


DDR AND PEACE



The
DDR
THE ROLE
NOVEMBER 2011

United Nations

DDR AND PEACEBUILDING:

THEMATIC REVIEW OF DDR CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEBUILDING AND THE ROLE OF THE PEACEBUILDING FUND

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Cover photo:

A mural informs visitors that no arms are allowed at the UNICEF-supported Redemption Public Hospital in Monrovia, the capital, in Montserrado County.

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ACRONYMS

AMAA - Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies
APRD - Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la démocratie
BCPR - Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CAAFAG - Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups
CAR - Central African Republic
CONADER - DRC's National Commission for DDR
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-M - Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist
CRRP - Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDPC - Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain
HIV/AIDS - Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IAWG - Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS - Integrated DDR Standards
ILO - International Labour Organization
IRF - Immediate Response Facility
ISSSS - International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
MDRP - Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MLCJ - Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice
MONUC - United Nations Mission in the Congo
MONUSCO - UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NPTF - Nepal Peace Trust Fund
OHCHR - Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
PBC - Peacebuilding Commission
PBF - Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO - Peacebuilding Support Office
PRF - Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility
RECOPEs - Réseaux communautaires de protection de l'enfant/Community Child Protection Networks

SSR - Security Sector Reform

STAREC - Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas

UE-PNDDR - National DDR programme in the DRC

UE-PNDDR- Implementation Unit of the PNDDR

UFDR - Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement

UFR - Union des forces républicaines

UFVN - Union des forces vives de la nation

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund

EXECUTIVE S

Each case study outlines how DDR was approached in the peace process; the nature of the DDR process undertaken; summary of PBF DDR funding; the project's fulfillment of PBF funding goals for being catalytic, relevant and sustainable for peacebuilding; and challenges encountered in implementing the project for DDR and PBF.

Case Studies

- CAR is the only case study country on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. The PBF contributions enabled a stronger preparatory phase of DDR, ensuring that DDR planning reflected the content of the IDDRS and supporting the initial launching of the process. PBF support was also catalytic in initiating and implementing two phases of support for child DDR.
- In DRC, PBF supported three projects that targeted ex-combatants posing security risks and led to increased stability and basic security. One project adopted a community-matching approach that saw the socio-economic reintegration of both combatants and other vulnerable community members. A second project, which focused on war-wounded combatants, directly supported the implementation of the Ituri Accord (2009). A third project targets the Disarmament and Demobilization of 4000 residual elements of former armed groups, still responsible for "insecurity pockets" in the forest, in order to provide means for DD gaps, contributing to Government Stabilization plans;
- In Nepal, the three PBF projects promoted the safety and security of women and children involved in the Maoist armed group and promoted the rights of the children involved in the group. The nature and set up of the PBF-support projects further helped the UN best prepare the systems and structures to support the process once the combatants were discharged. The programme preparations proved to be essential to providing as smooth, sustainable and consistent of a process as possible in the complex environment.

The fourth section explores the results of the three case studies horizontally, highlighting overall trends, contextual differences, lessons and challenges across the cases, focusing specifically on the peacebuilding goals of implementation support for peace process, basic security, and peace dividends—economic recovery and the peacebuilding outcomes of social cohesion, reconciliation and community resilience. The results of the case studies cast little doubt of the relevance and value of the PBF projects in meeting both DDR and peacebuilding objectives.

Meeting peacebuilding objectives

At some level, all of the PBF-supported projects reported dividends in the areas of security, economic recovery and seeing a change in the attitudes and behaviours of not only ex-combatants but also within hosting communities. Certain practices undertaken in the case studies further demonstrate how the economic and social benefits of DDR can be felt more widely across communities, such as, among many others:

- Reintegration benefits matched with other vulnerable community members;
- Micro-enterprises developed that improve the basic provision of nutritional or hygienic needs of a community (e.g., grain mills, soap);
- Professional training to build national capacity in the delivery of health services;
- Capacity-building and the provision of equipment (e.g., military hospital in DRC) strengthened overall national capacities and services that will be useful beyond the closing of DDR projects; and
- Community networks such as the solidarity groups, CAAFAG Network and RECOPEs established or supported ex-combatants and other vulnerable community members and provided opportunities for promoting positive interaction among ex-combatants, other vulnerable groups and communities in community, sporting and reconciliatory events/forums.

Section four also focuses on the value added and comparative advantage of the PBF in supporting DDR. In particular, the case studies demonstrate the value of the PBF in filling gaps in DDR programming, such as:

- Financial gaps: funding critical parts of the programme that require additional funds (e.g., reintegration), or to ‘jump start’ critical activities.
- DD and R gap/stop-gap measures: funding reinsertion projects, labour-intensive projects, community/dual targeting projects that aim to minimize the gap or serve as a temporary stop-gap measure between DD and R.
- Caseload gap: supporting marginal caseloads in the DDR programme that would be otherwise left out, for example women associated with armed forces or groups, children associated with armed forces or groups, wounded fighters and groups that entered the DDR process late or were left out of national DDR processes.

The final section of the report summarizes the main findings and puts forward five overarching recommendations that contain specific action points aimed towards PBF efforts to strategically and programmatically position its DDR support as well as action points for UN entities and DDR practitioners as they plan and prepare conflict sensitive DDR and implement DDR that contributes concretely towards achieving sustainable peacebuilding results.

Recommendations:

1. Establish concrete actions for ensuring DDR ‘process’, planning and preparations are aligned with peacebuilding priorities



- DDR practitioners should plan DDR in a manner that promotes transitional linkages between reintegration from medium to longer-term, non-DDR development and assistance, such as economic recovery and livelihoods initiatives.

-

- UN should aim to plan community-matching approaches in the design and planning of reinsertion and reintegration and link DDR more with community recovery and development. Similarly, PBF support should help to fill funding gaps that will enable community-matching initiatives or that ensure cross-cutting issues are adequately addressed in the programmes.
- DDR practitioners should increase, and PBF should support, their gender BDC 2rsSto include opportunities for address2rsSmasculinity and male-centered<FEFF20evention programmes of sexual and gender-based violence, ensure that the needs of women associated with armed forces and groups, HIV/AIDS and other<Fotentially marginalized<groups are included in DDR programmes.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report reviews the contributions of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to peacebuilding, with a particular focus on the DDR and DDR-related projects supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).¹ DDR aims to help build security, reconstruct social fabrics and develop human capacity for ex-combatants and associated members who otherwise pose a significant risk to the stability and security of post-conflict environments.

2.

confidence in the political process; strengthening core national capacity for conflict management¹². The report thus calls on the international community to be “capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively to these core objectives through:”¹³

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, DDR, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform (SSR);
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconcilia-

2.2 DDR

There is no one blueprint for DDR and related activities since country contexts differ greatly, according to the nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes and the programme must adapt according to the political, physical and cultural environments where the DDR is taking place.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the IAWG Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) defines DDR as “a process that cont[(Ne)10(v)14(ert640) DR Standar)1ecurit0.Orstabilit0.Orin (s osthath -dur)18(atiactiv

- Political reintegration supports interventions such as civic education and providing ex-combatants with valid identification documents that support the ex-combatant “in claiming rights and fulfilling duties, including those related to participation in political processes, such as elections and community-based decision-making processes.”²⁶ Political reintegration promotes confidence and investment in the peace process and transitional state structure.

2.3 General overview of DDR contributions to peacebuilding

DDR is unique from other peacebuilding sectors, such as health, social and administrative services, education, and the security sector, etc., as these sectors are continuous and inherent to the daily and sustainable functioning of a state. In contrast, DDR is a programme with a determined beginning and end, in spite of the fact that the implications of DDR, from its negotiations through its implementation and conclusion, penetrate a wide range of longer-term processes and programmes. The closing of a DDR programme is highly symbolic of a state’s return to stability and signals another milestone in the state’s transition out of post-conflict recovery. Once the DDR is completed, the sustainability of its results depends upon the ability of other peacebuilding sectors to incorporate individuals who were once formerly known as ex-combatants as regular citizens in longer-term peace, recovery and development programmes.

Similarly, national ownership, buy-in and support to national institutions implementing DDR are guiding principles of DDR and are seen as essential for the success and sustainability of the DDR programmes themselves.²⁷ However,

status and to become recognized as regular citizens that can engage—anonymous of their past—in longer-term development and recovery activities, DDR thus also depends in many ways upon the ability of other UN-wide initiatives to address the root causes of conflict, promote recovery, and to pave the way for broader and longer-term peacebuilding and development.

DDR is thus only one, narrow, aspect of broader peacebuilding objectives. It contributes to peacebuilding for one specific target group and, by extension can help to reinforce elements of peacebuilding within communities. DDR should thus be seen as one among other targeted post-conflict interventions. Successful peacebuilding requires other recovery and development initiatives that go beyond the means and scope of DDR.

The success of DDR, however, also depends on the positive results of other recovery and peacebuilding programmes. The chances for an ex-combatants successful and effective reintegration are improved when there are peace dividends, root causes of conflict are addressed, and the resilience of communities is built and government is better capacitated to manage conflict.

Given the challenges to DDR implementation, an important question for the PBSO is how PBF support can help to overcome some of these challenges to DDR in order to simultaneously strengthen DDR's chances for success and reinforce DDR's contributions to peacebuilding. The remaining sections thus look practically at PBF's contributions to DDR, and how the PBF-funded activities met PBF goals.

3. PBF SUPPORT TO DDR

Generally, DDR is financed from five funding sources: the UN Peacekeeping assessed budget; rapid response (emergency) funds; voluntary contributions from donors; government grants, government loans and credits; agency cost-sharing. The Peacekeeping assessed budget covers military, personnel and operational costs of DD (and occasionally reinsertion) within a UN peacekeeping context.

3.1 Trends in PBF support for DDR

Since 2006, the PBF has provided US\$ 36 million towards twenty DDR-related activities in ten different countries: Burundi, CAR, Comoros, Côte D'Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nepal and Sudan. Of these, Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia are on the agenda of the PBC. The majority of PBF-supported DDR projects AR, Comoros, Côte D'Iv4/4ty of PBF-

3.2 PBF contributions in Case Study countries

The case studies for CAR, DRC and Nepal are annexed to this review. Each case study outlines how DDR was approached in the peace process; the nature of the DDR undertaken; summary of PBF funding for the DDR; an explo-

lished in 2006 comprising UN, international and national NGOs⁵⁴—the project activities additionally encouraged and promoted community engagement in the social-reintegration of VMLRs.

Given the high number of women VMLR and the lack of reproductive services available to them, the PBF funded project “support to female members of the Maoist army” enabled UNFPA to recruit and place gynaecologists in the cantonment sites and to undertake measures to improve the conditions of reproductive health services in the sites. During the discharge process, the support enabled social workers to be made available to accompany female VMLRs, to counsel family members, if needed, and to provide women with referrals for their reproductive health needs.

OHCHR and UNICEF undertook the project “Monitoring, reporting and response to conflict related child rights violations”, as mandated by Security Council resolutions 1612 and 1882 on rights of the child. The project strengthened the national capacity to monitor and report on the discharge and rehabilitation process of minors and ongoing violations of children’s rights. The project extended support for informally or self-released CAAFAG and other children affected by armed conflict. UNICEF, with the help of the CAAFAG Working Group, also sought to locate the 1,130 verified minors who were absent during the discharge process.

⁵⁴ CAAFAG (Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups) Working Group comprises of UN agencies: UNFPA, WFP; INGOs (Save the Children, IRC, ICRC, Search for Common Ground, PLAN, CARE, and TPO); and national NGOs. The National Human Rights Commission, UNMIN and OHCHR are observers.

to integration and mission-UN Country Team relations in preparing the Adult DDR, which reportedly only recently improved as a result of a recent (2011) SSR/DDR Assessment and renewed inter-agency commitments. Further, the phase II of the Child DDR project is intended to be multi-agency, however, observers on the ground highlight that the agencies have been working independently of one another. It may thus be useful for the PBSO and DDR community to review in greater depth the challenges of multi-agency coordination and how the PBF could be used more concertedly as an instrument for fostering inter-agency coordination.

4.5.3 Sustainability

Achieving sustainability of peacebuilding results poses a unique challenge for DDR, given the precise parameters of DDR interventions and the important symbolism of ending DDR as countries move further along the peace process.⁶⁷ However, implementing partners in all of the cases expressed concern over the short-duration of the support coming from the programmes. In DRC and Nepal, for instance, many of the micro-enterprises will have just been getting off the ground by the end of the support, while on the agricultural side, support may end before the beneficiaries reach the harvest season.

In Nepal, some of the minors require more support than is provided through the 2-year duration of the programme. The UNIRP review warned that there could be a high number of drop-outs from the education programmes from those who will not be finished their studies within the 2-year duration of the programme and especially for those who live outside of the home to get their education.

Children in CAR also face the same challenge. The Child DDR programme supported the education of the children for one year, but the majority of families are too poor to continue the schooling beyond this. Some RECOPEs managed to provide additional help for primary school children (which were in the village), however they could not extend support for the students to attend the secondary schools further away. The justification for the second phase of the PBF project Child-DDR project was to address the fragile socio-economic environment into which ex-

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Findings

Financially, the contributions of the PBF are relatively small in comparison to the costs of DDR and PBF's overall allocations to a country. It is difficult to judge what the state of the DDR process would have been had the PBF assistance not been made available, however, the results of the case studies cast little doubt of the relevance and value of the PBF projects in meeting both DDR and peacebuilding objectives.

At some level, all of the PBF-supported projects reported dividends in the areas of security, economic revitalization and seeing a change in the attitudes and behaviours of not only ex-combatants but also within hosting communities towards ex-combatants. Peacebuilding activities have helped the DDR community identify ex-combatants who are not enrolled in a programme and are a useful platform for positively promoting and providing outreach for DDR. Peacebuilding activities create opportunities where ex-combatants and community members positively interact together, promoting social cohesion and reconciliation.

Even in CAR, where several delays have undermined the programme, spates of violence surfaced and funding for reintegration remains uncertain, the PBF support for the preparatory phase ensured that the strategies developed and process as a whole reflected the content of IDDRS and that the DDR process remained present despite the delays. In Nepal, despite several government and Maoists restrictions, the PBF support ensured that special needs of women were accommodated and the CAAFAG Working Group undertook



Based on the findings of this review, the following recommendations are presented below.

5.2 Recommendations

1. Establish concrete actions for ensuring DDR 'process', planning and preparations are aligned with peacebuilding priorities



- The PBF should consider funding inclusive DDR dialogues that both serve as entry points for reconciliation and as vehicles for developing multi-year, inter-agency, country-specific frameworks for reintegration, as recommended by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee. Such PBF support would encourage the creation of catalytic "One UN" approaches to resource mobilization, as well as multi-sectoral reintegration frameworks that provide viable transition options for the final stages of DDR processes.
- DDR practitioners should factor in conflict analysis prepared in the framework of peacebuilding and be aligned with country PBF Priority Plans; involve key actors from other peacebuilding sectors in the planning and preparation of DDR; plan reinsertion and reintegration activities that are conducive to achieving peacebuilding results and agree in the planning phase of how peacebuilding is included in DDR M&E.
- Peacebuilding and DDR practitioners should consider in conflict and risk analysis and needs assessments potential new threats that emerge and become conflict drivers as a result of challenges in/obstacles to the DDR process.

2. Address obstacles that hinder timing and sequencing of DDR



- PBF support for DDR may require rapid investment, especially to undertake reinsertion as a temporary stopgap before reintegration or to compensate for delays in the DDR.
- PBF is a flexible fund, and this flexibility for DDR should be safeguarded so that DDR can be adapted and

- PBF support is already flexible and this flexibility should be systematically maintained, however, the UN should seek to find alternative means for pooling resources that can be used in a flexible manner, such as in a trust fund.
- DDR practitioners should strengthen their partnerships and relationships with other sectors on the ground so as to minimize duplication of efforts in such areas as conflict and needs assessments and market analysis, etc., and to undertake peacebuilding activities that promote social cohesion with other vulnerable groups and communities at large.



- PBF should encourage projects that build up the capacity of local networks and mechanisms that could be used to support/include ex-combatants in their scope.

-

and peacebuilding events and activities that bring ex-combatants and communities together in cultural, music and sporting events and supporting the presence of psychosocial support services at such events.

- DDR planners should seek to increase their planning towards the exit strategies of reintegration programmes, allowing for beneficiaries with special needs to incrementally phase out of the reintegration assistance (e.g., to allow children to complete their education, child-care to allow mothers to work or search for work, etc.). PBF could consider supporting the special needs of these groups to support the closing of reintegration programmes.
- UN should strengthen their partnerships and relationships and PBF should aim to support projects and programmes that promote programmatic linkages between DDR and related issues such as SSR, Transitional Justice, Rule of Law, small arms and light weapons and armed violence reduction, peacebuilding and development.

5. Strengthen the mutual relationship between DDR and wider entities involved in peacebuilding

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ANNEX 2

Practical linkages between DDR and peacebuilding

Promoting the peace process

DDR-type programmes are very political and are a highly sensitive and visible part of the political process of consolidating peace. The majority of recent peace agreements includes at least some reference to DDR in the negotiations of and content of peace agreements, as encouraged by the IDDRS.⁷² The basic implementation of DDR is thus itself part of fulfilling the commitments of the peace agreements.

In certain instances, such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the peace agreements set out the establishment of national DDR commissions. In Mozambique, the general peace agreement established a dedicated commission to address reintegration. Other agreements only partially refer to components of DDR such as disarming and cantonments or

Secondly, DDR contributes to security on a community and individual level by reducing the risk of opportunistic violence and general lawlessness. Ex-combatants⁷⁶ are considered to have a high-risk potential of becoming spoilers of the peace process or committing banditry and other crimes.⁷⁷ Removing weapons from these groups and preventing their aimless return to cities and communities directly contributes to the provision of basic security and stabilization of a country. Further, assistance to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life and helping them establish an alternative livelihood helps to minimize the likelihood that the individuals will return to armed groups or participate in criminal activities.

Security, both on the strategic and communal levels, is a basic precondition for peacebuilding. While DDR alone cannot ensure security, one of its main contributions to peacebuilding is found in the provision of basic security, which enables other activities to take place.





Peace dividends

The primary guiding principle of the IDDRS is for DDR to “do no harm”. The IDDRS emphasizes that DDR operations must be based on an analysis and awareness of the root causes and nature of the conflict and post-conflict environment.⁸⁰ Specifically, the return of ex-combatants to communities must not aggravate tensions that may surround such issues as land reform, competition over natural resources and cultural and ethnic sensitivities. DDR also has to be careful not to give rise to new tensions by fuelling community perceptions that the ex-combatants are rewarded for their participation in the conflict or that they have impunity against grave violations they may have committed.

The IDDRS also establish that DDR will, within its capacity, help to address the root causes of conflict. DDR programmes can seek to implement programmes in such a way so that root causes of conflict are addressed through improved economic opportunities and more equitable access to natural resources, depending on the context. On a general level, done well, the DDR activities may inevitably tackle some of the root causes of conflict: economic reintegration activities help address unemployment issues; psycho-social counseling can help ex-combatants work through some of their personal or social motivations for entering the conflict and reconciliation; while social cohesion activities can help bridge social and ethnic divides.

More difficult, however, is understanding how DDR can contribute practically or more purposefully with the root causes of conflict. ***DDR is a highly political and sensitive activity and getting too involved in the root causes of conflict could put DDR practitioners in a difficult position of being perceived as taking sides or favouring specific groups or outcomes***

ANNEX

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-bound transportation; • Registration; • Socio-economic profiling; • Health screening; • Civic education; • Discharge orientation; • Out-bound transportation (repatriation and resettlement); 	<p>Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, agency in-kind contributions</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional safety allowances • Food • Non-food item support • Clothes • Short-term education and training • Short-term employment • Tools • Medical services 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional/vocational training; • Long-term education, accelerated learning; • Employment counselling and referral; • Job placement; • Financing of microenterprises; • Induction into uniformed services; • Family tracing and reunification, interim care services for CAAFAG; • Community support for reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups; • Reconciliation activities; 	<p>Voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radio • Print • Local theatre groups • Advocacy, publication information and social mobilization to raise awareness about children and women associated with armed forces and groups 	<p>Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes</p>

ANNEX 5 — Case studies – CAR, DRC, NEPAL

1. Central African Republic

1.1 DDR in the peace process

The government and five politico-military groups, operating in the north-east (UFDR and MLCJ), center-north (FDPC and UFR) and north-west (APRD), signed the Libreville Global Peace Agreement (APGL⁸⁸) in 2008⁸⁹. The

particularly in the north-east, and the political battles resulting from the absence of a power-sharing agreement between the government and politico-military groups. The start of DD was further affected by disagreements between Government and politico-military groups on the "pre-conditions"⁹⁹ to DDR as well as the political nature of the DDR Steering Committee. Also, it is widely believed that each side was employing tactics in order to delay the process until after the elections (which eventually took place in January and March 2011).¹⁰⁰

The DDR programme was initially planned in two phases: (1) a preparatory phase to set up the necessary structures and operational procedures, and (2) an operational phase including the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration of combatants. The preparatory phase began in April 2009 and included as primary activities: Establishment of a UNDP Management Unit; ongoing meetings of the DDR Steering Committee; opening of field offices and support to local DDR committees;¹⁰¹

a project already planned with and executed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The CEMAC funds were directly provided to the CAR government under personal supervision from the President.

In a separate initiative complementary to the national DDR process, the World Bank prepared (2010) and commenced (mid-2011) a 'Community Development Project' under its Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (TDRP). The US\$ 8.6 million project, led by international NGOs,¹⁰⁴ primarily targets conflict-affected communities throughout the northern provinces that have a high concentration of ex-combatant youths, youth associated with militia and banditry and youth-at-risk living among the population. However, the project is not linked to DDR and its inclusion of ex-combatants is widely considered to be a side-benefit as opposed to a purposeful targeted group of the programme.

1.3 PBF funding for DDR in CAR

Under the SSR component of CAR's Peacebuilding Priority Plan, the PBF contributed funding to two DDR projects. Managed through UNDP, the first project 'Support for the start-up of the DDR process for Armed Groups' received US\$ 3.96 million from the PBF. This amount set out to cover the full costs of the preparatory phase of the DDR. However, the delays and extended preparatory phase in the north-west and is still ongoing for the north-east, meant that the funding fell short and project staff had to be reduced in March 2011. In 2009, UNDP provided US\$ 1.9 million in additional funds. In total, the DDR project was thus funded with US\$ 5.94 million, of which PBF funding constituted 67 per cent, a large part of which went to the payment of salaries of international DDR experts.

For the second project, 'Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Socio-Economic Reintegration of CAAFAG and Other Children and Women' (Child DDR), the PBF provided US\$ 2 million to UNICEF. This amount covered the project's full budget. This project has since seen the development of a second phase (US\$ 1.5 million). The second phase is a multi-agency initiative composed of UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP, running from September 2010 through February 2012.

In total, the PBF allocated US\$ 7.46 million towards DDR, which amounts to 19 per cent of its total contributions to CAR (currently US\$ 31 million). In considering the total contributions for both projects, it should be noted that the PBF-funded project on Child DDR included a higher ratio of non-ex-combatants.

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1.4 Catalytic, relevance and sustainability of PBF funding

1.4.1 Adult DDR

PBF's contribution to the Adult DDR covered about two-thirds of UNDP's engagement and its activities in the preparatory phase of the DDR. The activities centered mainly on (a) building the institutional capacity necessary for designing, planning, steering and implementing the national DDR programme, (b) supporting the DDR Steering Committee put in place to oversee the DDR process, and (c) conducting all preparatory activities required prior to launching the operational DD phase, such as sensitization and public information campaigns.

The PBF directly supported the implementation of the Libreville Peace Agreement, specifically at the beginning of the process-oriented preparatory phase of the DDR, when there were no other donors coming forward to fund the planning and preparations of DDR¹⁰⁵.

The meeting, which additionally signalled the launch of the DDR process, came at a time when there was a sense of urgency to get the DDR process underway: armed groups were becoming impatient, having already begun assembling under the early promises of DDR in the lead up to and included in the peace agreement; and there had been early hopes to complete the DDR before the elections. The rapid investment in the preparatory phase of the DDR had an early positive impact on security. Seeing the creation of the DDR Steering Committee and the sensitization and verification activities that followed raised hopes among ex-combatants that the DDR process would begin in earnest, which led to a reduction of violence in conflict areas, though spates of insecurity continued through to the lead up to the elections and until the DD component of the operations itself began.¹⁰⁶

The preparatory phase of the DDR process is also relevant to peacebuilding as the highest authorities of the politico-military groups were involved in the DDR planning, and the government and politico-military groups worked together in the DDR Steering Committee, which contributed to confidence-building between the parties and to the DDR process itself. Decisions of the DDR Steering Committee were met by consensus, meaning the government and politico-military leaders were continuously meeting and negotiating on forward-looking political and security matters. While these were important achievements, they should be understood within the context of the overall criticism of the DDR Steering Committee, which includes a lack of medium-term and long-term approaches, overt focus on operational details without addressing the larger issues, and a perceived disconnect between the representatives of politico-military movements and their military leaders on the ground.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, the information and sensitization campaigns conducted as part of the PBF contributions helped build the confidence of, and engage the population living in, conflict-affected areas in the political process. Community members reportedly note that, for the first time in many years, they had seen government officials travel to their area. For them, this signalled a change that the government is taking an interest in their communities. Apart from the symbolic impact of the visits and the information provided on the upcoming DDR process, the sensitization campaigns provided a key forum for representatives of the government, politico-military groups and the population at large to discuss their perceptions of the peace process and the Inclusive Political Dialogue process.

This preparatory phase was considered process-catalytic as it enabled the rapid launch (and subsequent development) of a DDR process, a key element of the Libreville Peace Agreement. Further, the effect of announcing the availability of PBF funds was considerable as it enabled UNDP/BCPR to mobilize an additional financial contribution to the programme.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP/BCPR provided internal funds over US\$ 1.99 million later as of 2010, as described earlier.

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with diplomats and donor representatives in Bangui, July 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews with diplomats and donor representatives in Bangui, July 2011.

The sustainability of the reintegration programme is currently questioned. Although the CEMAC funding (managed by the CAR President) was earmarked for reinsertion and reintegration (94 per cent of its total, or US\$ 11.9 million), these funds no longer remain. The lack of coordination between existing donors and the absence of new donors results in significant challenges for implementing the reintegration strategy.

Substantively, however, the PBF-funded project provided capacity-building support, which promotes the sustained input of skills and resources into the DDR process. At various stages of the project, different actors from the DDR Steering Committee, local DDR committees, the UNDP Management Unit, military observers,¹⁰⁸

train the elements of the national army in a matter of hours to conduct the tasks of the military observers at the beginning of DD operations.¹¹⁴

- The early implementation of sensitization and verification led to hopes that the DDR would be conducted soon, and the delays produced frustration among ex-combatants and the general population, which in some cases fueled tensions and violence. The APRD, for example, continued to set up barriers to extort money from those transporting goods and stole livestock. During the long run-up to the national elections there were several occasions where the APRD threatened to disrupt the electoral process without progress on the DDR process, which in some cases led to significant challenges and intimidations during the preparation of the election.

Second, the process is criticized for not being sufficiently inclusive. Civil society is not represented on the DDR Steering Committee. Furthermore, the Adult DDR process is criticized by civil society organisations for not being sufficiently gender-sensitive, for instance, civil society raised the concern that the sensitization campaign did not contain specific messages targeting women, and that the government's insistence of not including HIV/AIDS programmes during the preparatory and operational DDR phases was a lost chance to address these issues among ex-combatants and their host communities.

Third, the vast majority of weapons (98 per cent) that have been turned in during the DD operations are artisanal/hand-made weapons, and thus there is concern that a number of weapons are still in circulation in the hands of the ex-combatants and/or armed groups.¹¹⁵ The effectiveness of the demobilization process is also questionable, according to critics, given that the demobilization seems to have had little effect on breaking down the command structures of the armed groups, as ex-combatants remain in the same locations and seem to be following the orders of their commanders in the APRD. Further, it is reported that the ex-combatants are paying their commander US\$ 20 from the reinsertion package they are given by the Government (CEMAC funds).¹¹⁶

A potential new risk could emerge from the fact that civilian disarmament programmes took place in the north-west at the same time as the disarmament of ex-combatants. However, the civilians have not received compensation for turning in their weapons, which could lead to a sense of ex-combatants being rewarded for their role in the conflict.¹¹⁷

Fourth, the fact that planning, funding, and implementation of DD is disconnected from R poses grave problems for the fluidity and complementarity of the DDR process. As referred to above, the planning of reintegration only took place late into the process, having been adopted only in July 2011. Further, as noted, the government has some of the earmarked funds available for reintegration,¹¹⁸ however it is not considered to be enough. UNDP provided some technical assistance to the development of the reintegration strategy, but it could not commit funds and resources to the implementation of the national reintegration programme itself. Although multiple international coordination meetings have taken place between HQ and field level (attended by UNDP, BINUCA, the PBC Chair of CAR, the WB, EU) and as initiated by UNDP, the key donors have so far not been able to successfully align their support to CAR with respect to the DDR process.

Furthermore, delays in implementing the reintegration programme could pose high risks for the 4,792 ex-combatants demobilized since the DD began on 14 July 2011 in the north-west of the country:

¹¹⁴ The EEAS further highlights that ECCAS MILOBS arrived in Bangui in October 2009 and stayed until June 2011. They were funded by the EU under the APF-support to the ECCAS MICOPAX operation in the CAR. The CAR government could have introduced (but did not) a new request to ECCAS for the renewal of the mandate of the MILOBS. Initially, it had not been foreseen to keep the MILOBS for as long as they stayed.

¹¹⁵ During verification in the northwest of 6153 ex-combatants, 4170 artisanal weapons were turned in versus 72 formal weapons. During the DD stage of 4,792 combatants, 3,467 artisanal versus 54 formal weapons were registered.

¹¹⁶ Interviews with communities and civil society, Bocaranga July 2011.

¹¹⁷ Interviews of communities and civil society, Bocaranga July 2011.

¹¹⁸ CEMAC committed US\$ 12 million in grants and US\$ 2 million in loan to the Government of CAR to fund DDR. The President of CAR personally manages these funds. In the December 2009 DDR project document, this money was allocated to reintegration activities. However interviews with donors and diplomats indicate concerns about how much of this money remains for reintegration.

- There are serious doubts concerning the availability of sufficient funds to cover the reintegration of ex-combatants. Civil society groups warn that if the reintegration packages are not adequately generous or if national institutions such as the JPN are not well-enough capacitated,¹¹⁹ given the current atmosphere among the ex-combatants and their continued ties to their armed group's chain of command, the ex-combatants will return to or establish new armed groups.
- At the time of research, the terms for the integration or recruitment of ex-combatants into the national defense or security forces had not been agreed, and senior figures in the Ministry of Defence do not appear keen to take steps to allow the ex-combatants to enter the national forces.¹²⁰

Fifth, sustainability of the benefits of the Child DDR project is a particular concern given the extreme poverty afflicting the families and communities the children returned to. In the first phase, implementing partners paid for the children to be enrolled in school for a year but the majority of families are too poor to continue the schooling beyond this. Some RECOPEs managed to provide additional help for primary school children (which were in the village), however, they could not extend support for the students to attend the secondary schools further away.

2. Democratic Republic of the Congo

2.1 DDR in the peace process

DDR in DRC is grounded in several agreements, annexes and resolutions.¹²¹ Notably, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), Inter-Congolese Dialogue (200-Cal 8(-C)dInclusi(v)14(e)1(Agr)18(e(ment)1oin)1Tnsiutioe (200ach(iclude pr

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UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took the immediate charge of minors and organized family reunification. The World Bank, within its Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), supported the government financially for the programme, including the reintegration component of the PNDDR or “civic reinsertion” as it was known. The six-month civic reinsertion consisted of a resettlement allowance of US\$ 110 upon leaving the transit center and US\$ 25/month for up to one year as a transition allowance. Additionally, 54,000 of the 102,148 demobilized adults received other forms of socio-economic reintegration benefits such as in the area of micro-enterprises.¹²⁵

MONUSCO (initially as MONUC) further undertook DDRRR of the foreign nationals, seeing to their disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and resettlement back to their own country.

The narrow eligibility excluded a large number of ex-combatants, both foreign nationals and individuals who did not qualify for the national programme.¹²⁶ These individuals¹²⁷ were widely considered to still pose a significant threat to security. In 2010, at the request of the government and in collaboration with UNICEF and MONUSCO, UNDP thus led the reintegration of residual combatants in an 18-month Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme (CRRP). The CRRP adopted a community-based reintegration approach, whereby vulnerable members of the community received comparable support to that received by ex-combatants. The ratio, originally planned to be 50 per cent ex-combatants and 50 per cent other identified vulnerable groups was revised to be 70 per cent - 30 per cent respectively. In total the CRRP processed 4,378 combatants, while 4,031 combatants and 1,713 community members were beneficiaries of the socio-economic reintegration (total 5,744).

As the 2009 Ituri Peace Accord called for the support of wounded CNDP combatants, UNDP, in collaboration with MONUSCO, ICRC and the government, provided capacity support for the military hospital in Goma, funded the treatment of 265 wounded CNDP combatants and facilitated their integration into the FARDC or their respective demobilization and socio-economic reintegration over a 10-month period.

2.3 PBF support for DDR in the DRC

Under priority two of the PBF Priority Plan for the DRC, “Demobilization and community-based reintegration of combatants and high-risk groups”,¹²⁸ the PBF allocated funds for three DDR-related activities: the CRRP, and the project supporting the war wounded and demobilization of residual ex-combatants.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ CONADER in particular but also the UE-PNDDR has been criticized for the management of DDR funds and for what many have perceived to be a too short and limited reinsertion programme. The UE-PNDDR further admitted the difficulty of implementing the reinsertion programme given the disparity in education and skills of the ex-combatants and the fact that implementing partners did not have the capacity and/or time to better tailor the programmes. Several ex-combatants are reported to have sold their reinsertion kits.

¹²⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/512, 8 October 2010.

¹²⁷ The CRRP covered ex-combatants who were not eligible to the PNDDR programme. The term ‘residual combatants’ was coined after the declaration of the end of the Amani Leo process, which stipulated that the armed groups were all integrated/reintegrated. The estimation made in October 2010 speak of residual elements, but in the CRRP, the target groups was still called ex-combatants.


¹²⁸ The PBF Priority Plan covers the period September 2009-December 2011. The total envelope for the funding is US\$ 20 million, which is divided along the four priority outcome areas: 1. Improv 10 sp Sta()TJEMFEFF1 ()TJE ((esidua-IRC(our b12. on and c)9(ommunit)9(y)18(ation of))TJ0.062 Tw

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PROJECT TITLE	BUDGET (US\$)	TIMELINE (MM/YY)	UN AGENCIES
Community Reintegration and Recovery Programme in eastern DRC (PBF/COD/B-1)	4,405,342	02/10 – 06/11	UNDP
Support to War Wounded (PBF/COD/B-2)	228,962	04/10 -06/11	UNDP T

- Identification of beneficiaries and socio-economic opportunities;
- Social cohesion and conflict prevention;
- Capacity-building of local authorities and community groups, in order to promote good governance;
- Improved access to Social Services through the reconstruction of certain infrastructure in areas where there is a high level of ex-combatants and vulnerable community members; and
- Sustainable revenue generating activities.


 The CRRP filled a gap in the DDR process by addressing a significant group of individuals that were left out of the national DDR programme and who were still recognized to pose a risk to the DRC peace process. According to one local implementing partner of the CRRP, prior to the initiative, the ex-combatants were known for committing armed robbery and extortion, and the level of this type of crime has decreased seemingly because the ex-combatants are now occupied.¹³⁰

The CRRP's design also contributed to a wider footprint of economic revitalization for the communities by ensuring that one third of the caseload represented other vulnerable groups, such as returnees and high-risk youths. Further, for instance, the purchase of a mill in one community for the community benefited the whole community, as there became an increased production of grain. Likewise the soap-making activity of one solidarity group in Uvira benefitted the whole community as it led to the availability of more affordable soap for the community. CRRP implementing partners noted that both the short-term labour intensive and the longer-term reintegration helped to prevent vulnerable groups from turning to violence and crime.¹³¹

The broadened scope of the project also produced several social dividends. By engaging the communities in the process, and having the ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups wn.92 Tknifde(y addrifde, CRRP)81(mana(er)184(o the ed)J-

programme. For instance, former beneficiaries of UNICEF's programmes started establishing and hosting their own

neering. Women have often reported that they do not see a change in the male attitudes towards women after the males have been reintegrated.¹⁴⁰ Few actors in the DRC address this issue. One NGO, the Congolese Men's Network, is not associated with any of the DDR projects but uses its meager resources to address gender issues of male ex-combatants.

Another implementing partner of the CRRP also noted that there needs to be better linkages with development. Many of the reintegration programmes provide strong initial support, but there needs to be a stronger linkage to development in order to see it through and provide greater chances of sustainability. Several implementing partners, for both projects referred to the difficulties caused by delays of UNDP in dispensing the funds.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with the Congo Men's Network, Goma, 20 July 2011.

3. Nepal

3.1 DDR in the peace process

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nepal was signed on 21 November 2006 by Nepal's main political parties, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) following a decade-long conflict. One of the immediate goals of the CPA was listed to be the management and integration/rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel. It also included a commitment to “instantaneously rescue children in armed force and provide necessary and suitable assistance for their rehabilitation”.¹⁴¹

Also in 2006, the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) set forth provisions for the redeployment and concentration of forces, Maoist army cantonment, and registration of Maoist army combatants at cantonment sites. The AMMAA established that the members of the Maoist Army who did not meet the relevant eligible criteria for the army—minors and those entering the armed group after May 2006—are to be discharged. This group, known as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR), became the target recipients of DDR-related activities. It is important to note that the Maoists did not approve of the terminology of disarmament and demobilization, preferring instead to consider their activities as SSR and to approve rehabilitation activities. In this review, any reference to DDR in Nepal thus actually only refers to the rehabilitation.

3.2 DDR-related programmes in Nepal

The UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)¹⁴² and UN Country Team—specifically UNDP and UNICEF along with other UN Country Team members – conducted the registration and verification of the Maoist combatants, between June and December 2007. The process verified 19,602 regular members of the Maoist army and disqualified 4,008 individuals as VMLR (2,973 verified minors and 1036 late recruits). However, it took another three years of additional negotiations and high-level advocacy before the Maoist army would allow for the discharge and reintegration of VMLR to take place.

In January 2010, the UN deployed an inter-agency team¹⁴³ to support the month-long discharge process. In total, 2,394 (60 per cent) of the 4,008 VMLR were officially discharged. The remaining 1,614 (40 per cent) were discharged in absentia in March 2010.

In June 2010, the UN established a 24-month Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP). UNIRP, composed of ILO, UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA, was tasked with the transitional rehabilitation of the 2,973 verified minors and 1036 late recruits. UNIRP's main activities included public sensitization and information campaigns and psychosocial support. Rehabilitation packages further provided VMLR's with four socio-economic reintegration options: vocational skills training, micro-enterprises, education and health training. For the late recruits, UNDP provided vocational skills training, micro-enterprises and non-formal education; and UNFPA covered the planning and delivery of Health Related Vocational Training and Education packages and took a lead role in identifying and addressing gender specific issues. ILO focused on enhancing the capacity of UNDP's implementing partners to provide the vocational training and to improve their skills for conducting labour market assessments. UNICEF oversaw the tracing, formal education and psychosocial support and community peacebuilding activities to support the social-reintegration of VMLRs.

¹⁴¹ Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Section 7.6, 26 November 2006.

¹⁴² The UN Mission in Nepal, UNMIN, established under Security Council resolution 1740, is administered by the Department of Political Affairs.

¹⁴³ Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

3.3 PBF support for DDR in Nepal

DDR-related activities in Nepal are undertaken within two complementary funding arrangements. The government established the national multi-donor Nepal Peace Trust Fund in February 2007, as a collective financing and coordinating mechanism for peacebuilding. The DDR-related support from NPTF enabled the establishment of the basic infrastructure of 19 cantonment sites, and temporary shelters in 28 sites.

In March 2007, the UN established the UN Peacebuilding Fund for Nepal as a complementary instrument to the national trust fund. PBF funding is incorporated within the UNPFN structure and is the largest single funding contributor.

2 Np 2007-2011

PROJECT TITLE	BUDGET (US\$)	TIMELINE (MM/YY)	UN AGENCIES
Project Support to Discharge of Adult Maoists Army Personnel from the Cantonment sites (UNPFN/A-3)	499,614	11/07 – 12/10	UNDP
Programme Support for Children and Adolescents Formerly Associated with the Maoist Army in Nepal * (PBF/NPL/B-2)	622,969	03/09 – 03/10	UNICEF
Support to Female Members of the Maoist Army* PBF/NPL/B-2	224,614	03/09 – 12/10	UNFPA
Discharge and Reintegration Assistance to Maoist Army UNPFN/A-6	3,392,216	01/09 – 05/10	UNDP
Support to the Rehabilitation of Verified Minors and Late Recruits UNPFN/A-7	9,349,660	06/10 – 05/12	ILO, UNDP, UNFPA & UNICEF
Monitoring, reporting and response to conflict related child rights violations* PBF/NPL/E-2	2,332,421	04/10 – 12/11	OHCHR & UNICEF
A	16,421,424		

* Highlighted rows represent the projects supported by the PBF

Six of the eight projects under the UNPFN's Cantonment and Reintegration cluster specifically addressed "DDR"-related activities in Nepal. Falling under "conflict prevention and reconciliation" under the PBF's Priority Plan for Nepal,¹⁴⁴ PBF contributed US\$ 2.2 million towards the DDR related projects, which amounts to 13 per cent of the total (US\$ 16 million) amount spent on DDR activities to date and 22 per cent of PBF's total contribution to Nepal (US\$ 10 million).

3.4 Catalytic, relevance and sustainability of PBF funding

children, support to females in the Maoist Cantonments, including VMLR, for health and reproductive services and

ernment and Maoist Party imposed several restrictions on the rehabilitation of VMLR. These restrictions included imposing a funding ceiling on rehabilitation costs per combatant, restricting the amount of public awareness and sensitization that could be undertaken and limiting access to sites where needs profiling could take place. The PBF's flexibility allowed for the activities and reintegration options to be designed on an ad hoc basis, being tailored according to the most suitable needs on the ground despite the limitations.

PBF funding was not particularly financially catalytic, as donors were widely hesitant to fund the rehabilitation, given the delays between the verification and actual discharge and the highly political nature of the exercise. However, PBF funding filled financial gaps for undertaking these activities. The fund was able to support preparatory activities, training and process, which are typically not associated with tangible outputs and results and thus, albeit critical areas of work,¹⁴⁷ are very difficult to receive funding for. In the case of Nepal, the support for the preparatory activities is seen to have been catalytic in enabling the UN's unprecedented delivery-as-one approach to the type of DDR-related activities undertaken within the UNIRP.

Instead of being hindered financially by the delays in the discharge process, the UN was able to use the UNPFN/PBF funds in a way that "allowed them to plan in a more unified way."¹⁴⁸ It also allowed them to advocate collectively for the early release of the VMLR. By the time the discharge was finally allowed, the foundation already existed for the UN to rapidly prepare and complete the discharge process despite the abrupt and short timeline allotted for the discharge (40 days). Under such conditions and demands, the prepositioning of services, logistics and the UN's joint-effort was critical for the successful completion of the discharge within the 40 days.

According to UNICEF, children's issues are often missed out in DDR-type planning and UNICEF's engagement may only take place once several decisions for the programme have already been made. Therefore, for UNICEF, receiving PBF funding allowed them to participate on a level footing in the early planning of the activities, which also promoted a more coordinated and integrated approach to UNIRP programme.

The CAAFAG Working Group, which UNICEF had previously established in 2006 and was a beneficiary of the PBF support, is widely perceived to have produced several catalytic and sustainable contributions towards peacebuilding. The CAAFAG Network established mechanisms (such as youth clubs, trained psychosocial workers, education and peacebuilding activities) that have become a model for other related and unrelated projects. The network and the mechanisms and facilities it established have brought VMLR and communities together at music events and festivals, cultural events, reconciliation meetings, visits to museums, and visits to local youth clubs. Several VMLR informed the UNIRP implementers that these events were the first time they had been able to positively interact with the communities.

More specifically, according to the UNIRP review conducted in February 2011, the above activities were observed to have contributed to:

- a) Setting VMLR free from the chain of command;
- b) Changing communities' negative perceptions against those who are "disqualified", especially women, because such interventions are conducted in a way to ensure mutual respect for all;
- c) Making VMLR feel that they are accepted;
- d) Promoting mutual understanding between VMLR and community members through repeated interactions;
- e) Harmonizing highly politicized communities;
- f) Facilitating interpersonal skills of participants; and
- g) Employment of VMLR in some cases by promoting interaction between VMLR and community members.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict [A/63/881-S/2009/304], 11 June 2009, pp.14, 25.

¹⁴⁸ Telephone interview, UNICEF-Nepal, 4 August 2011.

¹⁴⁹ Interagency Programming Mission Report, UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, February 2011, pp.15-16.

The UNIRP review further highlighted that peacebuilding activities creatively acted as an entry point to approach some VMLR who were not enrolled in any of the packages.¹⁵⁰

Finally, the relationship and engagement of the government and Maoist Party with the UN has improved to a degree and it could be argued that the collective, integrated approach of the UN and the positive practices and outcomes of the programmes, to which PBF played an important role, was catalytic in easing and facilitating the relationship between the government, Maoists and UN.

A priority of the PBF is that it provides support in activities that become part of longer term national or development funding. The Nepal Government is reportedly looking at the various structures and components of the PBF-supported discharge of children and adolescent project in order to replicate the components in its National Action Plan for conflict-affected children. Likewise, other UNICEF programmes, including within the UNIRP, have been able to benefit from the CAAFAG mechanism. Another non-DDR-related project, focusing on child labour, will also be drawing lessons from the CAAFAG reintegration programme and use the same structures and replicated mechanisms for vulnerable children. In addition, the government led “Juvenile Justice Coordination Committee” will also be working with CAAFAG established structures, social workers, psychosocial counsellors, to conduct social inquiry and to provide psychosocial support to children in conflict with law.

Sustainability is, however, a particularly challenging issue for DDR-type activities undertaken in Nepal and elsewhere and will be explored further below.

3.5 Challenges and lessons

Despite many of the positive achievements coming from the PBF support, the DDR-related activities themselves faced, and continue to face, several challenges. For starters, several circumstances around the discharge and government and Maoist imposed limitations on the rehabilitation programme created a number of difficulties, which the UN and its implementing partners had to overcome. These include:

- The nature in which the Maoist discharged the VMLR in the first place fostered anger and resentment. For most VMLR, the discharge came as a surprise and was taking place against their will.
- The political agreements considered the VMLR as being “disqualified” from the army. This was despite the many years of service of some combatants, who consequently felt frustrated and betrayed, and which only compounded the already negative stigma associated with the armed group.
- In the first year, the government and Maoist Party imposed tight restrictions on the outreach and communication about the DDR activities, including the issuance of negative press. As a result, the participants and the communities started with a poor perception of the programme as well as having mismatched expectations.
- The government and Maoist Party imposed a funding ceiling on the amount of support an individual VMLR could receive.
- The government and Maoist Party only granted limited access to cantonment sites and other areas, hindering the profiling of needs and stronger market analysis, etc.
- There remains limited national ownership and political buy-in from the Government and the Maoist Party.

These circumstances had several programmatic consequences for UNIRP and its partners. First, only the education option of rehabilitation had a community-matching approach whereby for every two VMLR enrolled in education, one other vulnerable child received the same support. This approach improved the social cohesion between the

¹⁵⁰ Interagency Programming Mission Report, UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, February 2011, p. 15.

