





# A

- A** French Development Agency
- B** Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
- A** Central African Republic
- Central Emergency Response Fund
- Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
- Countering violent extremism
- EU Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
- A** Development Financing Assessments
- Department for International Development
- Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
- A** Development Inclusive dans des Zones d'Accueil (Inclusive Development in Hosting Zones)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- European Development Fund
- B** European Investment Bank
- European Neighbourhood Instrument
- European Union
- EU Trust Fund for Africa
- A** Food and Agriculture Organization
- Financing for Development
- German Federal Foreign Office
- / Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator
- Humanitarian-development-peace nexus
- Humanitarian Response Plan
- A** Inter-Agency Standing Committee
- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
- A** International Council of Voluntary Agencies
- A** International Development Association
- Independent Evaluation Office
- International financing institution
- International Monetary Fund
- A** International Network on Conflict and Fragility
- Integrated national financing frameworks







result-based rather than transformative and able to demonstrate improved results over extended periods of time.

The availability of multi-year flexible humanitarian funding is a secondary concern to immediate absolute funding shortages, which are driving the aggressive prioritisation towards the most acute needs and life-saving interventions, and frustrating aspirations to adopt longer-term approaches.

***The use of funding to create incentives to support priorities and encourage collaborative action across the nexus is yet to be explored.***

In the case-study countries where Collective Outcomes have been developed - CAR, Chad, DRC and Ukraine - funding and financing (15)

The following recommendations address these fundamental conceptual and operational issues at both the global and country level. They also sug



and needs-based approaches. Donors should continue to provide practical technical support for the coordination functions of government actors.

**2. *Develop financing strategies to ensure policy coherence, sequencing and the identification of responsibilities.*** Financing strategies are an important tool in aligning the support required to deliver results. They should be used to map funding and financing against agreed priorities, and to develop a sequenced timeline and division of labour for different types of financing and actors. They should also be used as a tool to promote dialogue across key stakeholders in the domestic, international, public and private sectors to identify spending and policy reform priorities, and targets for investments and influence for international actors.

**3. *Create spaces for dialogue on financing to enable policy coherence and for discussion of risks, gaps and the potential to do harm.*** Building on financing strategies and diagnostic work to identify priority areas for investment and reform, ongoing dialogue is required at the country level to ensure that policies are coherent and major risks, gaps and the potential to do harm are not overlooked. The

dialogue should include major development financing actors, such as IFIs engaged in economic and fiscal reforms, and key coordinators with oversight of vulnerability, needs, protection concerns and contextual risks.

**4. *Use funding to incentivise collaborative approaches and bring successful programming to scale.*** When priorities are identified at the country level, financing should be mobilised to support these at scale through pooled funding mechanisms, multi-donor support for programmes and implementing consortia. Opportunities to link the reforms proposed under the new UN Funding Compact, including the commitment to increase contributions to pooled funds, should be identified to improve the UN system's response to programming and its ability to work effectively across the nexus.

**5. *Invest in institutional capabilities to design and deliver better programming.*** Donor capacity to invest is impeded by a limited pipeline of quality fundable programmes. The capacity of staff at the country level to design and deliver transformative programmes appears to be a key impediment, and implementing stakeholders need to make substantial investments in this area.

“The nexus” has emerged as a major focus of policy debate in the years since the UN Secretary General’s 2015 report for the World Humanitarian Summit, which made the case for humanitarian, development and other actors to find new ways of working to overcome long-standing systemic dysfunctions.<sup>1</sup> The report established a new set of commitments to reduce humanitarian need, risk and vulnerability, and envisaged moving beyond project-based official development assistance (ODA) funding approaches to deliver transformative outcomes at scale (UN, 2015a).

Under the new policy agenda, formalised in the Agenda for Humanity and the Commitment to Action, humanitarian and development actors are expected to mobilise behind a shared analysis, problem statement and set of “strategic, clear, quantifiable and measurable” Collective Outcomes. The UN also established the Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration (JSC) to deliver a New Way of Working (NWOW) “over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors towards collective outcomes”.<sup>2</sup>

The tone and content of the Secretary General’s report and subsequent policy frameworks reflect a growing policy consensus, which recognises the need to place addressing the root causes of vulnerability and risk at the centre of decision makers’ priorities.<sup>3</sup> This is most notably articulated in the bold commitments of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to “leave no one behind” and “reach the furthest behind first” (UN, 2015b). Its explicit acknowledgement of the structural barriers to sustainable development – including climate change and environmental degradation, peace and security, inequality and exclusion – brings risk and vulnerability to the heart of the development agenda and compels development actors to engage in the most difficult places to reach the most vulnerable people.

The critical enabling role of financing is highlighted in many of these policy frameworks and commitments, not only as a resource but also as a strategic tool to incentivise change and desirable behaviours and to catalyse further investment.<sup>4</sup> The potential for financing to support nexus approaches has, however, only recently been considered beyond the

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- 5 Funding for peacebuilding suffers many familiar challenges in securing adequate predictable and flexible funding to support longer-term programming. For example a 2018 independent review of UN agency, funds and programme

Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and had established a 2018 to 2020 roadmap for its implementation. Cameroon, CAR and Ukraine had also completed EU, World Bank and UN recovery and peacebuilding assessments.

The country case studies provide the core evidence behind the key findings and recommendations. Complementary documentary research and analysis of major public and private financing flows, which could in principle contribute to addressing humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding challenges, was also conducted to support the country-level analysis. These elements were supplemented by a series of global-policy level interviews, a review of global policy-level literature and a feedback session convened by the EU in Geneva attended by 22 donors.

Given that the findings draw primarily on five very distinct country case studies, they cannot be said to apply to all settings. The particularity of contexts and approaches is emphasised throughout the document. The authors also acknowledge that many other instructive examples exist that were not included in this study, which should be considered a contribution to an emerging body of

This study was conducted at a relatively early stage of practical application of nexus aspirations, and many fundamental conceptual and practical challenges are yet to be worked out. Thinking on the scope of the nexus at global-policy level has leapfrogged the guidance under which country-level actors are working, most notably to include peacebuilding. This expanded scope has yet to be formalised in policy and practice across institutions or at the country level. As such, funding for peacebuilding was not a prominent feature of discussion in most of the case study countries, with the exception of DRC.

The findings also address a range of issues well beyond financing flows and instruments. They touch on many fundamental aspects of political economy, interests and incentives, institutional cultures, structures and capacities, and policy and programming paradigms. The first two sections focus on conceptual and implementation challenges for actors at the country level and identify emerging good practices. The remaining sections focus on the funding and financing situation.

## 2

There was widespread support among those consulted in each of the case studies for the concept of working collaboratively toward shared priorities in principle. In reality, however, there are divergences of opinion on the scope and purpose of nexus approaches. There are also differences in very practical terms. There may, for example, be

several distinct geographic and contextual nexus scenarios in a single country.

***There are two fundamentally different schools of thought on the scope and ambitions of nexus approaches.***

The first focusses typically on problems and actions within the scope of humanitarian and development programming solutions, and emphasises the need for adequate coordination and transition of actions and caseloads from humanitarian actors.<sup>8</sup> This narrower double-nexus interpretation is consistent with the language of



**Figure 1: Comparison of RCBA priorities and Collective Outcomes across the case study countries**

	BA	
Chad	N/A	<p>Reduce the number of people in severe food insecurity by 27 per cent from a million to 770,000 people by 2019</p> <p>Reduce the number of people in food insecurity by 32 per cent from 2.8 million to 1.9 million by 2019</p> <p>Reduce the rate of severe acute malnutrition among children aged five and under from 2.6 to 1.8 per cent by 2019</p> <p>Reduce the rate of gl.6m.3ISD to 6 to 5 (r)-(e)-(c(r c)-11ov my 5(2-22(6 t)fi)6-(t)-21</p>

struggling to adopt a different way of operating.<sup>11</sup>  
Activities deemed to support the de facto au-  
thorities in non-government-controlled areas of



most likely to offer safe returns on investments to decrease poverty, precluding them from unstable areas with humanitarian needs. Some in Cameroon felt unable to operate amid the active conflict in the North West and South West regions without risk of causing harm. Some in Ukraine were unable to engage in non-humanitarian programming in non-government-controlled areas because of sanctions.

***The role of governments affected by crises in nexus approaches is currently ambiguous.***

The narrower double-nexus approach abstracts problems to a programmatic level where the role of government is primarily as a technical partner or enabler of access. In the wider triple-nexus approach, government is the central enabler. For development and peacebuilding stakeholders, working in partnership with government is typically a foundational principle, and their planning and priorities are, in theory, developed jointly and aligned. Without clarity on the role of governments in defining and driving nexus priorities, it is difficult for some development and peacebuilding actors to mobilise behind them.

***The absence of government commitment or capacity, and of viable political solutions to conflict, limits aspirations to end needs.***

International efforts to address structural root causes will only have a modest impact at best without an enabling political environment. For example, despite high-level agreement on col-

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effectively curated and reliable evidence base. There are gaps in evidence on risk and vulnerability, and between evidence on humanitarian needs and economic and social indicators.

There are some positive examples of investments in generating a shared evidence-base. The International Organization f-



Development actors, in contrast, face disincentives to coordinate. Coordination on the whole is not funded and significant antipathy was expressed toward the added burden of coordinating, and scepticism was expressed about the return on investment. National authorities tend to lead the coordination of development work, which means that if governance is weak so is coordination. For development partners and agencies, cultivating close bilateral relationships with government is of greater value in negotiating permission to implement and gaining influence for their respective governments than participating in collective processes. Development actors have a range of compelling reasons to limit their participation in coordination and not to allocate resources in support of a collectively agreed plan.<sup>16</sup>

This is a significant barrier to “working collaboratively towards shared objectives across the nexus”, particularly considering the relative importance of bilateral donors, who provide 77 per cent of development funding in fragile settings, programming directly or bilaterally with governments, compared with 88 per cent of humanitarian funding channelled via the multilateral system (OECD, 2019b).

Recovery and resilience fall between coordination systems. Humanitarian clusters often end up coordinating some of these activities even if they are not included in HRPs, because they are frequently the best platforms for information sharing and joint planning. Some UNDAFs have included recovery, resilience and social cohesion activities, but in practice a large proportion of such activities take place outside the UN system. In Cameroon, for example, there are a number of area-based resilience consortia funded by the EU and the French Development Agency (AFD). They are not included in cluster coordination or government-led sectoral mechanisms. In Ukraine, there are substantial funds flowing from bilateral donors to private contractors for

resilience, community development and social cohesion activities, on which coordinating actors have very little visibility.

Across the various humanitarian and development coordination structures and forums, there is also no obvious place for debate around financing policy coherence and the risk of doing harm.

***Opportunities for coordination are influenced by donors’ political and financial commitment and presence in country.***

Among the case study countries, the levels of interest and engagement from bilateral development partners was variable. Major development partners including the EU, EU member states and the US, have significant strategic interest in peace and stability in Ukraine and the wider region, and they are actively present and engaged in the country. The presence of bilateral development partners was far more limited in the four African case study countries. Many shared representation from neighbouring countries or their capitals. In Cameroon, a number of key donors have suspended their bilateral aid programmes in recent years. Ownership and alignment are likely to be far more challenging to secure if partners are not present and engaged regularly in the development of shared priorities.

***Competition for resources, profile and protecting mandates run counter to nexus aspirations to work collaboratively and according to comparative advantage.***

Competition for resources among UN agencies, private contractors and NGOs was often noted as the motivation for practices which undermined collaborative approaches. Some went as far as to

16 It is worth noting however, that msout-30(t)-1(Td( )TwgEh)-6(r)-43ph4(o)2 t -6(6(o)2n)-2(t m9(t)-o)2c-og hatirtwoatTd( 0(h)-6(a)-)2 ofeg 1

suggest that joint UN programmes were vehicles to better compete for resources and were joint in name only. NGOs' reluctance to share information was also noted as problematic, particularly in settings such as Cameroon and Ukraine where resources are limited. In Cameroon, the highly constrained humanitarian funding environment meant that some NGOs felt there was simply no point in participating in the HRP process since there was no realistic prospect of receiving funding.

***There are promising examples of alternative approaches to coordination.***

RPBAs often assess the existing coordination architecture and propose the creation of dedicated institutional forums to steer and monitor implementation. CAR's RPBA, for example, is supported by a permanent secretariat under the Ministry of Planning that has seconded international staff, holds sectoral coordination meetings and is responsible for monitoring international assistance. The secretariat also tracks development and humanitarian funding and is to establish a database of development expenditure broken down by region and sector (CAR Case study – Culbert, 2019a).<sup>17</sup>

Ukraine's RPBA envisaged an intragovernmental coordination structure that "could also oversee the RPBA financing strategy, including resource mobilization" (World Bank, 2015). This became the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons (MTOT) in 2016. Development partners have provided targeted support for MTOT. The World Bank trust fund, for example, provides financial and technical support for its coordination functions, including the development of a data platform that captures information on coverage of activities and funding. The UK has also seconded technical staff to the fund (Ukraine Case study – Poole, 2019a). Uganda's CRRF also includes a steering group and a secretariat charged with providing it with technical coordination and monitoring support.

There are limitations to the functionality of each of these structures and mechanisms, and returns on financial and capacity investments are unlikely to be substantial in the short-term. In practice, MTOT has far fewer staff, resources and influence than other more established ministries (Ukraine Case study – Poole, 2019a). In CAR, the RPBA secretariat rarely convened coordination meetings and its funding tracking tool remains of limited functionality (CAR Case study – Culbert, 2019a). Supporting government capacity is, however, a key priority for many development partners to ensure effective leadership, coordination, buy-in and sustainability.

A promising new approach to coordination is being trialled in DRC. A nexus expert has been deployed in the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC)'s office and has helped to establish working groups and a roadmap for implementation that includes developing a common understanding of objectives. The expert's responsibilities also include the softer coordination elements of building relationships and buy-in with stakeholders including government, bilateral and multilateral donors, UN agencies and NGOs. The DRC approach is also notable in convening working groups at the regional level and in their intention to have decentralised support structures for information management, analysis and coordination (DRC Case study – Culbert, 2019b).

***There are many positive examples of thematic, sectoral and area-based nexus approaches that offer lessons and the potential for scaling up.***

Many country-level actors said they found nexus

In DRC, for example, FAO and WFP have developed a joint resilience, peace and stabilisation programme, which includes agriculture, livelihoods, basic service provision and social cohesion activities. The programme started in 2016 and has received US\$ 80 million in funding. The programme is now moving toward a second cycle of implementation and scale up, including bringing onboard UNICEF to support basic service provision. Existing donors have committed to support a second round of funding, and a range of new prospective development partners are considering supporting scale-up of the programme.

DRC has also taken a sub-national approach to developing Collective Outcomes. The three provinces selected are currently experimenting with triple-nexus pilot programmes in which pairs of UN agencies have been selected in specific thematic areas to implement the NWOW, collecting lessons learnt and best practices along the way. The first phase of the pilots focuses on establishing the necessary methodologies and mechanisms in priority areas of each province and working with existing initiatives. The second phase is expected to involve the scaling up of activities with support from donors (DRC Case study - Culbert, 2019c).

***Nexus approaches at country-level suffer from a lack of clear leadership, as well as limited participation and buy-in.***

In countries where a higher proportion of ODA flows through the multilateral system and NGOs, a UN-led process is likely to have significant influence. In CAR, for example, 58 per cent of ODA flowed through multilateral actors and NGOs between 2015 and 2017. In countries where a significant proportion of ODA flows directly to government and is executed directly by donors and/or private contractors, there may be little appetite from these actors to participate in a UN-led prioritisation and planning process. In Cameroon, for example, 62 per cent of ODA flowed direct to the public sector between 2015 and 2017 and just 16 per cent to multilateral organisations and NGOs. The UN and its partners have far more limited influence in the country as a result.

Leadership of the Collective Outcomes process was noted as problematic. Actors in Ukraine

never officially signed off by the UN or the government. RPBA's, in contrast, had far greater participation in analysis and prioritisation beyond





Four qualitative changes relevant to the nexus were observed:

**1** *Nexus coherence within donor institutions.*

Individual donor institutions typically have well-developed internal policies supported by coherent logic that link programming across the humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding domains. Major development partners often described layering their internal funding instruments to achieve a degree of flexibility and coherence across a range of humanitarian, transitional, stabilisation and development priorities.

Some development partners in Ukraine have been able to adapt their existing programme portfolios to meet broader humanitarian, recovery, peacebuilding and development needs as the situation changed after 2014, drawing on a range of instruments (see boxes 2 and 3).

Many donors cited examples of achieving a degree of operational continuity across their separate

instruments at the country level by referring partners across instruments to help facilitate transitions from humanitarian to medium-term objectives. Chad's Programme for Inclusive Development in Reception Areas (DIZA) was developed by the EU with design input from ECHO NGO partners to use EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) funds for longer-term programming for displaced and host populations. It is a primary focus of cooperation between the EU's Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), ECHO and AFD (Chad Case study – Culbert, 2018).

**2** *Increased engagement of international financial institutions (IFIs), including through budget support.*

Multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are emerging as key actors in a number of settings with substantial resources and influence.

Direct budget support – both loans and grants - has increased significantly in some cases, particularly with the engagement of IMF and

Within the policy framework of the EU's Joint Humanitarian Development Framework for Ukraine 2017-2020, the EU:

- Provides funding for short-term humanitarian needs, particularly in non-government controlled areas and along the contact line, through the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO)
- Provides stabilisation and early-recovery funding for activities including humanitarian demining, observance of human rights,

income generation, social cohesion and strengthening local governance systems through its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

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the increased engagement of the World Bank and regional institutions such as the African Development Bank. For example, ODA to Cameroon grew significantly from \$0.3 million in 2016 to \$392 million in 2017, including \$282 million from IMF (Cameroon Case study – Poole, 2019b). Budget support to CAR increased from less than \$500,000 in 2013 to \$73 million in 2014, rising to \$104 million in 2017 (CAR Case study – Culbert, 2019a). Ukraine agreed a new 14-month refinancing package worth \$3.9 billion

with the IMF in December 2018 to support a range of fiscal stabilisation measures and reforms (Ukraine Case study – Poole, 2019a).<sup>18</sup> IFIs have also significantly scaled up their engagement in Chad since 2014 (Chad Case study – Poole, 2019a).

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funds were established to support state-building and stabilisation objectives at major moments of political opportunity in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan.

Multi-donor funds were not a prominent feature of the funding landscape in the country case studies, and there was limited appetite from donors to invest in their creation. In Ukraine, the conventional steps of a joint RPBA, a funding pledging conference and the establishment of a multi-partner trust fund were followed. Separate World Bank and UN windows were created, and activities were expected to include financing for infrastructure and social services, economic recovery, social resilience, peacebuilding and community security. Government approval proved protracted, however, and no contributions were made to the UN window, which has remained dormant. Contributions to the World Bank window were small and focussed on investing in government-led coordination capacity rather than large-scale recovery and peacebuilding programming. In Cameroon and Chad there are no dedicated financing instruments and no interest from major donors in creating them.

It is difficult to assess from these limited examples whether the lack of interest in new country-level financing instruments represents a wider pattern or trend. It is clear, however, that without sufficient donor interest and financial support, the return on investment and added value of country-level financing instruments is questionable.

Financing instruments and programmatic collaboration that support nexus approaches or priorities in the case-study countries have tended to be ad hoc experiments and adaptations driven from the country level or tailored to specific challenges. They often provide a centre of gravity for coordinated approaches and in some cases important leverage on key issues. They may also offer lessons and opportunities for scale-up. The Bekou Fund is the most active funding instrument of scale addressing early recovery in CAR, including in areas outside direct government control, and has succeeded in engaging the government in oversight and harmonising the approaches of various contributing donors.

The funding secured through the IDA Refugee and Host Communities sub-window for eastern Cameroon is significant and has enabled the World Bank to develop new programming approaches at scale. It has engaged both the government and UN agencies in programme design and implementation, and laid the foundations for a transition from humanitarian interventions to recovery, development and durable solutions for refugees. The volume of funds involved has also provided the World Bank with leverage to secure commitment from the government to put a protection framework in place that would in principle guard against future refoulement (Cameroon Case study – Poole, 2019b). There are many other examples across the case-study countries of smaller scale area, agency and issue-based collaborations, including large-scale joint programming by UN agencies and NGO consortia on thematic issues such as resilience and social cohesion.

Most of these instruments and programmatic collaborations do not currently operate at national scale and do not necessarily align with or support collectively agreed priorities. Given the apparently limited appetite to create new national-level instruments, international actors may have to accept and work with ad hoc area and issue-based instruments and collaborations. Efforts to influence and align existing instruments with new collectively agreed national-level priorities are also likely to be difficult. In CAR, for example, there is a proliferation of country-level instruments with various pooled funds, which many felt were not well coordinated. Efforts to streamline and align them under the RPBA framework have had little impact in practice.



• The number of donors that provide multi-year humanitarian funding has increased since the establishment of the Grand Bargain commit-



crises sits alongside a range of other priorities and interests, and there is a risk of humanitarian concerns being minimised. In Ukraine, for example, there is currently no indication of a political solution to the crisis, which means a









There is significant political support and goodwill across all levels of the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding constituencies towards the aspiration to work more collaboratively to reduce needs and vulnerability during and after crises. How the nexus will work in practice, however, remains far from clear. Funding and financing tools, instruments, policies and approaches have not yet had time to adapt to this new policy agenda and findings on the current status of financing across the nexus represent the baseline. This is an opportune moment to consider the strategic role financing should play, not just as a source of funding for projects and programmes, but rather as tool to enable and incentivise behaviour and outcomes across the nexus.

Recommendations focus primarily on the role of financing. In order to reach a clear set of priorities

collaborations for specific problems or locations are appropriate. In this case, support should emphasise fostering and incentivising collaboration and complementarity, and supporting the scale-up of initiatives that demonstrate results.

If separate planning and prioritisation are required, their purpose and added value should be clearly defined, responsibilities assigned, and resources provided. Country teams require specific technical support to develop coherent nexus approaches, particularly in developing financing strategies.

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New instruments are being mooted and trialled that have the potential to mobilise private investment, including remittances and Islamic social financing for large-scale programming and financing needs. These experiments should be adapted and prioritised for testing and scaling up in crisis-affected settings.



## 1

Country-level actors who lead prioritisation processes and coordination efforts have limited influence and tools to mobilise resources and stakeholders behind collectively agreed priorities. Investments should be made in reducing some of the barriers to a more coordinated response at a very practical level.

Shared analysis is a key enabler of collaborative approaches. Investing in a robust and comprehensive evidence base, including evidence on vulnerability and risk, will help to ensure that prioritisation is based on a common understanding. Evidence requirements and the most appropriate systems and actors vary by context. They may be a combination of independent actors, those within the multilateral system and governments.

The workload associated with coordination across the nexus is largely unfunded outside the humanitarian community. Investments in gathering information, including on who is doing and funding what and where, and the identification of geographic, sectoral and temporal gaps, would help to improve evidence-based decision making and rational coverage of priorities. Investing in practical day-to-day coordination work would also help to reduce the transaction costs for individual participants. This includes relationship building, communication and information sharing.

Among international actors, RCO is the logical site for investment in information management and coordination across the nexus. It should play a greater role in monitoring gaps and risks, including the risk of doing harm, and do more to advocate for principled and needs-based approaches. Donors should also continue to provide practical support for government actors' coordination functions at the national and sub-national levels.

Mechanisms to identify and advocate for the coverage of gaps between humanitarian and development planning and coordination systems represent an outstanding challenge. There may be opportunities to use existing investments in the cluster system, which is already adapting to medium-term programming, and in technical working groups to flag up gaps and challenges pending agreement on the most appropriate coordination and monitoring mechanisms for nexus approaches.<sup>25</sup>

## 2

Financing strategies are an important tool in aligning the support required to deliver results. They should be used to map funding and financing against agreed priorities, and to develop a sequenced timeline and division of labour for different types of financing and actors. Embarking on a financing strategy can be a useful means of facilitating dialogue across the domestic, international, public and private sectors to identify spending and policy reform priorities, and targets for investments and influence for international actors. Even in situations of ongoing conflict and humanitarian needs in which institutional resources and capacity are highly constrained, it is possible to agree a strategic and coherent approach to linking financing that goes far beyond resource mobilisation.


25 In Ukraine, the early recovery cluster was folded into the food security and livelihoods cluster in 2018, and the WASH cluster increasingly focusses on infrastructure.

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Building on financing strategies and diagnostic work to identify priority areas for investment and reform, spaces for ongoing dialogue are required at the country level to ensure that policies are coherent and that major risks, gaps and the potential to do harm are not overlooked. The most appropriate configuration of actors will vary according to context, but should include major development financing actors, such as IFIs engaged in eco-

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Many examples were cited of donors adapting their institutional rules and funding windows to achieve coherent, sequenced and consistent financing.

There are a number of ongoing initiatives to increase coordination between donors, promote transition between humanitarian and development windows and increase multi-year contracts in Chad. They include:

- **ECHO** plans to extend its timeframe for contracts to 24 months. It will also be possible to combine funds between two subsequent Humanitarian Implementation Plans in a single contract. This is a global change that could have a significant impact in Chad, which has the largest ECHO portfolio in Central and West Africa.
- **DIZA** programme is a leading example in Chad of humanitarian and development partners working to achieve a smooth transition through nexus modalities. It was designed by the EU with ECHO's assistance, based partially on the work of previous ECHO NGO partners working with displaced people and host populations in the east and south of the country. The DIZA funding channel through EUTF is structured to allow for a shorter inception phase than standard EU/DEVCO channels.
- **PARCA**. The World Bank has designed its support project for refugees and host communities (PARCA) to broadly reflect the DIZA programme. PARCA will be implemented by the Chadian government, but it was initially developed with

significant UNHCR input. Activities are similar across the two projects.

- **MRI** is a standardised administrative process that allows donors to move funds between their respective agencies. It means that one lead donor is able to take the lead on a project without the need for various layers of contracts. MRI was initially developed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), AFD and the German development bank KfW. The EU has since undertaken a similar process, and GIZ has started to work on joining the network. AFD also plans to use the mechanism to support DIZA, extending the implementation period from three to five years.

A number of major development donors - notably France, the World Bank and the EU - have undertaken a range of measures to adapt their engagement to the changing situation in Cameroon, recognising growing fragility and the need to target crisis-affected areas, and drawing on global-level instruments to leverage additional funding for them.



The World Bank Group's Systematic Country

EUTF for Africa was launched at the Valetta Summit on Migration in November 2015 with a primary focus on coordinating responses to “the diverse causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement”.

It currently funds a total of €40.3 million across four projects in Cameroon, of which €20 million is focussed on resilience activities, €17 million on economic and employment opportunities and €3.3 million on improved migration management. Projects include:

€10 million channelled through AFD to expand its pilot programme with PNDP’s intensive public works programme in 11 Far North communes from September 2016 to June 2019.

€7 million to GIZ for resilience programming in Adamawa, North and Far North between September 2016 and December 2019. GIZ’s

programme targets 5,000 “vulnerable youth” with cash-for-work activities, training and start-up livelihood activities through a range of partners, including international and national NGOs.

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The full study, including country specific reports, is available here:

[www.nrc.no](http://www.nrc.no)

[www.fao.org](http://www.fao.org)

[www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org)

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