



## ABSTRACT

The world's 90 million migrant workers are almost three percent of the three-billion strong global labour force, and their experiences outside their countries of birth or citizenship range from red carpet welcomes for some computer programmers and nurses to red card removals of some unskilled workers. The policy of welcoming the skilled and rotating unskilled has spread to most of the industrial democracies. If it persists, differences between nation states may widen as irregular migration increases. To avoid this, industrial countries welcoming professionals could provide human capital replenishment to their countries of origin and add economic mechanisms to guest worker programs to reduce employer distortion and migrant dependence. Both sending and receiving countries must carefully monitor the activities of recruiters, keystones of the evolving migration industry that profits from helping people cross national borders.

## A. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Population Division defines international migrants as persons outside their country of birth or citizenship for 12 months or more. In a world of about 200 sovereign nation states, each of which issues passports and regulates who can cross its borders and stay, there were an estimated 175 million migrants in 2000, including 110 million or 63 percent in what the UN calls “more developed” regions, which include Europe and North America, Australia/New Zealand, Japan, and the ex-USSR “where it is presented as a separate area.” Since 1960, the share of the world’s migrants in more developed countries has risen, largely because of immigration a 2m

short-lived. This has generally not been the case. In most countries receiving migrants, their number is at or near all-time highs with no “natural” end to migration in sight.

Migration is as old as humankind wandering in search of food, but international migration over regulated national borders is a largely 20<sup>th</sup> century development (Torpey). Long-distance international migration is the rarest type of movement due to inertia, controls, and hopes for improvement and opportunity at home. Inertia, the number one form of migration control, reflects the simple truth that most people do not want to move away from family and friends. Second, governments have significant capacity to regulate migration, and they do, requiring passports and visas from visitors and establishing border and interior controls to determine who enters and remains. Third, historical experience, such as European migration to the Americas as well as the contemporary experience of, inter alia, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and South Korea, demonstrates that the migration transition can turn a country from an emigration to an immigration area within decades.

Migration responds to differences, and there are two major categories of differences that prompt people to move: economic and non-economic (Massey, et al). The factors that encourage an individual to cross borders are usually grouped into three categories: demand-pull in destination areas, supply-push in

after some migrants return, network factors can become more important in sustaining migration. Once networks mature, the classic economic migration decision model in which migrants have a sure income at

A second dimension to increasing economic differences adds to international migration pressures. The world's labour force was 3 billion in 2000, and included 400 million workers in the high-income countries and 2.6 billion in the lower income countries. In lower income countries, almost half of the work force was employed in agriculture, usually as small farmers who are often taxed despite lower than average incomes.<sup>5</sup> The resulting farm-nonfarm income gaps encourage rural-urban migration, helping to explain why the urban share of the population in low and middle income countries rose from 32 to 42 percent between 1980 and 1997.

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The transportation revolution highlights the declining cost of long-distance travel. British migrants unable to pay passage to the colonies in the 18<sup>th</sup> century often indentured themselves, signing contracts that obliged them to work for four to six years for whoever met the ship and paid the captain for their one-way transportation. Transportation costs today are far less, typically less than \$2,500 to travel anywhere in the world legally, and \$1,000 to \$20,000 for unauthorized migration, and most studies suggest faster payback times, usually within two or three years (Kwong,; Kyle and Koslowski).

The rights revolution refers to the spread of individual rights and entitlements that allow foreigners to stay in the countries they reach. Many governments have ratified United Nations, International Labor Organization, and other conventions that commit them to guarantee basic human rights to all persons within their borders, including due process and emergency health care, and to ensure that migrant workers and treatment in the labour market regardless of legal status receive equal pay. Many countries provide housing and food to foreigners awaiting decisions both on their applications for asylum and the results of appeals of negative decisions.

There is little that countries experiencing “unwanted immigration” can do in the short-term about the demographic and economic differences that promote migration, and they have little power or desire to reverse the communications and transportation revolutions that, as a byproduct of connecting people in the global village, inform migrants about opportunities abroad and make it easier and cheaper for them to migrate. Governments create and enforce rights, and the default policy instrument to manage migration has been new or modified laws that restrict the rights of migrants. Two examples highlight the trend. In the mid-1990s, the US government restricted the access of migrants to social assistance programs, while

other developed as well as developing countries-- perhaps 70 percent or 40 million were from developing countries.

How many developing country migrants are professionals? The general rule is that the more difficult it is to immigrate, the higher the percentage of professionals among the migrants. About 20 percent of workers in developed countries are professionals, suggesting 93 million among the 470 million developed country workers in 2003. If 20 percent of migrants from developing countries in industrial countries are professionals, there would be 8 million, meaning that migrants were 9 percent of the stock of industrial country professionals.

There are no estimates of the stock of professionals among the 2.5 billion workers in developing countries.<sup>11</sup> If professionals were 4 percent of developing country work forces, there would be 101 million, and professional migrants would be equivalent to 9 percent of the stock. Alternatively, if professionals were 2 percent of developing country work forces, developing countries have 50 million professionals, and professional migrants would be equivalent to 16 percent of the stock. Both estimates suggest a far higher share of developing country professionals in industrial countries than of other workers.

Table 3. Global Labor Force: 1980, 2001, 2010

Global Labor Force: 1980, 2001, 2010							
	Population 15-64 (mils)		Labor Force(mils)			Average annual growth rate	
	1980	2001	1980	2001	2010	1980-01	2001-10
World	2,600	3,882	2,036	2,983	3,377	1.8	1.4
Developing Countries	2,071	3,240	1,662	2,517	2,894	2	1.6
Professionals-4%			66	101	116		
Professionals-2%			33	50	58		
High-income Countries	529	642	373	467	483	1.1	0.4
Professionals-20%		75	93		97		

Source: World Bank. 2003. World Development Indicators, p44

For PTK estimates, see text

It is very hard to estimate migrant stocks and flows by skill level. Carrington and Detragiache<sup>12</sup> considered those with 13 or more years of schooling to be skilled or highly skilled, and used 1990 US Census of Population data to compare the foreign-born 25 and older with adults still living in the 61 developing countries from which they came.<sup>13</sup> Half of the foreigners in OECD countries in 1990 were in the US, and Carrington and Detragiache assumed that the characteristics of foreign-born US residents



The result was two measures of professional emigration: educational selectivity and cumulative loss. Educational selectivity measures the professional share of migrants from a country, for example, 75 percent of adult Indian-born US residents in 1990 had 13+ years of schooling, as did 60 percent of the Egyptian-, Ghanaian-, and South African-born US residents, 40 percent of Jamaican-born US residents, and 13 percent of Mexican-born US residents. Cumulative loss is the share of migrants with 13+ years of schooling from a particular country who are abroad, and was highest for Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, countries with more professionals abroad than at home. Africa had the highest cumulative loss—a third of African-born professionals are believed to be abroad (World Bank 2000, 39; IOM, 2001).

Migrant professionals raise incomes and growth rates in destination countries in three major ways. First, they can fill vacant jobs until more local workers are trained in boom sectors such as Information Technology, increasing employment, production and GDP. Second, they can add to the labour supply and help to hold down wage increases, especially in labour-intensive services such as health care and education. Third, they can increase productivity in strategic sectors by fostering diverse work teams, which may boost the rate of innovation as people with different backgrounds and perspectives work together to solve problems.

However, the departure of professionals can slow growth in developing countries. In neoclassical economic growth models, the outflow of any labour, unskilled or skilled, can slow economic growth, and with human capital scarce, the departure of professionals can be especially damaging (Straubhaar). Most studies confirm that lower levels of education are associated with slower productivity and economic

virtuous rather than vicious circles: having sending countries maintain links to their “stored brainpower” abroad, having receiving countries provide human capital replenishment, and re-examining the content and financing of education in countries sending professionals abroad.

recognition of credentials, and discrimination often cited, but as long as they persist, it is likely to be hard to relaunch macro guest worker programs.

Table 4. Non-EU Foreigners in the EU: Employment and Unemployment, 2000

Non-EU Foreigners: Employment and Unemployment, 2000		
Employed, 25-39 (%)	Men	Women
Non-EU Foreigners	73	44
Nationals	86	68
Ratio--Non-EU/Nats	0.8	0.6
Unemployment, 25-39 (%)		
Non-EU Foreigners	15	19
Nationals	6.5	10
Ratio--Non-EU/Nats	2.3	1.9

Source: Thorogood and Winqvist, 2002, 6

Macro guest worker programs can be likened to shotguns spraying foreign workers throughout an economy, while micro programs are more comparable to rifles that aim to fill job vacancies in particular industries, occupations, and areas. Micro program admissions are less sensitive to overall economic indicators, as when nurses are imported despite a high unemployment rate. Employers often have more power in micro programs, especially as governments de-regulate labour markets and reduce the collection of labour market information.

Micro guest worker programs can be compared along two major dimensions, the requirements employers must satisfy to obtain migrants and their rights. Most programs require employers to satisfy pre-admission search-for-local-workers criteria before obtaining permission or certification to employ migrants, which usually meant searching for local workers at a government-set wage. Post-admission government checks, by contrast, permit employers to obtain visas for migrants by asserting or attesting that they need migrants and are offering the prevailing or minimum wage. Government involvement in checking on these employer promises usually waits until after migrants are at work.

Worker rights are a second comparative dimension, with the major distinction between migrants who have contracts that tie them to a particular employer and migrants who are free agents in the labour market. The US H-2 programs, for example, are certification and contractual, meaning that employers must try to recruit US workers in order to have their need for migrants verified, and the migrants are tied to the employer by a contract. The H-1B program is an attestation-contract program: employers open the border gate for foreign professionals on the basis of assertions, but migrants are tied to a particular employer by a contract.

Table 5. Employer Requirements and Worker Rights: US Programs

<b>Employer Requirements</b>	<b>Worker Rights</b>	
	<i>Contractual Worker</i>	<i>Free Agent Worker</i>
Pre-admission certification	H-2A/B unskilled	
Post-admission attestation	H-1B professionals	RAW
No employer tests	L-1 intra-company transfers; J-1 exchange visitors	

reduce the demand for migrants over time, such as by promoting mechanization, and to encourage returns by refunding migrant contributions in the country of origin.

There are 10 to 15 million unauthorized foreign workers in industrial countries, and most are not planning to depart voluntarily. Dealing with currently unauthorized migrants and future legal migrants will require cooperation with sending countries. The usual bargain, easier to propose than to implement, is for sending countries to agree to prevent irregular migration and accept the return of unauthorized migrants while receiving

workers. Having workers pay recruitment costs runs against many ILO conventions and national laws. If they allow workers to pay recruitment fees, most countries prohibit fees of more than a month's (foreign) salary (Abella, 2004). However, migrants are often willing to pay far more, and many do.<sup>19</sup>

Most worker and migrant advocates believe strongly that there can be only one labour market and one set of rights, with migrants enjoying all fundamental labour and human rights. They reject the notion of a numbers-rights trade off, as when the US AFL-CIO called for legalization for unauthorized workers and an end to the enforcement of employer sanctions laws. Most economists and many employers acknowledge the numbers-rights trade off, asserting that if wages were truly equal, there would be fewer migrant workers because trade, mechanization, or other changes would reduce the demand for them.

There is no easy way to balance the migrant numbers and rights trade off. However, in thinking about these trade offs, it is important to be mindful of the fact that the perfect can be the enemy of the good. There can be ever more theoretical rights for migrants at the same time there are more migrants in an irregular status in an underground economy. Finding the proper balance between numbers and rights is a difficult and complex challenge for migrants, employers and governments.

