arena that the most dramatic improvements in outcomes occur.

The finding that migration is good for development is not new – many research projects have approached this question from various different angles and often come up with the same conclusion. However, policymakers in some developed and developing countries alike have resisted it – for political reasons and/or because they are concerned about specific effects (such as those that might result from brain drain). Our research does not suggest that there are no reasons to be concerned. Migration can have negative impacts in some areas in some countries (for example on skills stocks or on health). However, when these negative impacts are set in a wider context, as we have tried to do in this project, it is clear that migration is generally a force for good in development with some negative impacts to be addressed by policy, rather than a force for harm that policymakers should be aiming to limit where possible.

While migration may be a force for good in development, nothing in the findings of this project suggests that migration is transformational at the societal level, or that it can be relied on to act alone as a national strategy for development. While migration is improving many outcomes for people in developing countries, these changes tend to be incremental. Indeed, poor economic opportunities continue to be drivers of migration even in places that have had many decades or even centuries of previous emigration.

The fact that people are migrating in order to achieve their goals (and are not being attracted back by opportunities at 'home') should instead be taken as a reflection of the fact that people are struggling to achieve their aims and improve their lives in their country of origin, and that more needs to be done to promote sustainable national development. This is not news – policymakers do not need high levels of migration to remind them of the need for development – but it is important, because there is a danger that under some circumstances migration and its benefits could be used as a reason for development to be pursued with less urgency. In many countries, the evidence suggests that migration should be seen as another indicator that successful long-term development strategies must be found.

One of the most striking findings, which has come up again and again in this research, is that migration is not a policy variable. It is not something that policymakers can switch on or off or that they can design: rather, migration patterns are the result of two incredibly powerful forces.

First, migration is part of globalisation. The increasing interlinkages and interdependence that are being built between countries through globalisation both encompass and create migration. Policymakers are aware that they can facilitate or mould other aspects of globalisation, but they are also aware that it is a process that is proceeding independently of them too. This same awareness must be brought to discussions of migration, which at present is all too commonly portrayed as something governments should 'get a grip on', or 'manage better'.

Second, perhaps more so than any other element of globalisation, migration is also a social phenomenon. This means that shaping migration is different to shaping trade or financial flows. Migration's impacts do not just arise because an economic factor of production has been moved from one place to another; the movement of people also has very profound and immediate social implications. It can potentially change people's identities, their social relationships and the nature of their obligations, all of which in turn have development implications.

This makes it more difficult to 'design' particular development outcomes through

With this vision of migration and development, and policymakers' potential role within it in place, it is possible to move on to examine specific policy measures that governments could put in place to promote better development outcomes. This section draws upon everything that has been learnt about the nature of migration and its impacts through the research thus far to consider and evaluate potential policies. The approach taken to achieve this (following Chappell and Glennie 2009) is based around altering the whole process of migration and development. In this view, migration's development impacts are seen as resulting from a process that occurs over time (see Figure 5.1 for a simplified depiction of this process).

Figure 5.1 will be familiar to researchers and policymakers working in the field of migration and development. It shows the cyclical nature of migration and development, demonstrating how migration is determined – at least in part – by development circumstances in the originating country. It also shows that the development outcomes of migration can then directly and indirectly affect future migration flows.

However, the main purpose of including this diagram is to show the migration and

- The *outcomes of migration* (including impacts on the migrant themselves, and on the development of the migrant's originating country. These help to form the determinants of migration, thereby returning to the first point in the cyclical process).

What this means in practice is that, starting from the *process of movement* and the question of whether or not a given person migrates, it is clear that this is affected by the development circumstances of the person in question, which are partially formed by the effects of previous acts of migration by that person themselves or by others in their household, community or country. Depending on their capabilities, such as financial resources, skills and also the situation in which they find themselves (for example, conflict or environmental degradation or disaster) the individual, in consultation with others, makes a decision regarding whether or not to move. They also decide the process of that movement – where to move to, how to fund the movement, how to make the journey and so on. This may be an initial movement out of their country of origin, a movement between countries of destination or the decision to return back to their country of birth.

So given that a migrant moves, and moves to a particular location, the next stage in the process is the *conditions* he or she experiences there³⁹. These include the terms of entry experienced, with distinctions between migrants (based for example on country of citizenship and skill sets) determining whether or not someone is allowed to enter a country legally, for how long they are permitted to stay, as well as what they are permitted to do once in the country. An important way in which these shape the conditions experienced by the migrant is by determining the legality of their actions. In particular, if some aspect of their movement is not legal, then the migrant's possibilities are restricted – they may have to remain more 'in the shadows', take less skilled work, have less recourse to the law should a crime be committed against them and so on (for example see United Nations Development Programme 2009).

As well as entry conditions, however, the conditions of integration experienced by the migrant are also vital. Here we interpret 'integration' widely, along the lines of the British Council-sponsored 'integration index' (Niessen *et al* 2007) which includes access to nationality, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access, long-term residence and political participation as relevant. These 'integration conditions' experienced by the migrant work in a similar way to the entry conditions in determining what kind of life the migrant is able to lead in their country of destination. Are they able to use and develop their skills or not? Are they able to earn a good wage or not? Are they able to share their ideas and ways of living and learn new ones from their host community? This is vital because it determines the outcomes of migration.

The third part of the migration and development process is the *outcome* of movement. The sum of the migrant's experiences thus far will determine how migration affects her or him – which matters in itself in any definition of migration based on capabilities, as emphasised previously⁴⁰ – and this in turn affects the ways in which they interact with their country of origin. Together these outcomes of migration influence development circumstances in the originating country. As Figure 5.1 shows, this in turn helps to determine the existence, extent and nature of the next round of migration.

So the key question is what makes impacts better or worse? What changes to movement itself, the conditions experienced and the outcomes of migration are important in altering migration's impacts? If we can identify these then we can identify what sorts of policies might be able to alter these aspects of the process most effectively to promote development. This section adds the substantial new information generated by this research to what is already known to analyse this, identifying four groups of factors that are important in affecting the migration and development process.⁴¹ These are:

1. The migrant's own characteristics and activities
2. The nature of the migration taking place
3. The characteristics and policies of the origin country
4. The characteristics and policies of the recipient country.

39. We want to urge that the diagram is not a perfect depiction of the relationship between migration and development. It is not strictly true, for example, to say that we can separate out a migrant's movement to a particular location and the conditions he or she experiences there. Rather, we see some feedback from the conditions experienced to the process of movement for example entry policies are listed here as conditions that the migrant experiences, rather than factors determining movement. We think this is appropriate because entry policies do only partially determine whether or not a person moves to a country (Dorling 2009), and thus can perhaps better be seen as conditions experienced by the migrant. However, such examples make clear that the diagram, while useful, is a simplified version of a rather complex reality.

40. This means, for example, that if a migrant experiences discrimination, we should count this as a negative development impact not only because they might earn less, inhibiting their ability to remit (and a poorer outcome for their families and country of origin), but also because we are concerned about the experiences and wellbeing of that individual.

41. The groups are all inter-related and factors listed in one group can affect factors in another. However, evidence suggests that each factor can be separately influenced by policy, and thus we list them separately.

Each of these is discussed below, and then the main findings are summarised in a table at the end of this section.

DotM research points to three aspects of the migrant's own characteristics and activities that are potentially important in shaping migration's development impacts, through altering movements themselves, the conditions migrants experience, and the outcomes of their movement.

- (a) *Personal characteristics.* Migrants' personal characteristics – their gender, age, education and so on – are much discussed as potentially important in influencing their migration and its development potential. And it seems clear from this research that these factors are influential in a number of ways.

First, it seems clear that migrants' characteristics, particularly their income and educational achievement, shape where they can afford to move to and where they are allowed to go. Broadly, the wealthier and more highly educated a migrant is, the more in demand they are from countries and employers across the globe. They are also more likely to have the resources required to fund emigration. Gender may sometimes be important too, with constraints related to traditional ideas of gender roles sometimes stopping women from moving – whether those ideas are in the country of origin (so families discourage their female members from moving), or in the country of destination (with one gender or the other in demand for particular kinds of work – such as care work or construction).

The evidence suggests that such constraints stop some people from moving at all, while others may move but find themselves in contravention of regulations in the country they have moved to. For example, the UK's migration for work system is closed to low-skilled migrants from outside the European Union (Chappell and Mulley 2010). Should a migrant from somewhere like Ghana migrate to the UK they would thus find themselves living and/or working without permission. This means that as well as affecting whether or not people move in the first place, the interaction between a migrant's characteristics and migration regulations can determine someone's experiences as a migrant, with irregularity in particular associated with many difficulties and restrictions (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

However, while personal characteristics clearly matter in this way, it is quite striking the degree to which one cannot predict any particular set of outcomes based on migrants' personal characteristics. The research found that there are no consistent outcomes regarding whether men or women or highly or less educated people remit more, for example. Nor are there clear patterns as to whether men or women gain more personally from the experience of migration, with both tending to report similar levels of improvements in their standards of living. In fact, throughout the report it has proved very difficult to generalise in any way about migration's impacts based on migrants' own personal characteristics.

In some ways this is not surprising. Experiences of migration are diverse and complex enough that simple demographic or social characteristics should not be expected to have too much purchase on migration's outcomes. But the findings should still be emphasised because many countries have discussed trying to encourage particular segments of their populations to migrate in order to gain from the supposedly better impacts that will result from their movement. (For example, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Pakistan have targeted more skilled people as migrants [International Organisation for Migration 2005, Orozco and Ferro 2008a, 2008b].) These results suggest that governments may be better off targeting their efforts at other points in the migration and development process.

- (b) *Migrants' social networks and ties.* This research seems to indicate that the second aspect of migrants' own characteristics that influences the migration and development process is their social networks, and social and cultural ties. DotM research suggests that the location of a migrant's family in particular, and also the

planned, the better this appears to be in terms of outcomes. Examples of this include the findings that if migrants arrange their job in advance of migrating they remit more; if return is planned then migrants earn more once they are back in their country of origin; and that if migrants are able to arrange alternative childcare arrangements for any children they leave behind, the effects of migration on those children appear to be more positive.

While this finding may at first seem to have little to do with policy there are at least two ways in which it is relevant for policymakers.

First, a number of countries provide pre-departure training to migrants. This is clearly very beneficial, enabling migrants both to plan for what they will encounter abroad and to think about the situation they will leave behind. DotM research suggests that such training should be provided to as many groups as possible.

However, while formal training of this kind is clearly useful, the research has made clear that much migration does not come onto the radar of policymakers but is rather arranged business to business or by individuals. It may therefore be useful to design alternative initiatives to target at this wider group of migrants. For example, the British government is currently running a substantial 'know before you go' campaign, which encourages travellers and migrants of all kinds leaving the UK to do research about where they are going in advance, and also to prepare (for example, to arrange insurance) in case they encounter problems. The government is placing advertisements and information where travellers and migrants might encounter it, from travel agents and airlines to public places like train stations.

Similarly, in Georgia a group of organisations led by the IOM has established a website, www.informedmigration.ge, which aims to serve as a 'one-stop shop' for would-be migrants, providing comprehensive up-to-date information on safe migration opportunities as well as information about the dangers of human trafficking. As well as providing this information and links to further details, the site informs migrants about free courses that can be attended on safe migration and provides a 'virtual consultation' email address for people with queries.

This seems to be an area where much innovation is currently taking place, and where countries of origin and departure may have some shared interests, presenting a good opportunity for collaboration and joint working. However, there appears to have been relatively little study of how effective such information campaigns are, and how to improve their effectiveness. Therefore as well as being an area in which it may be worth investing more effort, it may also be one where more policy impact assessment is required.

Second, sometimes the reasons that migrants do not plan is not because the migrant chooses not to, but because policymakers do not allow them to. For example, evidence presented to DotM suggested that when, at the turn of the millennium, Georgian migrants were unexpectedly forced to come back from Russia because of its economic crisis and the political difficulties between the two countries, the migrants who returned earned less than comparable returning migrants who came back at other times of their own volition. The importance of this kind of voluntariness in maximising migration's development impacts has also been stressed in previous work (Heath 2009). However, policy can sometimes force migrants to act quickly and sometimes against their will. Policymakers should be cautious about these sorts of sudden policy changes – the evidence is that they are bad for development.

While migrants' own characteristics may be less significant in determining migration's outcomes than might perhaps have been expected, this research suggests that the nature of the migration – particularly the reasons for which people move and how long they move for – is central.⁴²

(a) *Purpose of migration.* First, and unsurprisingly, it appears that the reason behind the decision to move matters. The implications here are quite intuitive. If someone

42. Where they go to also matters: the nature of the destination country is discussed in detail below.

migrates for study, for example, we see that they tend to be away for a shorter period, and are less likely to start a business on return (indicating that study moved them towards professional, rather than entrepreneurial, goals).

The implication of this finding is interesting. If people's reason for leaving matters, the value of an approach that advocates migration for migration's sake as a policy goal has to be questioned. While there may be a temptation for some to suggest that getting people across borders is what matters, these findings suggest that strategies should be more nuanced, as what people go to achieve affects the impacts of their movement.

- (b) *Duration of migration.* The research makes some quite surprising findings about the length of time a migrant spends away. Where the duration of migration has been discussed in previous research, it has often been suggested that shorter durations are better for development. This seems to be for one of two reasons. Firstly, longer stays are often associated with the migrants moving their family to the country of destination (as migrants are more likely to gain citizenship and other rights over time, enabling them to bring their families), which reduces migrant's interactions with their country of origin. The other explanation is that longer stays reduce the likelihood that the migrant ever returns (as they become more attached to the society they have joined), denying the range of positive development impacts that return appears to bring.

However, this research enables a greater degree of nuanced analysis than may previously have been possible. It suggests that while previous assumptions about family location and return do not appear to be incorrect, these are not the only issues that should be examined when looking at the duration of migration. The evidence presented here suggests that where migrants stay away for longer periods but do not move all their close family members away and do eventually return, longer stays may have stronger development impacts than shorter ones. For example, remittances do not reach their peak until the migrant has been away for at least several years, and in some countries they continue to rise over time for at least the first 10 years. Similarly, where migrants are away longer they are more likely to gain skills and qualifications, adding to a country's skill stock if they return.

This suggests that policy needs to distinguish carefully 2i2.2(.2(etts)-25(t1Similarly)ger1(o)0()-25(r-25

presented here suggests that labour market reintegration can take some time, and the economic context which returnees enter – especially labour market conditions – seems likely to be important in determining just how long. To get the most out of returned migrants policymakers need to create an enabling business environment and labour markets that recognise the skills and experiences migrants have gained abroad.

However, it should be noted that there is little evidence that migrants return to actively pursue economic opportunities, or that improvements to the economic climate would encourage people to come back – at least for the range of countries studied here. Few people reported returning for economic opportunity in any of the countries, and there appears to be no relationship between a country's economic

and variables that can be altered much more simply by policymakers and that appear to

development resources are often scarce, it is important to direct them towards

adds to any larger problem or challenge. There is no need, in most cases, to focus on altering migration itself, or even to design a brand new 'migration and health' strategy (for example). Instead government would examine all the factors that prevent the health sector from providing adequate healthcare, which would cover everything from finances to access to staffing. Migration would then be seen as one of the issues (alongside internal migration and movement into the private sector and out of health altogether) which make staffing difficult. This involves full mainstreaming of migration into existing national development strategies.

For this to be successful, however, governments must be aware of the problems facing their people, and be responsive to them. Thus one of the most effective actions that governments could potentially undertake to get the best results out of migration would be to build up their capacity to identify – through improved data on development trends and on migration – the development challenges their country faces, as well as their capacity to respond.

The lack of capacity to identify the migration and development cross trends

migrants do better themselves and therefore interact more positively with people remaining in their country of origin (Chappell and Glennie 2009). Other evidence suggests, however, that should the environment migrants enter present many opportunities, enabling them to integrate successfully, their communication with the

43. Although the frequency or quality of those contacts may be shaped by the economic climate in which the migrant lives. It seems likely that poorer migrants, or those located in remote rural areas, will be less able to afford and access technologies that enable them to be in touch regularly for example.

of origin, and the likelihood they will return; or changing the rules about the process for gaining citizenship, particularly reducing requirements around the amount of time the candidate has to remain in the country they have moved to, may increase the strength of migrants' ties and their circulation (Chappell and Mulley 2010).

Lastly, policies around labour migration should be considered in light of the contribution that low skilled migration in particular can make to development. In some countries such as the UK there has been a tendency to focus labour migration opportunities on the highly skilled. As well as not necessarily meeting the real labour market needs of the countries concerned (for example see Chappell *et al* 2009), limiting legal migration opportunities to the highly skilled will severely circumscribe the ability of poorer households to migrate legally, as the poor tend to be low skilled. This limits the reach of migration's direct developmental benefits down the income spectrum. Conversely, in situations where a larger number of poor, lower skilled people have been able to migrate (see for example emigration patterns from Vietnam) poorer people appear to gain more of the direct benefits of migration.

- (c) *Rights and anti-discrimination policy.* In addition to allowing migrants into a country and offering a general economic climate that enables success, it is also important that migrants are not prevented through discrimination or exploitation from improving their lives.

Much discussion has taken place over what kinds of rights and protection countries of destination can or should implement. DotM analysis provides relatively little fresh insight into the specifics of this, as it has not looked in detail at the rights accorded to migrants in a systematic manner, or linked this to wider developmental outcomes. However, a recent United Nations report on migration and development (United Nations Development Programme 2009) concluded that while it may not always be possible for international conventions on migrants' rights to be ratified (as this looks politically very difficult for many countries of destination), other ways of ensuring basic rights must be found. These basic rights include equal pay for equal work, decent working conditions and rights to collective organisation. According to the UNDP analysis, ensuring these rights should deliver better development outcomes for migrants, and potentially too for their families and others.

- (d) *Community cohesion policy.* qiccm houtca-a2.2(ation0025(c)12.2.0sap1familitio0.enables)-25(suc)12.2

(e) *Family reunion policy.* As discussed above, policymakers may feel that family reunion is not a positive, development-promoting policy, and that there are grounds

migration in mind – as, for example, the EU is currently doing, with migration systematically being included in country strategy papers for development cooperation. It is vital here that migration's implications for existing development priorities are the focus of this, rather than development tools being used to pursue the country of destination's migration priorities.

Countries of destination can also prioritise these issues by actively engaging in international fora that look to share lessons and create common ground, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development and regional consultative processes. Opening bilateral discussions may also prove useful.

Development on the Move's contribution to migration and development policy has been twofold. First, it has underscored the importance of a positive policy approach to migration and development, but one that is appropriately wary about the contribution that policy can make to improving migration's development impacts. It has stressed in particular the need for policy to 'go with the flow', and not try to stand in the way of what migrants and potential migrants intend to do. The analysis has also carefully dissected the points at which policy can intervene in the migration and development process, and explored what the effects of that intervention might be, with a view to understanding how impacts can be improved.

While further, impact-assessment forms of research would be required to assess rigorously what kinds of policies are most effective in enhancing migration's development impacts

The experiment that has been *Development on the Move* is now drawing to a close. It has been a unique project that has brought together an unusual coalition of partners

Secondly, the project identified a number of aspects of the migration and development process that can potentially act as policy levers. It seems clear that changing things like the skill level of the people migrating, or the nature of the communities they are migrating into, can change migration's development impacts. However, while Chapter 5 brought the new DotM evidence to bear on policy issues that have often in the past been discussed with very little associated evidence, our findings remain only preliminary. A vital next step would be to put these potential policy levers at the heart of analysis and explore how outcomes differ when these policy levers change.

Thirdly, we would like to see the methodology applied to additional countries, potentially including developed countries. After all, countries like the UK, US and France have large diasporas, are interested in harnessing them for improving outcomes at 'home', and are concerned about their migrants' well-being while they are abroad. It is just as possible to apply our methodology to assess the impacts of migration on developed countries as it is to developing ones. Moreover, doing so would make clear one of the central messages of this work – that migration is a natural part of everyday life, something that will necessarily happen in a globalised world, albeit something that can, especially for the poorest, dramatically improve lives.

In the meantime, however, we hope that the data generated by the project (all of which will be made available in the public domain before the end of the year) and the analysis conducted so far will be useful for researchers and policymakers alike in their quest to understand and shape migration and its impacts. In a century where we know so much about so many things, migration – an age-old and ubiquitous phenomenon – remains poorly understood but heavily politicized. We hope that this research has made a small step towards changing this.

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