



INTRODUCTION



- ISS provides training to law enforcement and security agencies; and mentors explosives and CBRN investigators – supported by the International Association for Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI)
- This evidence come directly from law enforcement/security personnel (first responders, CT investigators, specialised units). Post-training closed platform.
- Data from 18 countries: East Africa, the Horn, West Africa, the Sahel Many have dealt with attacks on civilian targets such as airports, hotels, cafes as well as softer targets such as community market places; roadside attacks
- Data was initially intended to help towards development of training programmes, but we are documenting this to share with governments, and might be able to publish some of it in 2018
- A main question for ISS: why are there so few prosecutions?



Securing Sites: Procedural Measures for Security and Capacity for Implementation


Management and maintenance of security regimes is a continuing challenge – even for targets such as airports

Consistency of implementation of security measures is questioned, often due to limited institutional capacity to implement established protocols

Weaknesses believed to be management level

Senior security official responsible for airport security – views on basic security protocols e.g. rotation of staff, differ vastly from those that are implemented

ONGOING CHALLENGES



Training and Equipping:

Notwithstanding significant and ongoing investment by countries and international actors in equipping and training security and law enforcement personnel

Specialised capacity relating to explosives, investigate incidents involving explosives (as well as CBRN materials) – very limited generally

Personnel like being in international training (nice venues, food, per diems, etc.)

Complaints:

Trainers have limited understanding of local context; they are intent on exporting measures from their own countries rather than engaging with local realities

Little coherence of methodologies used by training providers (different providers do different things) – ongoing complaints it is not practical enough


Accounts continue of: equipment dumping of old or sub-standard equipment; equipment that local staff are not capable of using and maintaining

Training disconnected from their own career development, no competency assessments done at training, little attention to them as individuals

Training provision is not planned to be ongoing, or connected to other courses – this is dangerous- bomb techs need ongoing upgrading of training


Training content – limited mainstreaming of human rights requirements

ONGOING CHALLENGES



Corruption: Continues to be a facilitating factor

Multiple stories of how various forms of corruption have



Bomb Data Centres being implemented at the national level in the Horn of Africa – several countries have already committed. This will enable the standardized documentation of incidents, devices used etc. Has the potential for sharing regionally; support planning efforts if done well.

Regional Intergovernmental Institutions (e.g. East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation - (EAPCCO)) taking up leadership role to engage states in greater cooperation – on multiple levels: standardized training and competency assessments; intelligence cooperation; joint field training exercises.

Increasing evidence of more practical approaches to training; greater cooperation amongst training service providers; transnational cooperation on training; etc.