UN/POP/MIG/SYMP/2006/11/Rev
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INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Population Division
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Secretariat
Turin, Italy, 28-30 June 2006

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N . 250

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Research programme on:
Economic and Social Effects of Migration on Sending Countries

June 2006

A V W R A RS

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This paper is an outcome of the Development Centre's activities on Policy Coherence and Productive Capacity Building under its 2005-2006 Programme of work. It is also expected to provide a useful input towards the Centre's continuing work on migration and development under its expanding activities on "Policy Coherence for Development and Human Security".

Prof. Louka T. Katseli
Director
OECD Development Centre
June 2006

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Migration is not solely driven by income disparities between home and destination countries, but instead it is motivated by geographic proximity and historical links such as common language and colonial ties which explain between 20 and 30 per cent of the variation of bilateral migration flows between Europe and its partners. A small number of developing and transition countries with high low-skilled emigration rates to the EU are indeed characterised by geographic proximity to the EU and/ or colonial ties.

Migration may impact on development in various and complex ways. Migration- related shocks produce endogenous behavioural and policy responses that affecting both labour resource utilization and productivity in sending countries; these in turn influence growth, poverty and inequality (section III.1.). The observation that inter-linkages, channels and outcomes have not been uniform across countries or time, has led to the decomposition of the migration cycle into five stages including an exit, adjustment, consolidation, networking and repatriation, immigration or circulation stage (section III.2). Each stage is associated with a different configuration of shocks and differentiated impacts on growth and inequality, thus explaining to a large extent both the heterogeneity of outcomes and the observed variation between short and long term effects; moreover, some of the above stages may not even be reached or their duration may differ significantly from one country to another.

The review of the empirical evidence identifies many cases where migration has had direct and indirect positive impact effects on development, via employment generation, remittances, human capital accumulation, diaspora networks or return migration. Gains tend to become more diffused within sending countries when labour markets are integrated; segmentation, either due to inadequate infrastructure or cultural and ethnic barriers, can restrict gains within migrant communities and might increase relative deprivation of non- migrant ones. However, there exist cases where massive and unmanaged migration especially of highly-skilled migrants, can have deleterious effects on service delivery (section III.3.2), inequality -depending on which group the migrants are drawn from- or labour depletion. Moreover, migration may have both positive or negative social effects (section III.5) in terms of children's education and health depending on changes11 Tc0.04I fami(ly)10.9(om posi)-11.22p d89osinpom posl10.9((e)-11.(o)1.5(n)-66r seie

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. WAR SA R VA A A:

Migration into Europe is on the rise and likely to increase in the years to come. According to Eurostat estimates, the population of the EU-25 is expected to increase by more than 13 million inhabitants from 456.8 million on 1 January 2004 to 470.1 million on 1 January 2025, with population growth mainly due to net migration (COM(2005)134). The ageing of European societies, limited intra-European mobility, the maintenance if not widening of income differentials, expectations of improved standards of living and targeted policies are some of the most important pull factors driving migration into Europe; push factors include high population growth, high unemployment, bad working conditions, poverty, insecurity and unfavourable economic prospects.

Managing effectively migration flows and impr

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security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing social and political structures" [COM(2005)134 final, p. 10]. Similarly, building on its 2002 Communication on Migration and Development [COM(2002)703], the Commission reiterated its aim to "promote the synergies between migration and development, to make migration a positive factor for development" [COM(2005)134 final, p. 15]. The Commission has indicated its

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adults with low levels of education (nine years of schooling or less). In comparison, there were nearly 6 million with a secondary school education and slightly less than 5 million with a tertiary education. By contrast, foreign-born adults in North America have substantially higher levels of educational attainment.

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b dc a ead g (2000)



Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004.

The early guest worker programmes in Europe, most of which ended around 1974, were designed to provide workers for manufacturing and some service jobs. Most of these tasks were semi-or low-skilled. Family reunification, which followed the settlement of substantial numbers of guest workers, brought in relatives with a socio-economic profile similar to that of the original guest workers. Little systematic information is available on the skill levels of the waves of people seeking asylum in Europe during the 1990s, but many were from countries where educational attainment is on average not high. Meanwhile, the growth in contract labour schemes in European agriculture has expanded low-skill opportunities for migrant workers. In 2000, about 55 per cent of foreign adults present in the EU-15 were estimated to have had less than a secondary education, which means less than 9 years of schooling.

Of these low educational attainment adults, about a third originated from within Western Europe itself (especially from Italy, Portugal and Spain). Almost another third were from the Middle East and North Africa, roughly equally divided between these two component regions

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

Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004.

Migration to the EU-15 has thus comprised la numbers of low-skill persons, even though these have not been drawn in particular from po ountries. There are nonetheless a few developing and transition countries with relatively larg ortions of their low-skill populations present in the EU, where they comprise large populatio Some of the more important of these are listed in Table 1.

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Table 1. Low-education Adults in EU-15 Selected Countries and Regions of Origin (2000)

	Number of Low Education Adults in EU-15	Per cent age of Low Education Adults in EU-15
Turkey	1 510 746	5.5
Algeria	463 307	4.6
Morocco	765 714	6.7
Tunisia	190 828	5.1
Albania	64 861	8.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	182 651	12.0
Croatia	208 834	11.7
Macedonia, FYR	76 276	10.2
Romania	91 823	2.2
Serbia and Montenegro	231 741	5.7
Senegal	62 974	2.0
Jamaica	69 778	8.2
Suriname	91 864	38.8

Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004.

The economies of most of the countries in Table 1 have performed poorly of late. It is not surprising to see high rates of emigration from these states. But two key factors distinguish these states from other low-income countries from which very few low skill migrants come to the EU. The first factor is proximity, which is apparent among the countries of East Europe and the Maghreb. The second factor is former colonial ties, as in Senegal, Jamaica and Suriname.

II.1.2. Evidence on the Size of the Brain Drain

The foreign-born, tertiary-educated populations of the OECD countries are estimated to have increased by nearly 8 million between 1990 and 2000. By the turn of the millennium, this resulted in a total of slightly over 20 million such highly skilled people in the OECD.

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

Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004

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Table 3. Tertiary stage female educated Adult population aged 15 and above in the EU-15 (2000)

Suriname	43.17	Saint Kitts and Nevis	15.50
Gambia	40.32	Dominica	13.86
Mozambique	36.68	Togo	13.45
Cape Verde	31.13	Grenada	12.89
Mauritius	29.12	Gabon	12.79
Angola	28.16	Equatorial Guinea	12.70
Malta	25.24	Morocco	12.34
Guinea-Bissau	23.80	Malawi	12.06
Sierra Leone	21.29	Mali	11.37
Cyprus	19.87	Senegal	11.30
Ghana	19.10	Bosnia and Herzegovina	10.95
Seychelles	18.74	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	10.89
Comoros	18.72	Rwanda	10.76
Kenya	18.63	Afghanistan	10.17
Uganda	18.10	Congo, Dem. Rep.	9.83
Saint Lucia	17.93	Tunisia	9.77
Congo, Rep.	17.16	Barbados	9.55
Sao Tome and Principe	17.12	Cameroon	9.50
Somalia	16.56	Lebanon	9.15
Macedonia, FYR	15.89	Sri Lanka	8.62

Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2005).

For some of these countries, the EU forms an important destination for their highly skilled. Table 3 lists the forty countries with the highest portion of their tertiary educated populations present in the EU-15 by 2000. In most of these forty countries, more than one in ten of their tertiary educated population is in the EU. For countries such as Gambia and Suriname, this fraction exceeds forty percent.

Twenty six of the forty countries listed in Table 3 with a high brain drain rate to the EU are in Africa: all but two is in Sub-Saharan Africa. A further seven are small states in the Caribbean or nearby; most have former colonial ties to Europe. Only two East European states appear in thisi nnn-20.1(Goln)-5(s 9ld Tw[(apU4(h)6.9(ln)-5(sy6mb8icTw[(T)on)5.7(i78 TD-1.6(8u)5(ch as Gam

4. Reg a d b f a dc a ed a a d S a f S (2000)

	Tertiary Educated Population in OECD percentage in each region			
	Americas	EU	Other OECD Europe	Asia/ Pacific OECD
Albania	44.8	52.2	1.4	1.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39.5	45.8	5.3	9.3
Bulgaria	30.8	26.4	5.2	37.5
Croatia	48.4	35.1	4.4	12.0
Czech Republic	47.7	27.7	20.8	3.9
Hungary	59.7	27.2	5.3	7.7
Macedonia, FYR	19.3	54.6	2.8	23.3
Poland	59.2	33.2	2.1	5.5
Romania	54.3	29.3	12.5	3.9
Serbia and Montenegro	28.3	49.1	11.3	11.2
Slovakia	30.6	15.1	52.4	1.8
Slovenia	40.0	50.8	3.8	5.4
Belarus	49.6	8.5	40.7	1.2
Estonia	39.6	54.5	1.1	4.8
Latvia	68.4	18.6	2.5	10.5
Lithuania	46.2	15.7	34.6	3.5
Moldova	67.0	28.8	2.3	2.0
Russia	69.2	19.3	6.4	5.1
Ukraine	62.8	13.0	21.9	2.3

Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004.

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push and pull factors in influencing the decision to migrate. Explanatory variables include demographic pressure, such as population density and population growth. In order to account for current economic and living conditions in the migrants' country of origin we include controls for GDP per capita, a variable measuring life expectancy at birth (in years) and a measure for unemployment in order to account for a part of the push factors which have been identified in the literature as main causes of migration. These three variables also serve to account for pull factors, when measured at the country of destination. Hence they are used in combination with those for the country of origin in some of the regressions (GDP of the country of destination is used lagged).

One of the most well-known factors determining migration is migration costs, which we would like to account for in our regressions. The cost of migration has been often proxied by the distance between the country of origin and that of destination. For that reason we use data from the CEPII geographic distance measures[3]. The CEPII has calculated different measuresTw[2.8(e5)-0.4

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development potential of remittances may be limited by local market imperfections, such as imperfect or absent rural credit markets in which case, recipients would be constrained to borrow against remittances or use them as collateral. Inefficient rural credit markets would also hamper the channelling of savings from households with remittances to those desiring to invest them in productive activities.

The existing evidence also suggests that the potential impact of remittances on the sending country may change with the type of migration (temporary versus permanent/ skilled versus unskilled) and the likelihood of return migration as a5.2(l0.3.)-8.5(m)61.4(typ)12.8(e)-11.4(0Fc-1(

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F , III.2. A c e de f g a : e , a ffe .

$\dot{Y} = \dot{L} + \dot{Y/N} + \dot{R}$

Growth= labour supply changes+ productivity effects + transfer effects

	Labour: $\dot{L}$	Productivity: $\dot{Y/N}$	Transfers: $\dot{R}$	Growth: $\dot{Y}$	Poverty	Inequality
Exit Stage	<0	<0 (skill depletion)	0	≤0	>0	>0
Adjustment Stage	≤0	?	≥0	≤0	≥0	≥0
Consolidation Stage	≈0	>0	>0	>0	<0	<0, Poor households start transforming Remittances into productive assets
Networking Stage	=0	>0 (Investments and improvements in human capital)	≥0	>0	<0	<0?
Repatriation/ Immigration/ Circulation Stage	>0	?	<0	?	?	Rising urban population, rising urban poverty?

Exit stage: The departure of migrants involves a decline in the supply of labour and usually implies a fall in output unless there is a large pool of unemployed or underutilised labour. In the case of skilled emigration, productivity declines as well. Because of the departure of labour, changes in the composition of output are likely to occur depending on the sectoral employment of emigrants. Moreover, intra-household inequality may increase and family roles may also change as a result.

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population, child labour or formation of human capital. These changes may under certain conditions lead to the restructuring of the economy including the mechanisation of agriculture, or increased investment including human capital accumulation. However, massive skilled labour migration may turn out to be disastrous for the

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which a substantial pool of unemployed workers exists, or where many workers are effectively under-employed at very low wages. Here, by definition, costs imposed on employers are minimal and overall output may hardly be affected. Yet unskilled workers, left at home, gain as the waiting time to find a job is cut, or as they ratchet up the job ladder.

Both forms are common across the countries and regions of the world. However, much of the emigration of low skilled workers occurs from poorly performing economies. Surplus labour conditions can be expected to be frequent among the high emigration countries.

Formal evidence, testing whether or not labour markets exhibit surplus labour characteristics is rare. Globally there are some contexts in which mass labour withdrawal has been accompanied by rising wages at home, perhaps partially induced by the emigration

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No matter whether an exodus of unskilled workers induces higher wages for those who remain at home or simply diminishes the pool of those unemployed and underemployed, thereby shortening waiting times for job openings, either way, low skilled workers who remain at home are rendered better off. In other words, such a pattern of migration offers a device for reducing poverty for those staying behind while clearly offering significant financial relief for the low skilled migrants themselves.

Regional effects and impacts on rural and urban areas

The chances of an indigenous population migrating vary very considerably from one location to another, within any given country. It is common to find that large numbers of people have departed from one village, county or region, but far fewer from the next.

A major factor causing this concentration upon specific places of origin is the role played by social networks in facilitating migration. Once a few people have relocated, it becomes easier for friends and relatives to follow. There are many reasons for this: kinfolk, established in the place of destination, can make it easier to find employment, before or after migrating; obtaining visas and other documents can be substantially cheaper through personal contacts[10]; friends and relatives may provide affordable accommodation upon arrival; they certainly can make the social adjustments to a new setting far easier.

There has been some controversy over how much of the tendency of large numbers of migrants to follow prior migration streams actually reflects such contributions of kith and kin. An alternative explanation is simply that past and current migrations both reflect common underlying causes from specific locations. However, more careful, recent analyses ind

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Albania's transition, (De Soto *et al.*, 2002), though most of this relief may have stemmed from remittances rather than any induced improvement in the domestic labour market scenario.

Summing up

In contrast to North America, a large portion of the foreign population in the EU comprises low skill workers who have entered through a variety of temporary schemes, as asylum seekers, or on an irregular basis. The probability of low skilled populations coming to the EU is greater among countries with higher incomes, rather than from the least developed regions. Nonetheless a small number of developing and transition countries do have significant numbers of low skill expatriates in the EU. This is particularly true for the neighbouring countries of East Europe, the Maghreb and Turkey, plus a smaller number of countries with former colonial ties to European nations.

In those select developing and transition countries that have provided low skill workers to the EU in large numbers, labour market prospects at home for low skill workers are generally quite poor. The opportunity to be in the EU offers a major form of relief, not only for the migrants themselves but in alleviating some of the pressures on those left behind in the home labour market. In some instances, these benefits are concentrated quite specifically on the particular communities or regions from which the migrants are drawn. In other cases, perhaps smaller in number, the benefits diffuse more broadly as the home population migrates internally to take advantage of vacancies that open. Given that poverty is typically concentrated in rural areas in most developing countries, where migration of low skill workers draws upon the rural population, the poverty reducing effects are probably greatest.

To date, a relatively small number of developing and transition countries have been the beneficiaries of these poverty-alleviating effects of low skill migration to the EU. But for this small set of countries the effects have probably been very substantial.

III.3.2. Brain Drain, Brain Gain and Brain Circulation

The process of brain drain is commonly considered one of the most negative facets of international migration from the perspective of home country development. What are the issues?

The loss of highly educated individuals can impose at least three kinds of specific losses on those left at home (Davies, 2003):

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countries with a perceived higher standard of living. Pakistani doctors move to the UK, UK doctors move to Canada, and Canadians move to the USA." (Bundred and Levitt, 2000).

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E e s a Se C es: a D e K w?

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The return of scientists and engineers, either upon graduation or after some period of work experience in the US, has been an important vehicle in the evolution of high-tech industries for such economies as that of Chinese Taipei and of South Korea (Saxenian, 1999). However, this return appears to have been instigated largely by the improving economic conditions at home. Moreover, for these upper-middle-income economies, the frontier technologies brought home

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the lack of credit facilities and physical infrastructure (notably reliable power and decent communications) have presented barriers to business establishment by returning Albanians.

Although systematic data are lacking it seems that enterprises started by returned migrant are commonly located in urban areas, and are in the retail and service sectors rather than manufacturing (Puri and Ritzema, 1999). Lack of entrepreneurial experience is commonly cited as a problem with these start-2(x)28 Ep-7.2artartDg.4(are)s

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A second channel through which immigrants may impact on trade arises when migrants have a preference for home produced goods either because of habit, or addiction or home sickness (Wagner, Head and Ries, 2002). If these products that they used to consume at home are not available in the current market of the host country, then imports from the home country would be necessary. This channel however is only expected to affect imports and not exports.

Head and Reis (1998) test the hypothesis that immigrants increase trade with the country of origin because of the better knowledge of

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mother, rather than poor performance being attributed to incomplete family socialization, and lack of parental attention[14]. These effects may differ in less developed countries or may be offset by intra household resource allocation and the role of extended family members. McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) and McKenzie (2005) point out that migration itself may well have an impact on education of children, and not just the remittances from that migration. At least two effects of migration may be cited: the absence of migrant parents may lead to less child supervision with lower attendance and success at school; in addition, emulation of the parents' migration may result in more or less schooling depending upon whether the parents' move abroad necessitated

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vaccinations" (McKenzie, 2005:13). Since children from migrant households have higher survival rates, yet lower levels of some key inputs likely to impact survival, it seems likely that remittances in the migrant households contribute positively to these higher survival rates.

Migration may have an important impact on migrants' household lives in terms of family roles and gender roles within the family. In particular the selection of migrants within the household (whether it is the father, the mother or older children who migrate) will have an impact on the family members who stay behind and their roles within the household after

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impact on women through their physical and financial independence and their self esteem gained by being perceived as family providers by the community. However this is not always the case as women might encounter difficulties in the accessing labour market and in earning their living. In successful cases, women can become drivers of change in family relations and structure. In addition the empowering of women can play a crucial role in the way remittances are spent back home. Moreover, by modifying the traditional gender roles in the family, migration may also have an impact on community activities and operations depending on womens' role and participation in the community.

There is indeed a literature, mostly based on US data, that shows that women legislators or female representatives put more priority on issues related to women, children and families,

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Not surprisingly then, the income distribution effects of remittances are mixed[22]. For example, in both Egypt and Pakistan, Adams (1

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schooling, but that the way in which remittances enter the household may indeed matter too. For example, some observers have suggested that if remittances give women additional control over spending patterns then more may be spent on the children (Chimhowu *et al*., 2003). In a related vein, Yang (2004) finds that families in the Philippines who were subjected to large losses in incomes, as a result of having a member abroad in a country where the exchange rate fell during the East Asia crisis, pulled their children out of school. However McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) and McKenzie (2005) point out a further limitation of such results which relate to difficulty in distinguishing between the direct impact of migration on children's outcomes and that operating through the remittances channel (see section on the social impacts for further discussion on this).

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V.2. Effects of Remittances on Non-Migrant Households

There are a number of routes through which the macro-economic effects of remittance inflows can and do benefit the wider community and not just those families directly receiving the transfers. One such important route is through any multiplier effects of spending by the recipients. That is, the spending of remittances may generate incomes for those providing the goods and services purchased, and they in turn spend this income, setting off a chain reaction.

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Challenges for policy making

Managing migration has become a priority for OECD and EU policy making. This change of thinking about migration is based on the understanding that migration, if well managed, may generate important gains for both host and sending countries. Effective management can also mitigate the risks associated with migration.

Based on the evidence presented in this paper, policy challenges can be summarised as follows:

a) Better management of migration and human resources needed for win-win outcomes

— Information on migration flows needs to be substantially improved through better collection of data, statistical capacity-building and more effective harmonisation and data-sharing across countries. As suggested by the European Commission's Policy Plan

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Latin America, 4.4 per cent, of which:
Ecuador: 0.7
Colombia: 0.7
Suriname: 0.6
Brazil: 0.6
Argentina: 0.5
Jamaica: 0.4
Venezuela: 0.4
Peru: 0.3
Chile: 0.2

Africa, 13.6 per cent of which:
Morocco: 4.5
Algeria: 3.9
Tunisia: 1.3
Angola: 0.6
South Africa: 0.6
Kenya: 0.4
Nigeria: 0.4
Senegal: 0.4
Somalia: 0.3
Ghana: 0.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.: 0.3

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Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004 (Census Data 1999-2003).

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Wider Europe 20.0 per cent, of which:
Albania: 5.6
Bulgaria: 0.9
Turkey: 4.3
Russia: 0.8
Serbia- Montenegro: 2.5
Croatia: 0.5

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Europe

Latin America
7.7 per cent, of which:
Ecuador: 2.4
Colombia: 1.9
Brazil: 0.9
Peru: 0.8
Argentina: 0.8
Chile: 0.4
Venezuela: 0.3
Suriname: 0.1
Jamaica: 0.01

Africa
20.6 per cent, of which:
Morocco: 10
Algeria: 5.0
Tunisia: 1.8
Senegal: 0.8
Angola: 0.6
Egypt: 0.5
Nigeria: 0.4
Congo, Dem. Rep.: 0.4
Somalia: 0.4
Ghana: 0.3
South Africa: 0.2
Kenya: 0.1
Mozambique: 0.1

Source: OECD Database on Expatriates and Immigrants, 2004 (Census Data 1999-2003).

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GERMANY							
Other	50.5		0	Other	38	Other	54.9
Turkey	13.1		0	Turkey	24.4	USSR	6
ASIA	4.1		0	ASIA	4.3	ASIA	5.3
USSR	3.6		0	Serbia and Montenegro	3.8	EURO	2.9
Serbia and Montenegro	3.1		0	USSR	2.8	Turkey	2.6
EURO	2.3		0	Croatia	2.6	United States	2.6
Croatia	2.1		0	EURO	2.1	Iran	1.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1.6		0	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1.9	Serbia and Montenegro	1.3
AFRI	1.2		0	AFRI	1.4	Romania	1.1
Romania	0.9		0	Morocco	0.8	AFRI	1.1
United States	0.8		0	Viet Nam	0.7	SCAC	1
Iran	0.8		0	Romania	0.6	Croatia	0.9
DENMARK							
Turkey	8.4	Turkey	10.5	Turkey	14.5	Norway	6.2
Iraq	4.9	Bosnia-Herzegovina	7.3	Lebanon	5.1	Iran	4.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.6	Iraq	6.3	Iraq	4.8	United States	4.2
Norway	4.6	Norway	4.9	Norway	4.4	Iraq	4
Lebanon	3.4	Somalia	4.9	Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.3	Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.1
Somalia	3.3	Serbia and Montenegro	4	Somalia	3.9	Turkey	2.3
Serbia and Montenegro	3.3	Pakistan	3	Serbia and Montenegro	3.8	Iceland	1.9
Iran	3.2	Afghanistan	3	Pakistan	3.6	North and South Korea	1.8
Pakistan	2.9	Iceland	2.4	Viet Nam	3.3	Serbia and Montenegro	1.7
Viet Nam	2.4	Thailand	2.2	Sri Lanka	2.8	Pakistan	1.6
United States	2.4	Lebanon	2.2	Iran	2.8	Lebanon	1.5
North and South Korea	2.3	United States	2.2	Thailand	2.5	Afghanistan	1.4
SPAIN							
Morocco	14.5	Morocco	15.5	Morocco	20.9	Argentina	7.5
Ecuador	10.1	Ecuador	14.2	Ecuador	11.7	Morocco	6.5
Colombia	8.1	Colombia	10.6	Colombia	7.6	Colombia	6.3
Argentina	4.8	Romania	3.8	Romania	3.1	Ecuador	5.6
Venezuela	3.1	Argentina	3.7	Argentina	3.1	Venezuela	5.3
Romania	2.8	Peru	2.6	Dominican Republic	2.6	Peru	3.8
Peru	2.5	Dominican Republic	2.1	Venezuela	2.1	Cuba	3.6
Switzerland	2.5	Cuba	1.8	Switzerland	1.9	Switzerland	3.3
Cuba	2.4	Bulgaria	1.8	China	1.8	United States	2.1
Dominican Republic	2.1	China	1.7	Peru	1.8	Mexico	2
Brazil	1.6	Algeria	1.6	Algeria	1.6	Brazil	1.9
China	1.4	Ukraine	1.5	Cuba	1.5	Romania	1.7

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GREECE							
Albania	36	Albania	59.4	Albania	44.4	Albania	14.3
Turkey	6.9	Bulgaria	5	Turkey	11.7	Georgia	7.4
Russia	6.5	Georgia	3.7	Russia	7.5	Russia	6.9
Georgia	6.4	Romania	3.1	Georgia	6.3	Egypt	5.6
Bulgaria	3.5	Cyprus	2.2	Bulgaria	4.2	Cyprus	4.9
Egypt	3	Russia	2.1	Kazakhstan	2.2	Turkey	4.3
Romania	2.4	Ukraine	2	Egypt	2	United States	4
Kazakhstan	2.2	Pakistan	1.6	Romania	1.9	Australia	3.1
United States	2.1	United States	1.4	Pakistan	1.8	Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	2.1	Turkey	1.2	India	1.2	Ukraine	2.9
Australia	1.9	Egypt	1.2	Australia	1	Romania	2.2
Ukraine	1.5	India	1.1	Ukraine	0.9	Canada	2.1
HUNGARY							
Romania	49.1	Romania	39.4	Romania	47.2	Romania	41.7
Serbia and Montenegro	9.4	Ukraine	11.2	Serbia and Montenegro	10.5	Ukraine	11
Ukraine	8.2	Serbia and Montenegro	10.1	Ukraine	6.5	Serbia and Montenegro	8.7
Russia	2.3	China	4.4	Croatia	2.5	Russia	5.5
Croatia	1.6	Russia	3	China	1.8	China	1.3
China	1.4	Viet Nam	2	Russia	1.2	United States	1.3
United States	0.9	United States	1.4	United States	0.8	Viet Nam	1
Viet Nam	0.7	Croatia	1.3	Viet Nam	0.6	Croatia	0.9
Bulgaria	0.5	Mongolia	0.8	Slovenia	0.4	Bulgaria	0.9
Mongolia	0.3	Bulgaria	0.7	Bulgaria	0.4	Syria	0.5
Turkey	0.3	Afghanistan	0.6	Afghanistan	0.3	Japan	0.3
Slovenia	0.3	Syria	0.6	Turkey	0.3	Canada	0.3
IRELAND							
United States	5.4	United States	5	United States	2.6	United States	6.4
Nigeria	2.4	Nigeria	4.1	Nigeria	1.4	Nigeria	2.6
South Africa	1.6	China	2.5	Romania	1.3	Philippines	2.4
Australia	1.6	Romania	2.3	China	0.9	South Africa	2.1
Romania	1.5	South Africa	2.2	Hong Kong, China	0.7	Australia	1.9
China	1.5	Philippines	1.8	Australia	0.7	India	1.7
Philippines	1.1	Australia	1.7	South Africa	0.6	China	1.6
Canada	1.1	Pakistan	1.4	Canada	0.6	Canada	1.5
India	0.9	India	1.3	Brazil	0.5	Pakistan	1.4
Pakistan	0.9	Latvia	1.1	Pakistan	0.5	New Zealand1iv2(i)14	Tc7-0.6(t)8.6(v)8

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POLAND							
Ukraine	39.9	Ukraine	17.1	Ukraine	44.9	Ukraine	39.5
Belarus	13.5	Other	16.9	Belarus	13.6	Belarus	16.7
Lithuania	10.3	Russia	10.1	Lithuania	9.6	Lithuania	12.7
Russia	7	Belarus	5.1	Russia	7.7	Russia	7.2
Other	2.4	Viet Nam	4.2	Other	1.2	Kazakhstan	1
United States	1.2	Bulgaria	2.6	United States	1	Other	0.9
Serbia and Montenegro	0.5	Armenia	2.3	Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.7	Viet Nam	0.8
Kazakhstan	0.5	United States	2.3	Serbia and Montenegro	0.7	United States	0.7
Romania	0.5	Lithuania	1.7	Romania	0.6	Bulgaria	0.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.5	Serbia and Montenegro	1.4	Latvia	0.3	Latvia	0.4
Latvia	0.3	Kazakhstan	1	Kazakhstan	0.2	Syria	0.4
Bulgaria	0.3	Syria	0.7	Croatia	0.2	Romania	0.4
PORTUGAL							
Angola	26.8	Angola	17.1	Angola	28.8	Angola	29
Mozambique	11.7	Brazil	14.6	Cape Verde	11.3	Mozambique	17.4
Brazil	7.7	Cape Verde	13.6	Mozambique	10.8	Brazil	7.8
Cape Verde	7	Guinea-Bissau	7	Brazil	7.4	Ukraine	2.7
Venezuela	3.5	Ukraine	5	Guinea-Bissau	4.3	Venezuela	2.6
Guinea-Bissau	3.3	Sao Tome and Principe	3.9	Venezuela	3.3	Cape Verde	1.8
Switzerland	2	Venezuela	2.4	Sao Tome and Principe	2.6	Guinea-Bissau	1.8
Sao Tome and Principe	2	Mozambique	2.2	Ukraine	1.5	South Africa	1.4
South Africa	1.8	United States	1.4	South Africa	1.4	United States	1.3
Ukraine	1.7	Moldova	1.4	India	1.3	India	1.2
Canada	1.2	Romania	1.3	United States	0.8	Sao Tome and Principe	1.1
United States	1.2	Russia	1	Canada	0.8	Canada	0.9
SLOVAKIA							
Ukraine	6.4	Ukraine	12.1	Ukraine	4.9	Ukraine	8
Romania	2.7	Romania	4.2	Romania	4.3	Russia	3.7
Russia	1.6	Viet Nam	3	United States	1.5	Serbia and Montenegro	1.7
Serbia and Montenegro	1.3	Russia	3	Serbia and Montenegro	1.1	Bulgaria	1.5
Bulgaria	0.9	Serbia and Montenegro	2.8	Russia	0.9	Romania	1.3
United States	0.7	Bulgaria	2.2	Bulgaria	0.8	United States	0.6
Viet Nam	0.6	Croatia	0.9	Viet Nam	0.5	Viet Nam	0.5
Croatia	0.3	United States	0.7	Croatia	0.2	Syria	0.5
Belarus	0.2	China	0.7	Macedonia	0.1	Afghanistan	0.4
Macedonia	0.2	Macedonia	0.6	Belarus	0.1	Belarus	0.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.2	Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.6	Canada	0.1	Croatia	0.3
China	0.2	Armenia	0.5	Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.1	Armenia	0.3

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A3. S c f g B a a c f 1 ac , a g ag a d a - a

Dependent Variable: log(Number of people born in country i, living in country j/total population of country i)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 if common official language in the two	1.749	3.053	3.068	2.922	3.002
in the two countries	(0.199)**	(0.292)**	(0.300)**	(0.293)**	(0.304)**
1 if colonial relationship after 1945	3.558	1.787	1.858	2.047	2.129
	(0.390)**	(0.776)*	(0.825)*	(0.764)**	(0.821)**
1 if the two countries are contiguous	0.734	0.961	1.532	0.358	1.410
	(0.502)	(0.974)	(0.397)**	(0.967)	(0.395)**
distance in km between the two countries	-1.074	-0.611	-0.912	-0.947	-0.936
	(0.066)**	(0.104)**	(0.063)**	(0.126)**	(0.064)**
Voice and Accountability –				0.586	0.374
measuring political, civil and human rights				(0.115)**	(0.082)**
annual population growth (per cent),		-0.339		-0.241	
sending country		(0.091)**		(0.093)**	
annual population growth (per cent),		-0.161		-0.136	
receiving country		(0.092)		(0.093)	
total unemployment (per cent of labour force),		0.536	0.444	0.427	0.350
sending country		(0.087)**	(0.087)**	(0.090)**	(0.089)**
Total unemployment (per cent of labour force)		-0.699	-0.693	-0.650	-0.662
(per cent of labour force), receiving country		(0.171)**	(0.150)**	(0.172)**	(0.152)**
GDP, sending country		-0.039	-0.117	0.069	-0.069
		(0.043)	(0.037)**	(0.047)	(0.038)
GDP lagged, receiving country		0.962	0.984	0.932	0.973
		(0.079)**	(0.107)**	(0.080)**	(0.109)**
Life Expectancy at birth (in years)		2.716	3.072	2.005	2.511
sending country		(0.551)**	(0.564)**	(0.560)**	(0.576)**
life expectancy at birth (in years),		34.184	22.439	35.972	22.124
receiving country		(5.539)**	(2.467)**	(5.589)**	(2.503)**
population density: people per sq. km,			0.001		-0.008
sending country			(0.054)		(0.054)
population density: people per sq. km,			-0.190		-0.204
receiving countr5.5895.3(. km)5.7(,)12.9( )-24 15.569					

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A4. Scaling Bilateral Influence, Language and Distance

Dependent Variable: log(Number of Highly skilled people born in country i, living in country j/total population of country i)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 if common official language in the two countries	1.906	2.973	3.111	2.827	3.014
	(0.173)**	(0.254)**	(0.273)**	(0.243)**	(0.271)**
1 if colonial relationship after 1945	4.072	2.529	2.641	2.903	3.047
	(0.262)**	(0.674)**	(0.751)**	(0.633)**	(0.732)**
1 if the two countries are contiguous	1.270	1.538	1.924	1.087	1.800
	(0.453)**	(0.846)	(0.351)**	(0.801)	(0.343)**
distance in km between the two countries	-1.060	-0.517	-0.933	-0.832	-0.954
	(0.061)**	(0.092)**	(0.058)**	(0.105)**	(0.058)**

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A5. S c k f eg B a a c f 1 ac e, a g age a d a e a

Dependent Variable: log(Number of Unskilled foreign people born in country i, living in country j/total population of country i)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 if common official language in the two	1.478	2.964	2.823	2.744	2.700
countries	(0.213)**	(0.339)**	(0.361)**	(0.335)**	(0.362)**
1 if colonial relationship after 1945	4.390	3.140	3.043	3.426	3.400
	(0.314)**	(0.898)**	(0.990)**	(0.870)**	(0.977)**
1 if the two countries are contiguous	2.142	1.862	3.008	1.153	2.829
	(0.537)**	(1.127)	(0.463)**	(1.100)	(0.457)**
distance in km between the two countries	-1.046	-0.777	-1.004	-1.177	-1.029
	(0.073)**	(0.123)**	(0.078)**	(0.145)**	(0.078)**
Voice and Accountability –				0.676	0.457
measuring political, civil and human rights				(0.135)**	(0.101)**
annual population growth (per cent),		-0.387		-0.263	
sending country		(0.105)**		(0.106)*	
annual population growth (per cent),		-0.518		-0.463	
receiving country		(0.109)**		(0.109)**	
total unemployment (per cent of labour force),		0.532	0.471	0.414	0.363
sending country		(0.106)**	(0.109)**	(0.107)**	(0.111)**
total unemployment (per cent of labour force),		-0.877	-0.839	-0.866	-0.805
receiving country		(0.209)**	(0.186)**	(0.208)**	(0.187)**
GDP, sending country		-0.075	-0.130	0.059	-0.067
		(0.051)	(0.045)**	(0.056)	(0.047)
GDP lagged, receiving country		1.253	1.165	1.223	1.154
		(0.100)**	(0.128)**	(0.099)**	(0.128)**
life expectancy at birth (in years),		2.766	2.840	2.058	2.154
sending country		(0.631)**	(0.688)**	(0.627)**	(0.694)**
life expectancy at birth (in years),		26.824	25.505	29.870	24.563
receiving country		(6.447)**	(3.138)**	(6.406)**	(3.166)**
population density: people per sq. km,			0.072		0.070
sending country			(0.067)		(0.067)
population density: people per sq. km,			0.006		-0.013
receiving country			(0.113)		(0.114)
Observations	2081	422	644	398	616
R-squared	0.2510	0.6609	0.6013	0.6859	0.6153

Standard errors in parentheses. One star: significant at 5 per cent; Two stars: significant at 1 per cent

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