51吃瓜

2021 marks the 20th anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. As part of the year of commemoration, CTED experts reflect on their work.

Jean-Philippe Morange, Senior Legal Officer at the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), coordinates a small team of professionals that work on border security, small arms trafficking, and law enforcement issues. Mr Morange joined the 51吃瓜 in 2000 and joined CTED in 2005. This interview was conducted in English and French and has been edited for brevity.

Mr. Morange: When I joined the 51吃瓜 more than 21 years ago I joined a commission that was in charge of controlling weapons of mass destruction activities in Iraq. That work was essentially about monitoring. It was a great experience. But also, as you know, Member States and the Security Council had different opinions on those issues. Joining CTED brought me into a different context, I would say, and also brought a change of perspective. At that moment, States were closely engaged in discussions on counter-terrorism. I moved from an experience in a context of extreme tension, to one that demonstrated the capacity of this institution to mobilize itself towards a common objective that was also focused on peace and security.

How long have you been working at CTED?

Mr. Morange: I joined CTED in June 2005. So it has been a long, interesting, 16-year journey, during which we’ve seen the international community face up to the terrorist challenge in different ways (because it has been a permanent and evolving threat). Of course we’ve lived through a number of tragic events that have impacted the peace and security agenda. But the reaction of the international community has been very positive, in terms of its collective effort and its decisions over this 16-year period.

What is border management and law enforcement? And why did the Security Council include it in its resolutions dealing with countering terrorism?

Mr. Morange: Actually, this was a critical element. As you know, resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted in the aftermath of the “9/11” attacks, and the investigation of those attacks led to the conclusion that some terrorist suspects at that time had crossed borders undetected and had obtained certain identity documents without being properly identified on the basis of their background or criminal activities. So, resolution 1373 (2001) (we call it the “mother” of all our guiding resolutions) really set up the key principles for preventing terrorist mobility, making sure that States were issuing secure documents; making sure that you have proper immigration controls; that no criminal can abuse certain statuses (including refugee status); making sure you have proper internal coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies; that they work together and also share relevant information with counterparts abroad and via resources such as INTERPOL. Of course, international terrorism has seen a considerable evolution, from the activities of Al-Qaida, to those of ISIL, to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon and the issue of FTF returnees. 

It was very important in that context for the Security Council to develop more detailed language on certain topics such as advance passenger information. Council resolution 2178 (2014) - which is a very important resolution – made the use of API mandatory. Then came resolution 2322 (2016), which was the first to call for the sharing of information (including biometric information) with frontline officers, Again, the context of FTFs is essential to understanding all these new requirements. It’s about making sure that people at the frontlines have access to pertinent information about certain suspects. Later, in response to the development of new types of attack, the Council adopted resolution 2341 (2017) on critical infrastructure protection. This was also very important, because we had seen an evolution in terms of terrorist organizations’ methods of operation and objectives. They were able to focus on new types of target, such as airports, trains, and underground railways. 

Council resolution 2396 (2017) is another very important resolution that brings into play elements such as the use of Passenger Name Records, which is very important to accessing the personal data of passengers and the use of a risk-based approach and criteria to detect terrorist suspects and international criminals. The resolution also included a provision on watch-listing, which is not an easy thing to put in place but is very important to preventing terrorist suspects from travelling to conflict zones. It also included important provisions on the responsible use of biometrics, which brings a number of challenges but is very important to ensuring that people actually are who they claim to be. This has been very important to ensuring that Member States fulfil certain required obligations and ensure that terrorists can’t travel undetected to perpetrate terrorist attacks. In its resolution 2396 (2017), the Council also focused on the protection of vulnerable and “soft” targets, following the deadly attacks in Paris, Manchester, Barcelona, Munich and Baghdad. Because of the complexity of the topics involved, the Council also issued the 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles on stemming the flow of FTFs, which added another layer for Member States in implementing the relevant Council resolutions. The Madrid Guiding Principles were developed in the context of the FTF threat, based on certain new Council resolutions (mainly resolution 2178 (2014)), but were also a response to the urgency of the phenomenon. 

How have border management and law enforcement (BMLE) requirements evolved over time?

Mr. Morange: It has evolved from resolution 1373 (2001) and its fundamental principles into a highly detailed series of counter-terrorism resolutions and requirements. It has also included the work developed by our key partner organizations (including WCO, ICAO, IMO, INTERPOL). The Security Council supports the work of those organizations, all of which have developed key standards and recommended practices. In the area of civil aviation, for example, ICAO has developed its Global Aviation Security Plan, as well as a number of other measures (including API/PNR standards, and so forth), which include a number of detailed technical elements regarding types of data, as well as data-sharing, retention, and deletion. Safeguards are also included to prevent misuse or abuse. So we have evolved from “You must prevent terrorists’ mobility” towards more specific measures involving, for example, the technical format for the transmission of standardized and readable data that can be processed in a couple of seconds by the relevant national authority. This evolution has also required CTED to significantly enhance its knowledge and expertise in conducting assessments on the ground and engaging with experts in their field. There are multiple fields of expertise in the realm of BMLE. 

Resolution 1373 (2001) (we call it the “mother” of all our guiding resolutions) really set up the key principles for preventing terrorist mobility, making sure that States were issuing secure documents; making sure that you have proper immigration controls; that no criminal can abuse certain statuses (including refugee status); making sure you have proper internal coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies; that they work together and also share relevant information with counterparts abroad and via resources such as INTERPOL.

What progress has been achieved? Do you feel the work you've done to promote border management and law enforcement, over the past 16 years has made an impact?

Mr. Morange: Ultimately, I think we have made the life of terrorist organizations and their movements much more difficult. And the evolution of their attacks demonstrates that. They were no longer able to attack certain critical infrastructure sites, for example, so they decided to carry out attacks in the street with a truck or using a suicide bomber in the middle of a Christmas market. This reflected their desperation, to a certain extent. It also shows that they’re having difficulties in achieving the same objectives that they achieved in the past. In countering terrorism, you must first try to prevent devastating attacks. And this is always challenging for BMLE agencies. So, I would say, yes, a great deal has been achieved. We’ve worked with Member States and we’ve learned about their tragic experiences. Of course, we’ve received directions from the Security Council in terms of our priorities, and we work closely with Member States and with our partners, such as UNOCT and other relevant UN counter-terrorism and BMLE entities, in our work. The increased use of security features on passports makes the identification of travellers and authentication of their documents more effective and also make travel safer for the general population. Border management and law enforcement officials are on the frontlines to prevent and also to investigate these terrorist attacks. So I would say that we’ve achieved a lot. But of course you still have those who want to express themselves through violence and find new ways to do it. It’s the old question of the sword and the shield. 

Do you have a favourite success story or a moment that stands out from the last 16 years that you'd like to share?

Mr. Morange: Let me first give a little bit more explanation about the positions I’ve held in CTED: I worked for half of my time as a Desk Officer for a geographic Section, focusing on a region that suffered from a number of terrorist attacks. It's always difficult to talk about “success stories” when you speak about counter-terrorism, because we’ve seen so many tragedies. But I do I recall, as a Desk Officer, the relatively low level of implementation of INTERPOL tools in most of the countries I visited more than 10 years ago. A great deal has been achieved since then. It is a success story to see INTERPOL tools now being made available at the frontlines, airports, and land borders. 

To give a more specific example: at the height of the FTF phenomenon, we visited a Member State from which many young FTFs had travelled to the conflict zones. And at that time INTERPOL decided to establish a criminal analytical file dealing with FTFs from all countries of the world to facilitate the sharing of data among Member States. At that time it was an urgent question. The problem that INTERPOL faced was the lack of data-sharing by law enforcement and immigration agencies around the world. States were reluctant to share their FTF files for international police cooperation, and so forth. During our visit we recommended to the host State that it share its data with INTERPOL. And we learned a couple of months after that, that this had been done. Thousands of names were shared. And that State’s response was critical because it gave a strong signal to other States that they must share data to prevent suspected and wanted terrorists from travelling, crossing borders undetected, and moving to new potential conflict zones, as well as from returning, transiting into their country of origin or other countries. So, for me, this was an important response from the international community, via INTERPOL, to share critical data and make it available to detect the movements of such individuals. It is also important to say that this INTERPOL tool has been critical in countering the FTF phenomenon.

On that note, what challenges remain?

Mr. Morange: I would say that new technologies (for example, the responsible use of biometrics and passenger-data processing) are particularly challenging for certain Member States. But, ultimately, the technology itself may not be the main challenge. Of course, you can find a commercial solution that’s very easy to use. But how do you use it? On what legal basis? Who are the people and what are institutions dealing with it? Can you cooperate internationally within that framework? What are the safeguards? It all requires a comprehensive framework and approach that involves multiple perspectives (including the legal, administrative and institutional perspectives, and so forth). And you’ll see that some Member States focus solely on the technology. They’ll use significant resources to obtain that technology (and sometimes for nothing, because they cannot use it without a proper legal basis and without proper safeguards). They can’t use it because they lack the framework and the background. They may draft a new law or rely on an existing law but they won’t develop a specific regulation that streamlines all details and relevant elements, including on privacy and data protection, for example. That’s why we work with other agencies and key partners such as UNOCT on certain capacity-building activities to facilitate the delivery of technical assistance. The definition of the various elements of this comprehensive approach is central, and there remains a great deal to be done. But we are seeing progress. Ultimately, I think the development of this comprehensive approach is probably the main challenge: you need to ensure that you address all dimensions of the issues at hand and address all the challenges. And, yes, we’ve often seen that it’s not always the technology itself that’s the issue.

Mr. Morange: j’ai parfois le sentiment dans des discussions, dans des forums, du besoin de se justifier, du besoin peut-être aussi de mieux expliquer le travail difficile des forces de police, des douanes dans la prévention des actes de terrorisme et cela doit se faire de manière responsable avec le respect des droits individuels, des obligations internationales. Nous y travaillons mais c’est essentiel de se souvenir qu’ils constituent la première ligne de défense dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et que cette dimension ne doit jamais être sous-estimée, oubliée et que c’est un travail très difficile. Quand on discute avec des enquêteurs le soir d’une attaque terroriste, on se rend compte de la pression qu’ils ont à résoudre une enquête et il faut avoir une bonne compréhension de ce défi important, du besoin de coopération internationale et du besoin de soutien dans leur travail.

[Translation]
I sometimes have the feeling, in discussions, in forums, of the need to justify, of the need perhaps also to better explain the difficult work of police forces or customs in the prevention of acts of terrorism and this must be done in a responsible manner with respect for individual rights and international obligations. We are working on that, but it is essential to remember that they are the first line of defence in the fight against terrorism and that this dimension should never be underestimated, forgotten, and that it is very difficult work. When you talk to investigators on the evening of a terrorist attack, you realize the pressure they have to resolve the case and it is important to have a good understanding of this important challenge, of the need for international cooperation, and of the need to support their work.