

Florence Keen: <u>florencek@rusi.org</u>



Who is RUSI?

Royal United Services Institute, founded in 1831 Offices in London, Brussels and Nairobi Centre for Financial Crime & Security Studies, founded in 2014



- Financial Crime Policy; public-private partnership; info-sharing
- Financial Crime 2.0; threats/opportunities of new tech; virtual currencies Finance/FININT against threats: terrorism; organized crime; proliferation; IWT; human trafficking
- Sanctions



Outline of the session



A nexus between international terrorism and organized crime: how did we get here?

"Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials..."

Tools to combat TF built into international

standards against money laundering

"...terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime, including

from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, and artefacts and from the illicit trade in natural resources including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal and oil, kidnapping for ransom extortion and bank robbery..."



How did we get here? (continued)

which encouraged FATF and FSRBs to include an analysis of financial flows associated with trafficking in persons that finances terrorism as part of its ongoing work, in close cooperation with CTED, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and with UNODC

called on all countries to "shut down all alternative sources of financing of terrorism, including dismantling the possible connections between terrorism and organized crime, such as through human trafficking", and based on this for



Defining the nexus: the academic debate

Inside Terrorism: should distinguish between terrorists and ordinary criminals, who are driven by material gain – not influence public opinion *The Crime-Terror Continuum* described alliances, motivations, convergence and the 'black hole' syndrome *Methods and Motives:* described a terror-crime interaction spectrum, including appropriation, nexus, symbiosis, hybrid and transformation *Terrorism, Crime and Transformation:* TOs have transformed into TCOs who are more interested in profit. TOs and TCOs do not cooperate on shared interests, but utilise in-house capabilities to undertake criminal/political acts



Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime in Sahel: demonstration of a symbiotic relationship based upon time and space – as opposed to real convergence

Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: a convergence of social networks, with recruits drawn from the same pools. Highlight the radicalisation process, role of prisons, skills and experiences and petty criminality

Viewing Organised Crime and Terrorist Organisations through Financial Threats when viewed through a financial lens, there is no meaningful difference in distinguishing between the groups, as so many have gone through convergence and transformation

Overhyping the Relationship: based upon confirmation bias analysts looking for a relationship will invariably find one. For criminal organizations, terrorists are more of a complication than an opportunity



Terrorist Finance: Criminal Methods

al	Methods	5			

 PIRA MAFIA FARC	ISIS AL SHABAAB ABU SAYYAF LTTE	AL QAEDA CORE		
 ORGANISED CRIME; SOME STATE SUPPORT	COMMODITIES TAX; KIDNAP DIASPORA (DONATIONS/ EXTORTION)	CHARITIES DONATIONS FORMAL BANKS	LEGITIMATE FUNDS; BENEFITS PETTY CRIME (MSB TRANSFER)	LEGITIMATE FUNDS; BENEFITS PETTY CRIME
 AML STRATEGIES; LEA ACTION; SANCTIONS	CLOSE MKTS; ISOLATE; KINETIC; SANCTIONS(?)	UNSCRs ASSET FREEZES	INTELLIGENCE- LED; NETWORK ANALYSIS	INTELLIGENCE- LED; NETWORK ANALYSIS



Relevance of the nexus: context dependent



Continued...

Disrupting operations via strategic prosecutions that target both, to ensure that

– e.g. in the case of ISIL, the group exploited its population and the resources under its control. Whilst this was 'criminal', identifying this as a nexus provided little disruption opportunity (other than kinetic!)

Occasions where , for example, IWT and terrorism in East Africa, or the purported use of virtual currencies by terrorist actors.

How do jurisdictions weigh risks versus realities?



The way forward



Thank you!

Florence Keen: <u>florencek@rusi.org</u> +447948537390

