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Analyst report: May 2002==( We do not see at risk the coupon payments on Global bonds in 2002 as long as oil prices remain at current levels and the government implements a fiscal adjustment. However, arrears with bilateral institutions and suppliers are likely needed in 4Q02 in order to service external bonds.  Public expenditures are not being controlled. We estimate a 2002 fiscal deficit of US$46 million or 0.2% of GDP. -- Salomon Smith Barney, Economic and Market Analysis, Country Analysis and Commentary, May 13 20022P~PsPgPB d* "2&"A&a "Uruguay: Successful restructuring?#"(debt rescheduling 2003 , VIs this  market based mechanism efficient?,,(TDebt exchanges => orderly workout, but without much debt relief Recovery values on defaulted debt are high Coporates [Altman]: market estimates 45% Post default prices average 35% ultimate recovery is 42% Sovereigns: market estimates 25%; ultimate recovery& depends on how measured Post default price average 31% [Moody s] Post restructuring prices are at least 20% higher [prelim] Based on holding periods investors receive, on average, slightly over full recovery within 18 months A diversified portfolio across the emerging markets does very well EM has been the best performing asset class, even on a risk adjusted bases, even excluding recent rally Investors being paid for cost of default without absorbing cost of default Sovereigns not getting  clean slate ; low screening?; excessive borrowing?lP*P9PNPPhPKPPKPl*9N  hKKl (Recent debate on sovereign restructuring))(The recent debate focused on collective action But modern bankruptcy theory has other crucial elements including : debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, bankruptcy triggers, reorganization plans, and other issues necessary for efficiency. 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