

To begin with the obvious: conflict is a main driver of internal displacement. The resolution of conflicts is needed for IDPs to find durable solutions, and durable solutions for IDPs are necessary for consolidation of peace. Or to put it in negative terms, without peace, it is difficult for IDPs to find durable solutions and without durable solutions for IDPs, it is difficult for peace to be sustained. While the relationship is clear, the fact is that different actors are responsible for ending conflicts, consolidating peace and supporting IDPs. Both preventing and ending conflicts – peacemaking – falls largely in the domain of political leaders, while humanitarian actors are largely responsible for protecting and assisting IDPs and at least in the past, have been expected to facilitate solutions for IDPs. This seems to hold true at both the national level – where different ministries are usually responsible for humanitarian aid and for conflict-resolution – and at the international level. Similarly, the process of sustaining peace – whether through peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding initiatives or transitional justice mechanisms – is usually led by different actors than those working with IDPs.

Over the years and continuing to the present, there has been considerable resistance from some humanitarian actors towards becoming more involved in preventing conflict and violence as well as resolving and consolidating peace. In large measure, this resistance is due to a fear that humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality will be compromised by their engagement in political actions necessary to prevent and resolve conflicts. This resistance was brought sharply into focus in the early 2000s over the issue of UN integrated missions which were “designed to streamline UN efforts to ensure that the objectives of all UN forces and agencies are channeled towards a common overarching goal.”⁶ Humanitarians tried to insist on the need for independent humanitarian action, even while recognizing the need for joined-up action to support peace.⁷ When humanitarian aid is given in support of political objectives – even noble political objectives of ending conflicts – humanitarians may no longer be seen as independent and impartial, but rather aligned with political actors in ways that might limit their access to people in need. While integrated missions have gone ahead, similar issues are now surfacing with respect to the peace-humanitarian nexus. Indeed, the tension over humanitarian principles is probably the greatest impediment to increased collaboration between humanitarian and peace actors.

A recent IOM publication contrasts two interpretations of how humanitarian

Research shows that prolonged humanitarian aid can extend crises, diminish IDPs' coping strategies, encourage dependency and contribute to grievances by both IDPs and host populations.⁹

While finding durable solutions for IDPs would reduce the negative impacts of protracted displacement on IDPs, host governments, and donors, it is also important for consolidating the peace. A study by SIPRI reminds us that one-third of peace agreements fail within five years.¹⁰ The presence of large numbers of displaced people unable to return or settle permanently in other parts of the country – particularly when they have grievances -- can be a source of instability.¹¹

While the relationship between peace and displacement is clear, implementing the triple nexus is difficult for many reasons.

The peace and security landscape is complicated, and it is difficult to single out who the peace actors are in order to strengthen their collaboration with humanitarian and development agencies. Peace and security actors include: state armed forces, non-state armed actors, UN and regional peace support operations, stabilization actors, police, mediators (including international organization mediators, state mediators and private diplomacy mediators), peacebuilding agencies and transitional justice mechanisms (such as truth and reconciliation commissions and reparations/compensation initiatives.) All of these types of actors have their own mandates, histories, budgets, accountability mechanisms and often their own distinct analyses of the causes of specific conflicts. While there are normally some operational coordination mechanisms in peacekeeping settings, there are few strategic initiatives for coordinating the work of peace and security actors and humanitarian actors.

While peace and security actors are often grouped together, there are important differences. A state security force that is actively engaged in armed conflict would require a completely different type of engagement than a UN-mandated peacekeeping operation or a UN peacebuilding initiative or an NGO focused on conflict-resolution.

Of all the humanitarian actors, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement probably has the most experience in working with armed forces (both state and non-state)¹² to provide humanitarian aid, and there is

Conflicts take many different forms and each conflict engages different peace and security actors -- a factor which impacts possibilities for enhancing collaboration with humanitarian actors. When there is a peacekeeping operation (PKO), for example, there are different channels of communication open with other UN agencies than when there isn't a PKO. Similarly, there are different phases of conflicts which impact both humanitarian and peace and security actors. For example, there are frozen conflicts with protracted displacement (e.g. Georgia, Azerbaijan); conflicts which continue to 'simmer' after peace agreements have been signed (e.g. Colombia); long-standing continuing conflicts with protracted displacement and peacekeeping missio

primarily armed parties, and have been kept confidential. Consequently, there is not much room for either IDPs or humanitarian agencies to sit directly in the room when peace agreements are hammered out. But there are a number of alternative consultation formats, allowing IDPs to participate in peace talks without sitting directly at the table. Gerard McHugh's suggestions are uniquely helpful in this regard, noting for example that mediators can meet with IDPs outside of the negotiating room and feed their concerns into the process.²¹ These models have gained traction in recent years as a result of a growing commitment to "inclusivity" in mediation.²² There is also the potential for Track two dialogues between IDPs as part of peacebuilding efforts.

There are some examples where IDPs have been consulted or included in peace negotiations. As noted above, there was an extensive process of consultations and track 2 involvement of IDPs in Colombia in the leadup to the peace agreement between the government and the FARC. Sometimes, as in Darfur, there were efforts to mobilize stakeholder input into peace processes. Although these processes were flawed, they point to a willingness to engage with civil society organizations, including IDPs, in the peacemaking process.²³

There are also cases where existing negotiation formats intended to resolve conflicts can be used to take up issues of concern to IDPs, including questions of humanitarian access to IDPs. Thus the Trilateral Contact Group (based in Minsk) dealing with the conflict in and around Ukraine has a working group on humanitarian issues which has been able, on occasion, to weigh in on humanitarian/displacement issues. Similarly the Humanitarian Task Force set up by the UN Envoy on Syria (co-chaired by the UN, the US and Russia) has occasionally dealt with issues of concern to IDPs.

Humanitarian diplomacy, where humanitarian actors negotiate with military/political actors over issues of access and assistance, may serve as a confidence-building measure for supporting ongoing negotiations to resolve conflicts. For example, UNICEF has successfully negotiated ceasefires or 'days of tranquility' to enable children to be vaccinated.²⁴

In 1999, the UN Security Council explicitly added protection of civilians (POC) to its agenda through Resolution 1265, and later that same year it tasked the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone with the first explicit mandate to protect civilians from the threat of violence. Since then, the Security Council has adopted many resolutions on protection of civilians.²⁵ Its initial focus was on 3 groups seen as particularly vulnerable: IDPs, women and children.

²¹ McHugh 2010. Op cit.

²²

OCHA reports that POC developments have led to a 'culture of protection' within the Security Council.²⁶ Presently 8 of the 14 UN PKOs currently have mandates to protect civilians: MINUJUSTH (Haiti) MINUSCA (CAR), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (DRC), UNAMID (Darfur), UNFIL (Lebanon) UNISFA (Abyei) and UNMISS (South Sudan.) While the UN included POC mandates in peacekeeping operations since 1999, it took 10 years for the UN to offer guidance, policies and training on how these mandates can be implemented (and indeed another decade to produce a handbook on incorporating POC into peacekeeping operations).²⁷

However, protection of

The scale or footprint of stabilization programs is often much larger than that of humanitarian agencies. For example, in Mali, the collective cost of stabilization and counterterrorism is estimated at over \$2 billion annually – while the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan had received only \$160 million at the end of 2019 – less than 1 percent of the cost of stabilization efforts. Meanwhile beneficiary communities struggle to differentiate between MINUSMA and aid workers as both are juggling service provision and state substitution.³⁵

Coordination between stabilization programs and humanitarian efforts has been difficult. Coordination mechanisms

3. call for greater collaboration between UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes relevant to solutions for IDPs, such as protection of civilians; Women, Peace & Security initiatives; R2P and atrocity-prevention mechanisms as well as the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire in light of COVID-19.
4. support empowered Resident Coordinators to prioritize joint assessments by humanitarian, peace and development actors on potential solutions for IDPs and to develop mechanisms for monitoring and assessing collective outcomes
5. challenge donors to coordinate humanitarian and stabilization initiatives in their programming and to insist on complementary approaches in the field.
6. call on transitional justice actors to recognize IDPs as an important group who must be included in transitional justice processes, and to provide appropriate measures for recognizing their losses and redressing their claims in the various mechanisms they develop.
 - a. Equitably engage IDPs in the development and implementation of transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives, including but not limited to those associated with returns and property claims.
 - b. During displacement, support IDPs to document their claims in preparation for eventual transitional justice processes.
7. call for all post-conflict durable solutions strategies to explicitly examine the relationship between the resolution of displacement, transitional justice and reconciliation, and identify concrete steps to strengthen the links between these processes.
8. call on the IASC to develop ways of engaging with various peace actors at both the global and country levels. This could include, for example, IASC convening an annual meeting with peace actors (, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, stabilization, etc) to develop ways of ensuring that their efforts consider solutions for IDPs.
9. call for the establishment of a 'window' to support solutions for IDPs in the UN Peacebuilding Fund to open a 'window for IDP solutions

Name of PKO, Country/Region, & Date Established	# of Contingent Troops; # of Military Personnel*	# of IDPs in Country, Date as of
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