ࡱ> #` nbjbj >f%84<.2||"yyy-------$D/h1-yy--@ @ @ X-@ -@ @ r))T*p `})]-4-0.)z2X2*2*Xy@ Kyyy--Xyyy.D`` TAX ADMINISTRATION AND TRANSFER PRICING Claudino Pita, CIAT Executive Secretary A main priority in the work being carried out in relation to transfer pricing at the international sphere is the identification of the principle and methods that should be applied for determining those prices. In this regard, there has been significant progress, to the point of arriving at a certain consensus at the doctrinal level and a certain standard in tax legislations, on recognizing that the arms length principle should prevail. In other words, such prices should be equivalent to those corresponding to similar transactions carried out between independent businesses under similar circumstances. There is not the same level of coincidence in the methods for applying said principle. The work carried out at the international sphere, mainly by the OECD, is of great help in an attempt at converging national standards and practices toward common methods that may abide by the "arm's length principle", to thus avoid double taxation. Nevertheless, many times, because of the complexity of intra-group international transactions, it is not always possible to implement the theoretically most adequate solutions. For example, the transaction-based methods, which theoretically would be the most appropriate for determining arms length prices, on occasions, are inapplicable due to the lack of comparable uncontrolled transactions. It is very difficult to determine and apply methods for establishing arm's length prices, even in countries with a wide and diversified economy, wherein several companies carry out identical or very similar types of activities, with a broad range of transactions and where there are home offices of multinational companies that manage and control the groups business at the world level. In countries that lack such characteristics where, on the contrary, several activity sectors and branches are managed by a single or very few subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, as is the case of most developing countries, there are increased difficulties for determining arms length prices, especially if one takes into account the scarce resources and development of their tax administrations. The most relevant aspect for the tax administrator with respect to this issue is that, in addition to knowing and having to theoretically discuss the principle or methods for establishing transfer prices, he must fundamentally apply them (which undoubtedly is the most difficult task). For the tax administrator, the transfer pricing problem is mainly focused on the needs for controlling those prices, to avoid their being used as mechanisms for the concealed transfer of benefits or, said otherwise, for combating tax evasion and fraud. Undoubtedly, the analysis of the principle and methods for determining adequate transfer prices is of utmost importance for a fair allocation of revenues and expenses between associated businesses to avoid economic double taxation. Nevertheless, in this presentation we endeavor to make a series of considerations on transfer pricing mainly with respect to the tax administrations, in particular, those of the developing and emerging countries. 1. Tax administration and transfer pricing. From a broad optics, of interest to the tax administrators, transfer pricing may be framed within the various mechanisms used by businesses for the concealed transfer of benefits, thus fully or partially evading the payment of taxes that should have been applied to such benefits. The benefits of a company may be transferred to another by stipulating transfer prices to their transactions that may differ from the real ones (under-invoicing their sales or over-invoicing their purchases) or simply by recording and declaring fictitious transactions. Over-invoicing, under-invoicing, invoicing of fictitious transactions, the use of inadequate figures or forms of transaction (under-capitalization, for example), are some of the mechanisms used for unduly reallocating revenues and expenses between related companies, to minimize the taxes to be paid on the earnings of the group. The use of these mechanisms implies forms of tax evasion of a fraudulent nature and combating them is a priority concern of the tax administrator, regardless of other motivations to control transfer pricing such as, for example, adjusting those prices for the correct assignment of taxation powers among countries, to avoid double economic taxation of income. In a strict sense, transfer prices are understood to be the values assigned to transactions carried out between associated companies acting under the same or common control. The greatest attention in this respect is focused on prices applied by multinational enterprises to their intra-group transactions. These companies, which represent over 60% of world trade transactions, are a cause of concern to capital exporting countries which are generally the headquarters of the parent companies, as well as the capital importing countries where the subsidiaries are generally located, because the manipulation of transfer prices affects the correct assessment and taxation of benefits in each country. The situation is further worsened when use is made of intermediate corporations located in tax havens, as it frequently occurs in abusive tax planning schemes. The most common method used by international tax evasion are the so-called tax havens, the latter being countries who apply no taxes or very reduced tax rates. In addition, these countries generally have extensive and sophisticated banking devices and strict confidentiality rules, whereby benefits may be accumulated therein, or mobilized therefrom without being encumbered or without significant tax effects. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the tax haven concept is a relative one. Any country may establish a tax haven with respect to another, when its taxes are significantly lower or when it does not apply its tax, in circumstances in which the other country actually applies them (stricter definition of the concept of taxable income, concession of tax incentives, existence of agreements to avoid international double income taxation, etc.). Since we are dealing with transfer prices between parent companies and subsidiaries of multinational companies, their interests may be set against each other, depending on the relative position of the tax administrations. For example, in the case of reallocation of expenses, the main concern of the administrators of countries hosting parent companies would be to push the expenses (general administration, investigation expenses, etc.,) outside their borders, so that they may be included in the calculation of taxes to be paid by their subsidiaries in the countries where they operate. In turn, the administrators of the countries hosting the subsidiaries will attempt to reduce to a maximum the allocation of expenses incurred by the parent company to the earnings of the subsidiaries to which they must apply the taxes. This could result in a confrontation between countries, as in fact, it does occur, by each one trying to impose the criteria that best respond to their fiscal interests, and causing double economic taxation, among other undesirable effects. On the other hand, the attitude of the tax administrator may also differ, to the extent the adjustments to be made increase or decrease the tax base. It is easy to understand, for example, that on detecting an under-invoicing of exports, the tax administration may adjust the amounts to what could be considered "arm's length" prices, thus increasing the earnings to be taxed in the country. However, it is difficult to imagine that same tax administrator officially proceeding to adjust the amount of over-invoiced exports by applying arms length prices, when this may result in reducing the taxes to be paid in the country. In addition, leaving aside doctrines and principle, it would be very difficult for a tax administrator to justify before his superiors, the considerable efforts devoted to refund taxes which the taxpayers declared they had to pay and convince them, at the same time that these must be paid to another countrys treasury. The foregoing shows that even though standard criteria and compatible methods are established for determining transfer prices, success in defending the fiscal interests of each country will depend on the aptitudes developed by the tax administration for controlling those prices and for upholding the adjustments it may deem pertinent, not only before the taxpayers, but also before the tax authorities of other countries. 2. Transfer prices in national legislations. Tax legislations have been establishing for a long time, general rules that authorize the tax administrations to adjust the declared prices of transactions when these deviate from certain pre-established parameters. It must be noted that these rules are currently applied to internal as well as international transactions and between related and unrelated taxpayers(in various instances, the application of prices that differ from those considered normal, is taken as a presumption of economic relationship). In many developing countries, particularly of Latin America, even though there are general rules, special rules have not been established for determining acceptable prices in international transactions between related companies and much less, methods to be applied by the tax administrations to adjust said prices when they deviate from the amounts that could be considered acceptable. In the nineties, some Latin American countries included in their income tax legislations express and detailed provisions on transfer prices. These are mainly the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Legal regulations and resolutions complementing them explicitly consider such aspects as: taxpayers subject to the rules; specific regulations for territories with low or no taxation; determination of the relationship; applicable methods; comparability criteria; adjustments to achieve comparability; documentation; special returns; tax secrecy; burden of proof; sanctions for manipulation of transfer prices and noncompliance with rules regarding documentation. The process for implementing these provisions involved significant efforts for training specialized officials who, once trained, left the administration to work independently on transfer prices or were recruited by large auditing firms. This happened in countries like Argentina and Mexico, but also occurs in the United States and even at the OECD. On July 5-7, 2005 the seminar organized by CIAT in Buenos Aires, on the Application of legislation regarding transfer prices, included officials from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Spain, The Netherlands and Venezuela, who considered the most frequent controversial issues between the taxpayers and the Treasury; namely: recognition of the existence of economic relationship; selection of the best method; consistency in the comparability analysis and lack of adequate supporting documentation; preference for nontransactional methods without having exhausted the possibility of using the transactional methods; the generalized trend toward using data bases with information on earnings (not on prices). 3. The transfer pricing issue at the international level. Among the most important and more widely disseminated works at the international level, are those developed by the OECD. In 1979, it prepared the report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, which establishes guidelines for the allocation of revenues and expenses among related companies. These guidelines were adopted as basis of the solutions provided in the legislations of several member and nonmember countries of said organization. Those guidelines were complemented with the report entitled: "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. Three related topics ", which deal with their application in the banking sector, problems regarding correlative adjustments and administration costs and central services. There was no significant change for some time at the OECD. However, in 1993, when the report of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) regarding possible manipulations of transfer prices was disseminated, the matter again acquired momentum. The 1979 report was reviewed, approved and published in mid 1995, and thus became the Guidelines on transfer pricing for multinational enterprises and the tax administrations, it being determined that they would be complemented and periodically revised. A fundamental orientation arises from the various OECD works dealing with transfer pricing; namely: that homogeneous rules should be established to determine the countries authority to tax benefits originating from international transactions between related companies, based on the arms length principle to, in turn, likewise agree on each countrys tax base and thus avoid international double taxation of those benefits. On the other hand, the arms length principle is provided in article 9 of the OECDs Model Tax Convention which deals with related companies. Therefore, the works developed within the framework of the OECD are basically aimed at implementing said solution. Within the sphere of the 51Թ Organization, the Management Committee in charge of preparing the agenda for the seventh meeting of the Ad-Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, held in December 1995, concluded that the Group should participate in the work of the OECD and other international tax organizations on transfer pricing, so as to take into account the viewpoints of the developing as well as developed countries in the consensus solutions that may be agreed on the issue, and for this reason it was included in the agenda of the aforementioned meeting. Finally, because of the importance acquired by transfer pricing, it should be noted that the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations, CIAT, whose fundamental mission is to serve its member countries by promoting, among other actions, the exchange of experiences on relevant aspects of the activities of the tax administrations, has also devoted particular attention to this issue on several occasions. Thus, the topic was raised for discussion the first time, in 1977, at the XI General Assembly held in Caracas, Venezuela, with a presentation by Prof. Stanley S. Surrey, from the United States of America entitled: "Reflections on the assignment of revenues and expenses between national fiscal jurisdictions ". Likewise, the presentation by Prof. Vctor Uckmar, from Italy, dealt with: "Tax evasion: how to detect sophisticated tax evasion schemes. In addition, it has sponsored several courses and seminars on transfer pricing intended for tax administration officials of its member countries. Currently, a virtual course is in the final stage of design. It is intended for these same officials and the first version will be given in the first semester of 2008. 4. Alternative criteria for determining transfer prices. As already commented, the methods for applying the arms length principle in establishing transfer prices do not experience the same level of consensus at the international level, as the principle itself. In this regard, the most appropriate ones, which would be the transaction-based methods, are rejected by some because they require comparisons that are difficult to achieve. This is so, given that extensive segments of activity such as communications, chemical, pharmaceutical and computerization industries, among others, are based on highly sophisticated technologies, are generally vertically and horizontally integrated, their products are unique and include a highly intangible value added. Of course, this does not take into account the restrictions emerging from industrial secrecy which these companies may use as basis for refusing to provide information. It is also argued that transaction-based methods are very costly for the taxpayers, on requiring that they provide a significant number of documents in relation to each transaction or multiple transactions for each line of products or services. The well-known difficulties for identifying arms length transfer prices led several countries to apply pragmatic administrative procedures, aimed at simplifying the determination of those prices and reducing the possibilities of lawsuits between taxpayers and the tax administration. The procedures used for attempting to overcome difficulties arising from the previously described methods are known as safe harbours and advance pricing arrangements or APAs. Safe harbour procedures involve the establishment of a series of rules for determining transfer prices which, if followed by the taxpayers, guarantee that the prices thus determined will be automatically accepted by the tax administration. This series of rules may be aimed at fixing a simplified method which taxpayers must observe or else, the latter may provide specific information and maintain records for the control of their transactions by the tax administration, for example. The advance pricing arrangements ("APAs") constitute an agreement whereby a series of criteria regarding methods, corresponding aspects of comparability and adjustments, etc. are pre-established. They will be applied for a specific time period to establish transfer prices of future controlled transactions. These agreements may be subject to cancellation, even retroactively, in case of fraud or falsity of information provided during their negotiation or when the taxpayer fails to comply with the terms and conditions provided therein. Some of the advantages of those agreements is that they afford the taxpayers greater certainty by being able to anticipate the tax treatment of international transactions, while at the same time affording the taxpayers and the tax administrations the opportunity of consulting each other and cooperating in a more favorable environment than in an examination process. Argentina constitutes one specific case that endeavors to pragmatically solve the difficulties of conventional methods. A modification was introduced in that countrys legislation on transfer prices which gave way to what came to be known as the sixth method. Its most important innovation is a new mechanics for determining transfer prices for an assumption specifically anticipated therein. It is intended to eliminate in export transactions of goods with internationally known price, maneuvers that may have a strong negative impact on collection and which were detected in the examination processes. To give an idea of the losses caused, it is worth noting that for 5 years, 7 companies sold 22.000 million dollars and paid the treasury by way of taxes on those earnings, less than 2 million, which implies an approximate ratio of 0.09% -Tax/Sales-, when in the rest of the Argentine economy during a similar period such ratio was 1.6%. The rule is applicable in the case of exports of cereals, oils, hydrocarbons and their byproducts and, in general, products with known quotations in transparent markets where there may be an international intermediary which is not the actual person for whom the goods are intended. In these cases, the best method for determining the Argentine source of income from exports is the amount of the quotation of the products in the transparent market on the day the products are loaded regardless of the means of transportation -, without considering the price agreed with the international intermediary. If the agreed price were greater than the quotation price in force, only the first of them is considered. This sixth method will not be applied when the taxpayer reliably shows that the intermediary abroad meets certain requirements that allow for assuming that it is actually a sales agent and not a sham intermediary. Brazil, on its part, to adjust itself to its real possibilities of transfer prices control, deviated itself from the orthodoxy to which the greater part of the legislations had adhered. The transfer pricing legislation in Brazil is based on a system of predetermined margins, although fixed for every type of operation in question, which is calculated on a product by product basis and where it is impossible to perform economic analyses based on business reasons or strategies, except for those specifically regulated, as is the case of conquests of new markets. 5. Administrative aspects. Transfer pricing control, especially in the case of multinational companies, is an activity framed within the examination functions of the tax administration at the international level, which involves entering into the most complex and difficult area of such examination. First of all, it requires information on individuals and events that are outside the jurisdiction, which is worsened in the case of developing countries, given that management and control of multinational groups (home offices) are generally outside their territories. In addition, another factor is the very complexity of international transactions and the changing forms of relationship between the participating companies. Therefore, in order that the tax administration may effectively control transfer prices, it requires an organization and technically qualified staff that may allow for applying nonconventional auditing techniques, based on data originating from sophisticated economic and legal analyses and technical expertise. The following are some of the requirements for exercising an effective control of transfer prices, according to the experience of countries that have achieved greater progress in this field: - the establishment of special bodies in the tax administrations for the examination of international activities, - the use of specialists, e.g., economists who may assist the examiners in evaluating substantial economic factors and performing functional analyses for determining the participation of the parties involved in the transactions, etc. - availability of detailed information provided by the companies regarding their transactions with related companies and the types of relationship, -- obtaining and analyzing the information available in the taxpayer and related company books and records, and comparison with information provided to other government offices, especially customs, central banks, trade departments and securities commissions, an effective customs valuation system with data bases on transactions between related companies, that may allow for correlating them with the transfer prices used in intra-group transactions. entering into agreements with tax administrations of other countries regarding information exchange and carrying out simultaneous examinations that may allow them to become aware of adequate transfer prices. An equally relevant administrative aspect is to promote the mutual use of information-input for determining the customs valuation and transfer prices. This does not imply disregarding the peculiarities that make the difference between customs valuation provided in article 8 of the GATT and transfer pricing which arises from article 9 of the OECDs Model Tax Convention. Even on recognizing differences, the generation of synergies between the customs valuation and transfer pricing control tasks is an advisable step for greater effectiveness in such tasks and besides, it is easy to achieve through the integration or coordination of customs and tax information systems. Even though many countries have integrated their tax and customs administrations, not all of them have adequately integrated information systems. On the other hand, in those countries where tax and customs administrations continue as separate entities, it is advisable to at least promote the coordination of information systems between both entities, from which there will arise the aforementioned synergies for the benefit of effective controls. CONCLUSIONS The OECDs work on transfer prices are a significant contribution to international rules aimed at achieving homogeneity in the principle and methods for determining transfer prices, to avoid double economic taxation of company benefits. However, the technical complexity and magnitude and quality of resources required for the implementation of those rules, renders it difficult for developing countries to effectively adopt and apply them. For this reason, it would be convenient to support not only the dissemination of this matter, but also its customization in developing countries, as well as the definition of a strategy that may allow them to advance in this area. The analysis of international transfer pricing problems is of interest to tax administrators in general; not only those in developing countries, especially as regards the control of those prices for combating tax evasion and fraud. To more effectively face the phenomenon of concealed distribution of profits through the values or nature assigned to transactions between related companies, the tax administration should count on sufficient normative support and an adequate organization to detect and sanction those maneuvers. Probably, the issue would have to be considered gradually so as not to begin implementing highly sophisticated technical solutions that may lead to such results as: significantly increased costs of control activities of the administration without a reasonable return; juridical uncertainty, as well as increased costs of compliance for the taxpayer and an expansion of the market and increased profits for tax professionals and counseling businesses. The support which entities such as the UNO and CIAT could provide for promoting these actions in developing countries, either through studies on the subject matter, holding of seminars and/or preparation of Manuals or good practices digest, would contribute to diminish the gap that separates them from most of the developed countries in this area and would also allow them to undertake a more effective defense of their viewpoints and interests.     PAGE  PAGE 1 '()8GOPQR# $  S T   յzl^zShVRCJOJQJhhuOuh @CJOJQJhhuOuh229CJOJQJhhuOuhyBCJOJQJhhgCJOJQJhhd!CJOJQJhh%hgh|f huOuhmhuOuhuOuhmCJOJQJh#huOuhuOu5CJOJQJ^JaJ#huOuh~x5CJOJQJ^JaJ huOuh~xhuOuhmCJhuOuhuOuCJ ()QR   NOgdj"6 $1$a$gdj"6$a$gdj"6gdj"6nn ? 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