

**Papers on Selected Topics in Administration of Tax Treaties
for Developing Countries**

Paper No. 1-A

May 2013

Overview of Major Issues in the Application of Tax Treaties

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Contents

1.	Introduction	1
2.	Background: The General Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Law	3
3.	Rules of Application in Bilateral Tax Treaties	5
3.1	The United Nations and OECD Model Conventions	5
3.2	Rules of Application In Actual Bilateral Tax Treaties	9
4.	Rules for the Application of Tax Treaties in Domestic Law	10
4.1	Introduction	10
4.2	General or Specific Application Rules	11
4.3	Legislative or Administrative Rules	12
4.4	Relationship between the Rules for the Application of Tax Treaties and the Method of Taxation	13
4.5	The Role of the Tax Authorities in Applying Tax Treaties	16

Overview of Major Issues in the Application of Tax Treaties

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1. Introduction

Over the last few decades, the number of bilateral tax treaties has increased dramatically. The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries¹ (“UN Model Convention”) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital²

involved in the application of tax treaties is to differentiate between the substantive rules of the treaty and the procedural aspects of applying those rules. This distinction is not completely clear, however, because substantive and procedural issues sometimes blend together. For example, the substantive provisions of a treaty require interpretation before they can be applied. This interpretative aspect of tax treaties can be considered to relate to the substance of the provisions or to their application or to both. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this overview a discussion of treaty interpretation has been excluded.

The paper begins with a discussion of the different ways in which countries implement tax treaties into their domestic legal systems because the method of implementation may affect the requirements that countries impose on taxpayers seeking to obtain the benefits of a tax treaty. It then examines the

or receives the payment is resident and usually taxable on the income or payment. Developing countries are typically source countries. Moreover, the provisions of bilateral tax treaties based on the UN and OECD Model Conventions often require the source country to reduce its taxes on

Traditionally, under public international law a distinction was made between so-called monist and dualist approaches to the status of treaties and international law.⁷ Under a monist approach, international law and domestic law are part of one system in which international law always prevails over domestic law. Under a dualist approach, international law and domestic law are separate legal systems and the former does not necessarily prevail over the latter in the event of a conflict. Public international law scholars have recognized more recently that this distinction between monist and dualist approaches is too simplistic to accommodate the enormous variation in national practices.⁸

The scholarly debate about monism

procedures or conditions for the application of the treaty. This raises the potential for conflicts between the implementing legislation and the treaty.

In summary, most countries appear to have considerable freedom and flexibility from the perspectives of both international law and domestic law with respect to the method for the application of bilateral tax treaties. Such freedom and flexibility exist despite the widely varying differences with respect to the status of tax treaties vis-à-vis domestic law. Nevertheless, these general considerations concerning the status of tax treaties may impose limitations on the way in which a country applies the provisions of its tax treaties. One especially important aspect of this issue is the relationship between a country's tax treaties and its domestic anti-avoidance rules. This issue is discussed in the final section of the paper.

3. Rules of Application in Bilateral Tax Treaties

3.1 The United Nations and OECD Model Conventions

For purposes of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions, it is assumed that any rules for the application of the provisions of those Model Conventions are a matter for the domestic law of the contracting states. Consequently, there are no general rules in the Model Conventions or in the Commentaries with respect to how the provisions of the treaty should be applied. There are,

Overview of Major Issues in the Application of Tax Treaties

more appropriate method for providing the benefits of the treaty – the reduced rate of source country tax – in an expeditious fashion. That Commentary also emphasizes that, if a country uses a refund mechanism, the refund should be provided expeditiously unless interest is paid on the amount of the refund.

The provisions of Articles 10(2) and 11(2) of both Model Conventions and Article 12(2) of the UN Model Convention, requiring the competent authorities of the contracting states to agree on the method by which the reductions in source country tax are to be applied, are not widely used. The competent authorities are not obligated to agree and most countries have not in fact entered into competent authority agreements as to the mode of application of these provisions.

Aspects of Article 24 (Nondiscrimination) of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions may affect the method of application of other provisions of the Model Conventions. Article 24(1) provides that nationals of one country shall not be subject to taxation or “any requirement connected therewith” by the other country that is different or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of the other country are subject. A similar requirement applies to stateless persons under Article 24(2) and to enterprises of one contracting state owned or controlled by residents of the other state under Article 24(5). The Commentary indicates clearly that the reference to “any requirement connected” to taxation in Article 24(1), (2) and (5) is intended to cover procedural aspects related to the application of the provisions of the treaty such as the filing of tax returns, terms of payment of tax, time and other related requirements.¹² However, the Commentary on Article 24(5) of both Models indicates that most countries do not consider that the imposition of additional information requirements or a reversal of the burden of proof with respect to transfer pricing for enterprises owned or controlled by nonresidents would be discriminatory, in violation of Article 24(5).¹³

The other aspects of Article 24 – the prohibition of discrimination against a permanent establishment in the source country of a resident of the other country under Article 24(3) and against resident enterprises with respect to the deduction of payments to residents of the other country compared to

¹² Ibid., paras. 15–17. ¹³ Ibid., paras. 18–20. ¹⁴ Ibid., para. 21. ¹⁵ Ibid., para. 22. ¹⁶ Ibid., para. 23. ¹⁷ Ibid., para. 24. ¹⁸ Ibid., para. 25. ¹⁹ Ibid., para. 26. ²⁰ Ibid., para. 27. ²¹ Ibid., para. 28. ²² Ibid., para. 29. ²³ Ibid., para. 30. ²⁴ Ibid., para. 31. ²⁵ Ibid., para. 32. ²⁶ Ibid., para. 33. ²⁷ Ibid., para. 34. ²⁸ Ibid., para. 35. ²⁹ Ibid., para. 36. ³⁰ Ibid., para. 37. ³¹ Ibid., para. 38. ³² Ibid., para. 39. ³³ Ibid., para. 40. ³⁴ Ibid., para. 41. ³⁵ Ibid., para. 42. ³⁶ Ibid., para. 43. ³⁷ Ibid., para. 44. ³⁸ Ibid., para. 45. ³⁹ Ibid., para. 46. ⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 47. ⁴¹ Ibid., para. 48. ⁴² Ibid., para. 49. ⁴³ Ibid., para. 50. ⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 51. ⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 52. ⁴⁶ Ibid., para. 53. ⁴⁷ Ibid., para. 54. ⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 55. ⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 56. ⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 57. ⁵¹ Ibid., para. 58. ⁵² Ibid., para. 59. ⁵³ Ibid., para. 60. ⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 61. ⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 62. ⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 63. ⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 64. ⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 65. ⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 66. ⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 67. ⁶¹ Ibid., para. 68. ⁶² Ibid., para. 69. ⁶³ Ibid., para. 70. ⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 71. ⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 72. ⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 73. ⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 74. ⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 75. ⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 76. ⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 77. ⁷¹ Ibid., para. 78. ⁷² Ibid., para. 79. ⁷³ Ibid., para. 80. ⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 81. ⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 82. ⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 83. ⁷⁷ Ibid., para. 84. ⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 85. ⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 86. ⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 87. ⁸¹ Ibid., para. 88. ⁸² Ibid., para. 89. ⁸³ Ibid., para. 90. ⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 91. ⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 92. ⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 93. ⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 94. ⁸⁸ Ibid., para. 95. ⁸⁹ Ibid., para. 96. ⁹⁰ Ibid., para. 97. ⁹¹ Ibid., para. 98. ⁹² Ibid., para. 99. ⁹³ Ibid., para. 100.

the deduction of such payments to residents of the source country under Article 24(4) – do not extend to requirements connected with taxation. Accordingly, a country is not precluded from imposing different requirements concerning the application of the provisions of the treaty to a permanent establishment, as long as the taxation on the permanent establishment is not “less favourable” than the taxation imposed on resident enterprises in similar circumstances. As the Commentary indicates, under Article 24(3) “it is the result alone that counts.”¹⁴ Thus, it is permissible for countries to apply a different mode of taxation and related procedural requirements to nonresidents with permanent establishments. Similarly, although the deduction of payments by a resident of the source country to a resident of the other country must be allowed “under the same conditions” as payments to residents of the source country, Article 24(4) does not prevent the application to payments to nonresidents of differe

Article 25(3) of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions provides a more general rule that requires the competent authorities to “endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the . . . application of the Convention.” The Commentary indicates that the power of the competent authorities under Article 25(3) can be used to resolve any problems resulting from the implementation of procedures for the limitation of source country tax on dividends, interest and royalties.¹⁹

Articles 26 and 27 of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions, dealing with exchanges of information and assistance in the collection of tax, clearly have an impact on the application of the other provisions of the treaty and on the enforcement of domestic tax generally. Most of the distributive articles of the Model Conventions rely on the need for accurate information about the taxpayer and the income derived by the taxpayer. Article 26 is an important mechanism to supplement the information-gathering powers of the tax authorities under domestic law. The exchange of information under tax treaties has recently been enhanced through the elimination of bank secrecy, the broadening of Article 26 and the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information.²⁰ Article 27 is a relatively recent addition to the UN and OECD Model Conventions, and thus it has been included in only a few treaties and there is little experience with its practical application.

3.2 Rules of Application In Actual Bilateral Tax Treaties

Given that the Model Conventions do not contain rules for the application of their provisions, it is not surprising that few individual bilateral tax treaties

the time limits of domestic law applicable and requires a certificate from the tax authorities of the residence country that the requirements of the treaty have been satisfied.

4. Rules for the Application of Tax Treaties in Domestic Law

4.1 Introduction

different treaties? A second issue is whether any domestic application rules are administrative or legislative in nature. Third, the rules for the application of tax treaties may be dependent on the basic method or methods of taxation – self-assessment, assessment by the tax authorities or withholding tax – adopted by a country. Closely related to, or part of, the method of taxation are the issues of the burden of proof and time limits with respect to claims for treaty benefits. Fourth, several general considerations arise with respect to the role of the country’s tax authorities in applying its treaties. For example, the effectiveness and efficiency of domestic rules may be impacted by the location of responsibility for applying tax treaties within the organizational structure of a country’s tax authority. Moreover, do the tax authorities have the necessary powers, such the power to gather information and collect tax, to enable them to apply the provisions of tax treaties effectively? Finally, to what extent do the tax authorities provide administrative guidance to taxpayers concerning the application of tax treaties, and what form does that guidance take?

Each of these general considerations is discussed briefly below.

4.2 General or Specific Application Rules

It may seem obvious, especially for countries with sizeable tax treaty networks, that a country should have general rules to govern the application of all of its tax treaties. Such general rules would apply uniformly to all treaties and would provide certainty for taxpayers and tax officials. Although the desirability of general rules for the application of tax treaties seems obvious, very few countries have comprehensive general rules.²² Some countries may consider that rules for the application of tax treaties are unnecessary because the ordinary procedural aspects of their domestic tax law are adequate to deal with any issues.²³

For many countries, the rules for the application of tax treaties have developed over time on a piecemeal basis in response to specific problems arising with respect to a specific treaty or a specific article. In some cases, application of the rules may have emerged from case law rather than legislation. Such a system of specific rules may lack coherence and consistency. More importantly, the complexity of such a system may result in the denial of treaty benefits if those benefits are conditional on a taxpayer’s faithful adherence to the application rules. Because of these problems, it

²² Williams, *supra* note 5, at 32-35.

²³ This is apparently the situation in Belgium. See Thierry Denayer, “Belgium,” in IFA, *Cahiers de droit fiscal international*, *supra* note 5, 245-64 at 245-46.

would be worthwhile for countries entering into tax treaties to seriously consider promulgating general rules (legislative or administrative – see section 4.3 below) for the application of tax treaties. Such general rules should deal with issues such as the requirements for claiming treaty benefits (filing tax returns or other forms, information disclosure requirements, burden of proof, time limits, etc.).

Moreover, the promulgation of general rules for the application of tax treaties could require a country to apply all of its tax treaties uniformly. Such uniformity would ensure that taxpayers are treated fairly in terms of access to treaty benefits irrespective of the particular tax treaty that applies. However, this type of equal treatment might be viewed as inappropriate in some circumstances. Tax treaties are bilateral rather than multilateral agreements and therefore differences between a country's tax treaties are to be expected. In some cases, the particular treaty negotiated between two countries may involve not only the substantive provisions of the treaties but also the method of application for those provisions. Therefore, the only firm conclusion concerning the equal application of a country's tax treaties is that, in principle, such equal application is a desirable objective, although it may be subject to exceptions based on particular treaties.

4.3 Legislative or Administrative Rules

4.4 Relationship between the Rules for the Application of Tax Treaties and the Method of Taxation

In general, there are three primary methods used by countries to establish the amount of tax payable by a person: assessment by the tax authorities, self-assessment and withholding. Under a system that requires the tax authorities to assess the amount of tax payable, the taxpayer is typically obligated to provide certain specified information and the tax authority is obligated to assess the tax payable based on that information. In contrast, under a self-assessment system, the taxpayer is obligated to file a return containing specified information and

Under a self-assessment system, the onus is on the taxpayer to claim any treaty benefits that may be applicable. The taxpayer applies the relevant provisions of a treaty in the first instance – usually when filing a tax return – and the tax authorities then have the responsibility to verify the taxpayer’s claim. Even under a self-assessment system, some countries require taxpayers to disclose specifically any claims for exemptions, credits or reduced rates of tax based on tax treaties.²⁵ The same effect may be accomplished in countries (for example, Australia)²⁶ that impose penalties for failure to disclose questionable positions that turn out to be incorrect. Some countries may deny self-assessment to nonresidents making claims for treaty benefits because of concerns about protecting the domestic tax base. However, this concern is limited to business profits because most countries enforce taxes on payments to nonresidents by withholding, as discussed below.

Claiming treaty benefits under a self-assessment system raises a serious concern where a taxpayer claims exemption from source country tax as a result of the treaty. For example, a resident enterprise of one country doing business in the other country claims that it is not taxable in the other country because it is not carrying on business through a permanent establishment in the other country. The issue raised by this situation is whether the resident is required to file a tax return in the other country even though it claims to be exempt from tax by that country. If the taxpayer is not required to file a return, the tax authorities of the source country may never be put on notice about the taxpayer’s situation and never get an opportunity to verify the taxpayer’s claim for exemption. Therefore, in such circumstances it is appropriate to require taxpayers to file a return or otherwise disclose the claim for exemption.²⁷

The importance of disclosing exemptions claimed under tax treaties also applies to residents of a country claiming an exemption or reduction in residence country tax as a result of the application of a tax treaty. For example, a taxpayer may claim exemption from residence country tax under Article 23 for income that is taxable in the source country under the provisions of the tax treaty. The taxpayer should be required to disclose the claim for exemption so that the tax authorities can verify

²⁵ For example, section 6114 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to disclose if they are claiming treaty benefits.

²⁶ See Roger Hamilton, “Australia,” in IFA, *Cahiers de droit fiscal international*, supra note 5, 217-23 at 217. Under this type of penalty regime, taxpayers are induced to disclose any tax positions, including tax treaty positions, that are risky.

²⁷ Such a requirement would not be discriminatory under Article 24(3), even if it is imposed only on nonresidents claiming exemption, because Article 24(3) does not extend to requirements connected with taxation, as discussed above in section 2.

4.5 The Role of the Tax Authorities in Applying Tax Treaties

4.5.1 Introduction

Since the provisions of tax treaties require interpretation and application, the role of tax authorities of a country in performing these functions is important. In this section of the paper, three aspects of the role of the tax authorities with respect to applying tax treaties are discussed: the location of responsibility for applying tax treaties, the powers of the tax authorities with respect to the application of tax treaties, and administrative guidance for taxpayers.

As a general matter, the development of expertise by the tax authorities with respect to tax treaties is a critical prerequisite for the proper application of tax treaties. Expertise concerning tax treaties is relatively scarce even in the tax administrations of developed countries with extensive and longstanding treaty networks. The development of such expertise in the tax administrations of developing countries is a serious challenge.

4.5.2 Location of Responsibility

One important aspect of how the tax authorities of a country apply the provisions of tax treaties is where the responsibility for that function is located in the organizational structure of the tax administration. There are many possibilities in this regard and although no single option is right for all countries, it is a matter that all countries should consider seriously. Some of the considerations that should be taken into account include:

- Whether issues involving the application of tax treaties are dealt with by a centralized unit of tax treaty specialists or by decentralized tax auditors as part of their general assessment and audit functions.
- How the tax administration is organized to deal with international issues in general. The provisions of tax treaties affect both residents of a country earning foreign source income and nonresidents earning domestic source income. Therefore, if a country allocates responsibility for dealing with residents earning foreign source income and nonresidents earning domestic source income to different units, responsibility for applying tax treaties could be allocated on the same basis. However, for many developing countries, the taxation of nonresidents earning domestic source income is likely to be more important than the taxation of residents on their foreign source income.

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- If responsibility for applying tax treaties is allocated to different groups or units within the tax administration, their work should be coordinated to avoid duplication and inconsistency.
 - The relationship between the competent-authority function and the application of tax treaties to taxpayers.

4.5.3 The Powers of the Tax Authorities Relating to the Application of Tax Treaties

The tax authorities must have the powers to properly investigate claims for treaty benefits. These powers include the ability to gather information and to collect tax. These powers are not peculiar to tax treaties and a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this overview.

The power to obtain information from a country's treaty partners is particularly important for the verification of claims for treaty benefits. Article 26 of both the UN and OECD Model Convention provides for the exchange of information necessary to carry out the terms of the treaty. In addition, as noted above, Article 27 of both the UN and OECD Model Convention allows the treaty partners to provide assistance in the collection of each others' taxes.

4.5.4 Administrative Guidance Concerning the Application of Tax Treaties

It is obviously important for the tax authorities to provide as much information as possible to taxpayers about how the provisions of the country's tax treaties will be applied. At the very least, the tax authorities should provide the text of the tax treaties that it has entered into with other countries, preferably in electronic format freely accessible by taxpayers and their advisers. Other information that could be provided includes treaties signed but not yet ratified and countries with which negotiations for a tax treaty have commenced. The provision of this type of basic information is especially important for developing countries in which such information may not be readily available from commercial publishers.

In addition, the tax authorities should provide information about any procedures that must be followed or forms that must be filed to obtain treaty benefits, including any related time requirements. It is desirable that such information be provided in a readily accessible manner on the tax authorities' website. Treaty benefits should not be denied because taxpayers cannot easily discover and comply with any procedural requirements. Similarly, any forms should be readily available on the public website of the tax authorities.

The use of forms is a common and effective way used by several countries to allow taxpayers to claim treaty benefits. To the extent that such forms may impose procedural requirements, they may make treaty benefits more difficult to obtain, contrary to the purpose of the treaty. For example, if a nonresident is expected to file a form claiming reduced treaty rates of withholding tax for every such payment, the compliance burden on the taxpayer and the administrative burden on the tax authorities dealing with the forms could be substantial. In some circumstances, the taxpayer may be required to file the forms with the withholding agent rather than with the tax authorities. The withholding agent is then required to file a return with the tax authorities. If forms are used, a decision must be made as to whether their use is mandatory or optional and, if optional, whether a letter providing the necessary information is sufficient. Obviously, it is desirable if the forms are available in the languages of the country's treaty partners.

Many tax authorities provide binding rulings to taxpayers with respect to proposed transactions. These advance rulings should also be available with respect to the application of tax treaties. In addition, taxpayers should be able to contact the

residence and beneficial ownership and connected requirements are discussed in this section. The application of the substantive provisions of a tax treaty to residents of a country and to residents of the other country is then discussed in the next two sections of the paper.

Time limits for claiming the benefits of a treaty cause many difficulties, especially where the domestic rules of the contracting states differ significantly. One persistent problem is the need for a taxpayer to provide information to one country before the information is available because, for example, it depends on the tax situation in the other country. Time limits are also relevant with

state by reason of certain criteria. Therefore, as a preliminary matter, it must be determined whether a person is a resident of a country so that that person can claim the benefits of that country's treaties.

Where a country must determine whether a person is a resident of that country for purposes of its tax treaties,²⁹ the determination of residence is straightforward. In the first instance it must be determined whether the person is a resident under the country's domestic law. This issue should not be difficult for either the taxpayer or the tax authorities, since they both can be expected to be familiar with their own domestic law. Similarly, in most cases it should be straightforward to determine whether the person is a resident under the definition in Article 4, since again the issue is whether the person is liable to tax under domestic law by reason of certain criteria. In effect, the country applies its own domestic law to determine whether a person is resident in the country under Article 4.

In some countries, there may be a direct link between an individual's immigration status and their tax status as a resident. The United States green card is the best-known example. Anyone holding a U.S. green card, which allows the person to enter the United States to work, is considered to be a resident for U.S. tax purposes. Such a direct link between immigration status and residence may induce taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations as residents in order to maintain their immigration status.

Where, however, a country must determine whether a person is a resident of the other contracting state³⁰ the issue is much more difficult. In this situation, the tax authorities must determine if the person is a resident of the other contracting state for purposes of the treaty by applying the other state's domestic law. Not surprisingly, many countries require a certificate from the tax authorities of the other country to the effect that the person is a resident of that country as a condition for granting the benefits of the treaty. The use of residence certificates is widespread and can be formalized by an agreement between the competent authorities, as provided for in Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2) (UN Model Convention only). The efficiency of the use of residence certificates can be improved if special forms for the purpose are cr

A country may require the tax authorities of the other country to certify things in addition to residence. For example, a country may require the foreign tax authorities to certify that the taxpayer is the beneficial owner of dividends, interest or royalties in order to get the benefit of the reduced rates of source-country tax under Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2) (UN Model Convention only).

There are potential problems with the requirement of residence and other certifications from the tax authorities of the other countries. Although the requirement of a certificate of residence imposes some additional compliance burden on the taxpayer and administrative burden on the tax authorities, this additional burden does not seem overly onerous if it is simply an annual requirement. If, however, a separate certificate is required for each payment, the burden could be significant. Another problem is the potential delay in obtaining the benefits of the treaty caused by the necessity to obtain residence or other certifications from the foreign tax authorities. The delay is dependent on how frequently such certificates are required and how much information about the tax affairs of the taxpayer must be certified by the foreign tax authorities. Another potential problem is the possible use of the certificate as leverage against the taxpayer in its other unrelated dealings with the tax authorities. Such misuse of the certification process should be discouraged. Residence and other certificates should be issued by the tax authorities based exclusively on the merits of each certificate requested.

Some countries allow withholding agents to reduce the amount withheld pursuant to a treaty based on the address of the recipient. Relying on addresses in this way makes the delivery of treaty benefits much more efficient, but is susceptible to abuse. Therefore, the withholding agent may not be able to rely on the recipient's address if the agent has reason to suspect that the recipient is not a resident of the other contracting state. In this case, a residence certificate must be obtained.

Situations in which a taxpayer is considered to be resident in both contracting states for purposes of a tax treaty are frequently encountered because countries' residence rules tend to be overly broad. In these dual-resident cases, the UN and OECD Model Conventions provide tie-breaker rules to allocate residence exclusively to one contracting state for purposes of the treaty. Under Article 4(2) of both Models, a hierarchy of four tie-breaker rules is provided for individuals, whereas under Article 4(3) the tie-breaker rule for other persons is the person's place of effective management. The Commentary on both Models allows countries to resolve the dual residence of entities other than individuals on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the mutual agreement procedure instead of by reference to the entity's place of effective management.

The application of the tie-breaker rules has important implications for the contracting states because it determines which country must give up its taxing rights. Consequently, the application of the tie-breaker rules should be carefully considered. For individuals, the tie-breaker rules are intensely factual and should be applied on a balanced basis to give residence to the country to which the individual is more closely connected. In addition, dual-resident entities are sometimes used for tax avoidance purposes.³¹

5.4 Hybrid and Special Entities

The application of the definition of resident of a contracting state to persons other than individuals and companies creates special problems. For example, although a partnership is a person for purposes of a tax treaty,³² it is not a resident of a country under Article 4(1) if it is not liable to tax under the laws of that country. In many countries, partnerships are treated as flow-through or transparent entities for income tax purposes; they are not taxable but the partners are taxable on their shares of the partnership's income. In other countries, at least some partnerships may be taxable on their income in the same way as corporations. Similar issues may arise with respect to trusts, foundations and other entities.

A partnership that is treated by one contracting state as a flow-through or transparent entity but by the other contracting state as a separate taxable entity and a resident is an example of a co-called hybrid entity. These hybrid entities cause serious problems for the application of tax treaties. For example, in some cases the use of hybrid entities may result in unrelieved double taxation. For example, assume that X, a resident of Country A, earns business profits sourced in Country B through a limited liability company (LLC) established under the laws of Country B. Country B treats the LLC as a separate entity for tax purposes; therefore, Country B imposes tax on the LLC as a resident of Country B. In contrast, Country A treats the LLC as a flow-through or transparent entity for tax purposes and imposes tax on X in respect of the income earned through the LLC; however, Country A may not allow any credit under Article 23 for the tax paid to Country B on the income because the tax is paid by the LLC, not by X. This type of double taxation is contrary to the spirit of the treaty.

³¹ See section 8 below.

³² Because it is a body corporate or a body of persons under Article 3(1).

In other cases, the use of a hybrid entity can result in double non-taxation. For example, assume that an LLC established under the laws of Country B realizes a capital gain in respect of shares of a corporation resident in Country B. Country B does not tax the LLC on the gain because it treats the LLC as a flow-through or transparent entity for income tax purposes. Instead, Country B considers the capital gain to have been realized by the members of the LLC, who are all individuals resident in Country A. Therefore, under Article 13 of the treaty between Countries A and B, Country B does not have authority to tax the capital gain (assuming that the assets of the LLC do not consist primarily of immovable property located in Country B). On the other hand, Country A considers the LLC to be a separate taxable entity and therefore, it does not tax the capital gain because it belongs to a resident of Country B. The use of hybrid entities to obtain tax treaty benefits raises the possible application of anti-avoidance rules. The prevention of tax avoidance through the use of tax treaties is discussed below in the final section of the paper.

The Commentary on both the UN and OECD Model Conventions provides useful guidance concerning the application of the provisions of a treaty to partnerships and their partners³³ and to real

OECD Model Conventions, the residence country is obligated to provide relief from double taxation with respect to any income that is properly subj

credit method is used for other types of income. This type of mixed approach is expressly recognized by Article 23B(2) of both Model Conventions.

It should also be noted that the competent authorities are authorized by Article 25(3) to use the mutual agreement procedure to consult about the elimination of double taxation that is not eliminated under Article 23 or the other provisions of the treaty.

the exemption method to use the credit method for dividends, interest and other income items.⁴² More generally, the problem of double non-taxation involves the larger issue of the abuse of tax treaties and the relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-abuse rules, which are discussed in section 8 below.

A final point about the application of the exemption method under Article 23 relates to the treatment of losses incurred in the source country by a resident of the other contracting state. Some residence countries may deny any deduction of such a loss because any income from the source country is exempt. In such a case, relief for the loss must be provided by the source country in the form of a loss carryover. If, however, the residence country allows a deduction for a loss occurring in the source country, the residence country is free to reduce the exemption for income subsequently derived from the source country by the amount of the earlier loss.⁴³ This point about losses is important because it emphasizes the more general point that the proper application of the provisions of the treaty often involves the interaction between the treaty and the country's domestic law.

6.2.3 Credit Method

As with the exemption method under Article 23A, the provisions of Article 23B with respect to the credit method do not contain detailed rules for the application of the credit method. Therefore, similar problems of application arise under the credit method as under the exemption method. These problems are sometimes resolved by recourse to the domestic law of the residence country relating to the foreign tax credit. However, if that country does not provide a foreign tax credit under its domestic law, according to the Commentary, it should establish rules of application for the credit under Article 23B and it should, if necessary, consult with the competent authority of the source country.⁴⁴

Many issues arise in connection with the computation of a foreign tax credit: differences in the timing of the recognition of the income in the source and residence countries, foreign exchange

⁴² Paragraph 31 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Convention and paragraph 15 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the UN Model Convention.

⁴³ Paragraph 44 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Convention and paragraph 16 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the UN Model Convention, quoting paragraph 44 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Convention.

⁴⁴ Paragraph 60 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Convention and paragraph 16 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the UN Model Convention, quoting paragraph 60 of the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Convention.

issues, the determination of the limitation of the credit to the portion of the domestic tax attributable to the income earned in the source country, the treatment of losses, and hybrid entities.⁴⁵ The Commentary on both the UN and OECD Models indicates that these “problems depend very much on domestic law and practice, and the solution must, therefore, be left to each State.”⁴⁶

Where a country uses the credit method under Article 23B, the deduction allowed against its tax is based on the tax paid to the other contracting state. Most countries require taxpayers to provide proof concerning the amount of foreign tax paid by providing a copy of the foreign tax return and evidence that the foreign tax has been paid. A certificate from the foreign tax authorities could be required for this purpose.

Although the UN and OECD Model Conventions do not contain such provisions, many tax treaties between sh

provided by Country B is effectively transferred to Country A, whose tax increases from 50,000 (if Country B does not provide any tax holiday) to 350,000 (if Country B provides the tax holiday).

7.2 Identification of the Relevant Nonresident Taxpayers

Dealing with issues concerning the application of tax treaties by a source country assumes that this country has identified the nonresidents that are deriving income from the source country that is subject to source-country taxation. Obviously, if a source country is not imposing tax on a nonresident because it is not aware that the nonresident is carrying on business in the source country or deriving income from the source country, there is no need to apply the provisions of an applicable tax treaty. The identification of nonresidents deriving income from the source country is critical, both for source country tax purposes generally and for the application of tax treaties.

Many countries use taxpayer identification numbers to identify taxpayers and keep track of their income-earning activities. Such numbers can be readily used for residents but some countries also require nonresidents to obtain such numbers in order to claim treaty benefits. Although the conditions for issuing a taxpayer identification number are matters of domestic law, they may have an impact on the availability of treaty benefits. For example, some countries require proof of a nonresident's country of residence as a condition of issuing a taxpayer identification number. It is necessary for countries to balance the administrative convenience afforded by taxpayer identification numbers and the burden imposed on taxpayers. The conditions for obtaining a taxpayer identification number should not be used as a disguised method for disallowing treaty benefits.

In addition to taxpayer identification numbers, several countries require nonresident individuals and companies to register with the appropriate authorities in the source country. These registration requirements often apply to nonresidents living in the country or doing business in the country. This information may be available to the country's tax authorities.

In some cases, the nonresident may be required to register directly with the tax authorities. The effectiveness of registration requirements appears to vary widely. Requiring nonresidents to be registered as a precondition for claiming treaty benefits may have a small positive impact on registration. As noted above, however, if nonresidents can derive income from the source country without detection by the tax authorities, claiming treaty benefits is irrelevant.

For countries with exchange controls, there may be a link between getting permission to transfer funds out of the country and the payer's tax obligations. Some countries (for example, Argentina) require nonresidents to appoint a local agent as a condition for claiming treaty benefits. Most countries impose withholding obligations on residents who pay amounts to nonresidents which

effectively makes the resident payer the nonresident's agent for the payment of tax. This is also the case with respect to interim withholding at source on salaries and wages paid to employees and certain other amounts, including amounts paid to nonresidents.

Treaty relief in the form of reduced withholding requires authorization for the resident payer to withhold in accordance with the treaty rate rather than the domestic rate. How this reduction is implemented will determine how efficiently the treaty benefits are delivered. If, as is common practice, the withholding agent is liable for the tax payable by the nonresident if the agent fails to withhold properly, the agent may be unwilling to accept the risk of withholding less than the full amount required by domestic law. Similarly, if the conditions imposed for reduced withholding are too onerous, the withholding agent may withhold at the domestic rate, thus forcing the nonresident to apply for a refund. For example, is the withholding agent entitled to reduce the amount of tax withheld based on the residence of a recipient, as indicated by the address provided by the recipient, or is more rigorous proof of residence (certification by the foreign tax authorities) required? The former procedure is capable of providing treaty benefits faster and more efficiently but is susceptible to abuse. The latter procedure has more integrity but takes longer and imposes considerably larger compliance burdens.

As noted above, the alternative to delivering treaty benefits through reduced withholding is to require nonresidents to apply for refunds of amounts withheld in excess of the treaty rate. Such a refund process requires a large commitment of resources by the tax authorities to operate such a process efficiently. It is not surprising that many countries have decided for practical reasons to implement procedures for delivering treaty benefits that eliminate or reduce the need to make refunds.

The determination of the persons who are entitled to treaty benefits and, in particular, the issues of residence and beneficial ownership, are dealt with above in section 5.

7.3 Nonresidents Earning Particular Types of Income from the Source Country

7.3.1 Introduction

In this section, the application of the provisions of tax treaties to different types of income is discussed. The discussion is intended to show how the practical issues concerning the application of tax treaties differ depending on the type of income involved. A detailed discussion of the application

of tax treaties to business profits, income from services, and investment income is provided in the separate papers in this collection dealing with those specific topics.

7.3.2 Business profits

Once it has been determined that there is an applicable treaty, in applying the provisions of that treaty to business profits, the first issue is to determine which of the several provisions of the treaty is relevant. At least 6 of the distributive articles of the UN Model Convention are potentially applicable to business profits: Articles 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, and 21. Moreover, if dividends, interest and royalties that are otherwise dealt with in Articles 10-12 are effectively connected with a permanent establishment in the source country, they are taxable by the source country in accordance with Article 7. A complete discussion of the various types of business profits is beyond the scope of this overview. It is sufficient to note that the treatment of various types of business profits differs enormously both in terms of the allocation of the right to tax and the practical issues in applying the relevant treaty provisions. A few brief comments with respect to Article 7, the general provision dealing with business profits, and Article 17 dealing with artistes and sportspersons, should serve to illustrate the range of application issues involved.

Under Article 7, the profits derived from a business carried on in the source country by a resident of the other contracting state are taxable in the source country only if the business is carried on through a permanent establishment in the source country and the income is attributable to the permanent establishment (subject to a limited force-of-attraction rule in Article 7 of the UN Model). The issues that the source country must deal with to apply Article 7 are formidable. They can be summarized as follows:

- First, as dealt with above in this section, the nonresidents carrying on business in the source country must be identified.
- Second, as also dealt with above in section 5, the country in which any particular nonresident is resident must be determined.
- Third, it must be determined that the nonresident is carrying on business in the source country through a permanent establishment in the source country; this permanent-establishment determination is intensely factual and requires the tax authorities to have good information about the nonresident's activities in the source country.

- Fourth, it must be determined that none of the other provisions of the treaty applies to the profits because those provisions prevail over Article 7.⁴⁸
- Finally, the profits attributable to the PE must be determined, which involves the application of the provisions of both Article 7 and the related Commentary and the provisions of domestic law.

In sharp contrast to Article 7, Article 17 of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions gives the source country the right to tax income derived from the personal activities of a resident of the other contracting state as an artiste (entertainer) or sportsperson if the activities are exercised in the source country. No permanent establishment is required and the activities do not have to continue for any specified period. Consequently, the application of Article 17 requires a source country to determine that a nonresident has performed activities of an entertainment or sports nature in the source country and to determine the amount of the income. It is unnecessary to determine the country in which the nonresident is resident because a nonresident artiste or sportsperson will ordinarily be taxable under the domestic law of the source country irrespective of whether a treaty applies.

The primary difficulties involved in applying Article 17 are gathering accurate information about the activities of nonresident artistes and sportspersons in the source country and collecting tax. Information gathering is less difficult with respect to prominent artistes and sportspersons since their performances are likely to be well publicized in the public media. Collecting tax in these circumstances is critical because artistes and sportspersons are often in the source country for a very short time. Article 17 does not impose any limits on how the source country taxes income derived by artistes and sportspersons. As a result, most countries impose tax on such income by way of a withholding tax on the gross revenues. Collection of the tax may be facilitated by arrangements between the tax authorities of the source country and the local promoters of the event or the owners of the venue. If the tax authorities have difficulty collecting the tax at the time of the event, they may have recourse to Article 27 to seek assistance from the country of residence to collect the tax, assuming, of course, that the treaty contains a provision dealing with assistance in the collection of tax.

⁴⁸ See Article 7(6) of the UN Model Convention and Article 7(4) of the OECD Model Convention.

7.3.3 Income from Services

Several provisions of the UN and OECD Model Conventions are potentially applicable to income from services.⁴⁹ The purpose of this brief discussion here is to show generally the issues that the tax authorities of the source country must confront in applying the provisions of a relevant tax treaty. These application issues can be summarized as follows:

- First, the nonresidents performing services in the source country must be identified.⁵⁰
- Second, the country in which the nonresident service provider is resident must be established in order to determine if the benefits of a treaty are available.
- Third, it must be determined which provision of the relevant treaty is applicable. This determination is based primarily on the nature of the services (for example, employment (Article 15)), government service (Article 19), or professional or other independent services (Article 14 or Article 7).
- Fourth, it must be determined if the threshold for source-country taxation is met under the applicable article. The threshold requirement varies, from no threshold under Article 17 for entertainment and sports activities and for certain employees of resident enterprises and nonresident enterprises with a permanent establishment in the source country, to a time threshold (183 days) for certain other employees and independent contractors, to the necessity for a permanent establishment or a fixed place of business in the source country.
- Fifth, the amount of the income subject to source-country tax, in accordance with the treaty, must be determined. Some provisions allow the source country to impose tax on the gross revenue derived by the nonresident service provide

authorities of source countries, especially developing countries. For practical reasons, some countries have decided to use withholding to collect tax from nonresident service providers.⁵¹ In general, residents paying independent nonresident service providers are required to withhold a specified percentage of the gross amount paid. The nonresident service provider is then required to file a return on a net basis and claim a refund for any excess tax withheld. Since nonresident service providers are taxable only if they have a permanent establishment or fixed base in the source country, some countries provide a system of waivers to allow nonresidents to apply to the tax authorities in advance of any payments for an exemption from withholding. Such a system requires the tax authorities to have sufficient information to decide whether a nonresident service provider has a permanent establishment or fixed base in the source country.

7.3.4 Investment Income

The treatment of investment income derived from the source country by a resident of the other contracting state under the provisions of the UN and OECD Model Conventions depends on the nature of the income. Dividends, interest, royalties, rental income from immovable property, and capital gains are all dealt with in different articles and in different ways. As with business profits and income from services, a detailed discussion of the application of the provisions of the treaty to investments is well beyond the scope of this overview. The purpose of the brief discussion here is to show the range of application issues concerning investment income that a source country must deal with. A detailed discussion of these issues is found in the paper in this collection dealing with investment income.

With respect to dividends and interest under both Model Conventions, and royalties under the UN Model Convention, the rate of source-country tax on amounts paid by a resident of the source country to a resident of the other country is limited. The other provisions dealing with investment

None of the provisions of the UN and OECD Model Conventions restricts the manner in which source-country tax is levied on investment income.

In general, the following steps are necessary to apply the treaty to investment income derived in the source country by a resident of the other contracting state:

- The nonresident recipient of the payment must be identified.
- The residence of the recipient of the payment must be determined in order to establish which treaty is relevant and whether the recipient is entitled to the benefits of the treaty.
- The character of the payment must be determined so that the relevant article of the treaty can be applied.
- In the case of dividends, interest, and royalties, it must be determined whether the recipient is the beneficial owner of the payment.
- The method for collecting the tax must be adopted.

As noted, in most cases source countries use withholding taxes to collect tax on nonresidents deriving investment income. Further in most cases the withholding tax is imposed as a final tax, with the result that the responsibility for the four steps outlined above to apply the treaty is placed on the person making the payment to the nonresident. The issues involved in balancing the compliance burden on the withholding agent and the delivery of treaty benefits in an efficient manner with integrity are discussed in section 4.4 above.

The provisions of Article 13 of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions dealing with capital gains present several difficult application issues. In general terms, the source country is entitled to tax capital gains from the alienation of immovable property located in the source country, the movable property of a permanent establishment or fixed base in the source country, shares of a company and interests in a partnership, trust, or estate if the assets consist principally of immovable

property located in the source country.⁵² Other capital gains are taxable exclusively in the residence country.⁵³

The application of the provisions of Article 13 involves many of the same issues involved in applying the treaty provisions dealing with business profits, income from services, and investment (for example, the necessity to establish the residence of the taxpayer). These issues are not repeated here. The source country must obtain information necessary to calculate the amount of the gain: the cost of the property, the proceeds of the sale, and the costs incurred in connection with the sale. These amounts may require conversion from a foreign currency into the domestic currency of the source country. Finally, the collection of the tax on a capital gain realized by a resident of the other contracting state poses special problems. An obligation to withhold an amount from the purchase price on account of the estimated tax on the capital gain can be imposed on the purchaser. However, such an obligation may be difficult to enforce if the purchaser is not resident in the source country.

The enforcement problem is limited with respect to capital gains because under Article 13 the source country is given the right to tax capital gains in respect of property that, with the exception of substantial interests under the UN Model Convention, is physically located in the source country. Consequently, the tax authorities of the source country should be able to take effective enforcement action with respect to any tax payable by a nonresident against the property located in the source country.

8. Abuse of Tax Treaties and the Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Law

The provisions of tax treaties can be used in a wide variety of ways to avoid tax.⁵⁴ It is important for countries to protect their domestic tax bases from abuse through the improper use of tax treaties. This is a challenging task, especially in light of the general principle that the provisions of a tax treaty generally prevail over the provisions of domestic law in the event of a conflict.

⁵² Capital gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in international traffic and boats engaged in inland waterways transport and associated movable property are taxable exclusively by the countries to which they are registered.^{1.670}

favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions.⁵⁷

Although this principle is broad and general, it provides useful guidance for taxpayers and tax authorities. As the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model indicates:

The members of the Committee endorse that principle. They considered that such guidance as to what constitutes an abuse of treaty provisions serves an important purpose as it attempts to balance the need to prevent treaty abuses with the need to ensure that countries respect their treaty obligations and provide legal certainty to taxpayers. Clearly, countries should not be able to escape their treaty obligations simply by arguing that legitimate transactions are abusive and domestic tax rules that affect these transactions in ways that are contrary to treaty provisions constitute anti-abuse rules.⁵⁸

The Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model provides a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of including a general anti-abuse rule in the treaty.⁵⁹ Any such rule should be applied in accordance with the general principle outlined above as to what constitutes an abuse of a tax treaty.

Some treaty abuses can be prevented by interpreting the provisions of the treaty in accordance with their purpose and the good-faith requirement as set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.⁶⁰ This interpretive approach to controlling treaty abuse should also conform to the guiding principle in the Commentary on Article 1 as to what constitutes treaty abuse.⁶¹

The guidance in the Commentary concerning treaty abuse was extensively revised in 2011 for the UN Model Convention and in 2003 for the OECD Model Convention. Consequently, there is a serious issue as to the relevance and weight of the revised Commentary for the interpretation of tax treaties entered into before the respective Commentaries on Article 1 of the UN and OECD Models

⁵⁷ Paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention and paragraph 23 of the

were revised. The Introduction to the OECD Model indicates expressly that subsequent versions of the Commentary should be taken into account for purposes of interpreting tax treaties previously entered into.⁶² Some commentators have expressed a contrary view. Ultimately, this issue may be resolved by a country's courts. Nevertheless, the tax authorities should be aware of this issue, especially in connection with the issue of abuse of tax treaties.

In general, the tax authorities of a country should apply the provisions of its tax treaties to prevent tax avoidance and evasion. This requires a careful consideration of the inclusion of anti-abuse rules in tax treaties and the adoption of domestic anti-avoidance rules that can be applied to treaty abuses. However, in addition to ensuring that the appropriate anti-avoidance rules are in place, the tax authorities must have the capacity to interpret, apply and enforce those rules with respect to treaty abuses. In this regard, developing countries face the challenge of balancing the need to provide foreign investors with certainty in order to attract investment with the need to protect the tax base.⁶³ To execute this difficult balancing act properly, the tax authorities must have the necessary expertise to apply complex anti-avoidance rul